UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ SHARON D. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 24-cv-1610-pp

SGT. PELISCHEK,

Defendant. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER SCREENING AMENDED COMPLAINT (DKT. NO. 18) AND DISMISSING CASE FOR FAILURE TO STATE CLAIM ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Sharon D. Williams, who is incarcerated at Taycheedah Correctional Institution and who is representing herself, filed this case alleging violations of her constitutional rights. The court screened the complaint and determined that it did not state a claim. Dkt. No. 17 at 6. The court gave the plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint; this order screens the amended complaint. Dkt. No. 18. I. Screening the Amended Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats,

(7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison,

(7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

(citing Twombly,

). To state a claim for relief under

, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp.,

(7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee,

(7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal,

(citing Perez v. Fenoglio,

(7th Cir. 2015)). B. Amended Complaint’s Allegations The plaintiff alleges that on May 30, 2024, the defendant, Sergeant

Pelischek, laughed at her when she “asked him to call PSU and was feeling suicidal and homicidal.” Dkt. No. 18 at 2. The plaintiff states that she doesn’t know why he did it, but that she believes it was because it was time for shift change and he really did not care about her mental health issues.

She asserts that she is a mental health patient, and that she has tried suicide several times.

The plaintiff states that she is suing under state law for $250,000. Id. at 4. For relief, she seeks damages and for the defendant to be fired. Id.

C. Analysis Failure to provide protection from suicide or self-harm constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation if deliberate indifference by prison officials to an incarcerated individual’s welfare effectively condones the harm by allowing it to happen. Eagen v. Dempsey,

, 693-94 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must allege that (1) “[she] presented an objectively serious medical need;” and (2) “a

defendant . . . responded . . . with deliberate indifference, thereby resulting in some injury.” Lord v. Beahm,

, 904 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Petties v. Carter,

(7th Cir. 2016)). A medical condition is objectively serious if it is “so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.” See Roe v. Elyea,

(7th Cir. 2011). “All agree that suicide is an objectively serious medical condition . . . [and] prison officials cannot intentionally disregard a known risk that an inmate is suicidal.” Lord, 952 F.3d at 904 (citing Lisle v. Welborn,

(7th Cir. 2019)). Regarding the second prong, a defendant responds with deliberate indifference when he or she “actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm.” Petties,

. “This requires ‘more than mere or gross negligence, but less than purposeful infliction of harm.’” Lisle,

-17 (quoting Matos v. O’Sullivan,

, 557 (7th Cir. 2003)). The plaintiff’s allegation that she asked the defendant to call PSU (presumably, the psychological services unit) because she was feeling suicidal

and homicidal arguably satisfies the objective element of an Eighth Amendment. But the plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference, nor has she alleged that she suffered any injury based on the defendant’s actions. The plaintiff does not say what she did after she asked the defendant to call PSU. She does not say that she was harming herself, or someone else, when she asked the defendant to call PSU. The plaintiff does not state that she harmed herself, or someone else, after the

defendant laughed at her. And although the plaintiff asserts that she was a mental health patient and that she had attempted suicide in the past, she does not allege that the defendant knew this. The plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim that the defendant violated her constitutional rights. II. Conclusion The court ORDERS that this case is DISMISSED under

(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1) because the amended complaint fails to state a claim. The court will enter judgment accordingly.

The court will document that the plaintiff has incurred a “strike” under

(g). This order and the judgment to follow are final. A dissatisfied party may appeal this court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by filing in this court a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of judgment. See Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3, 4. This court may extend this deadline if a party timely requests an extension and shows good cause or excusable neglect for not being able to meet the 30-day deadline. See Fed. Rule

of App. P. 4(a)(5)(A).). If the plaintiff appeals, he will be liable for the $605 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal. If the plaintiff seeks to proceed on appeal without prepaying the appellate filing fee, he must file a motion in this court. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1). The plaintiff may be assessed another “strike” by the Court of Appeals if it concludes that his appeal has no merit. If the plaintiff accumulates three strikes, he will not be able to file a case in federal court (except a petition for habeas corpus relief) without prepaying

the full filing fee unless he demonstrates that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Under certain circumstances, a party may ask this court to alter or amend its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or ask for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Any motion under Rule 59(e) must be filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment. The court cannot extend this deadline. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). Any motion under Rule 60(b) must be filed within a reasonable time, generally no more than one year after the entry of the judgment. The court cannot extend this deadline. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). The court expects parties to closely review all applicable rules and determine, what, if any, further action is appropriate in a case. Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 23rd day of July, 2025. BY THE COURT:

Chief United States District Judge