Dajon D. Daniel v. Clayton Housler

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN DAJON D. DANIEL Plaintiff, Case No. 25-CV-1978-JPS v.

CLAYTON HOUSLER ORDER Defendant.

Plaintiff Dajon D. Daniel, an inmate confined at Waupun Correctional Institution, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendant violated his constitutional rights. ECF No. 1. This Order resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, ECF No. 10, and screens his complaint.

1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. Id. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On December 23, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $23.19. ECF No. 5. Plaintiff paid that fee on January 22, 2026. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. ECF No. 10. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order.

2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)).

2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations On July 29, 2025, Plaintiff was attempting to intervene in an altercation between his friend and another inmate. ECF No. 1 at 3. The argument turned into a “two against two brawl.” Id. The altercation went on for several minutes without any staff member coming to break it up. Id. The guards continued to yell at the inmates to stop fighting. Id. Plaintiff stopped fighting his opponent to go help his friend who was getting punched in the face by another inmate. Id. Plaintiff hit the inmate on top of his friend with a closed fist. Id. at 4. The inmate pushed Plaintiff and Plaintiff fell to the ground. Id. The other inmate then put Plaintiff into a rear chokehold position. Id. At this point, Officer Cora L. McLeRoy (not a defendant) and Defendant Housler (“Housler”) started spraying chemical OC spray at the inmates while yelling at them to stop fighting. Id. The inmates did not stop fighting. Id. The other inmate used Plaintiff as a human shield to block the OC spray while continuing to choke Plaintiff. Id. Housler used excessive force and kicked Plaintiff in the head with his steel-toed boots. Id. at 5.

Housler’s action caused the other inmates to become animated, and it almost caused a riot. Id. Housler admitted that he was trying to kick the other inmate’s arm in order to loosen the grip on Plaintiff’s neck. Id. Plaintiff believes this to be an unreasonable risk for more harm than good because it caused Plaintiff excruciating pain. Id. Another inmate angrily asked Housler why he kicked Plaintiff in the head. Id. Housler responded, “What else was I suppose[sic] to do, he’s trying to kill him.” Housler went against his training because kicking an inmate in the head is a prohibited form of force. Id. at 6. Plaintiff maintains that Housler should have instead used a pressure point to gain control of the other inmate. Id. After kicking the inmates, Housler just stood there as the “angry mob of inmates” admonished him for his actions. Id. A supervisor arrived moments later, and the other inmate finally released Plaintiff from the chokehold. Id. Plaintiff previously had been treated for extreme migraines and this incident made matters worse. Id. at 7. Plaintiff was traumatized by this event. Id. 2.3 Analysis First, the Court will not allow Plaintiff to proceed on an excessive force claim. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” on prisoners. Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2001). When a correctional officer is accused of using excessive force, the core inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 757 (7th Cir. 2010). Several factors are relevant to this determination, including the need for force, the amount of force applied, the threat the officer reasonably perceived, the effort made to temper the severity of the force used, and the extent of the injury caused to the prisoner. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 504 (7th Cir. 2004). “When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated. This is true whether or not significant injury is evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Housler accidently kicked him in the head in an attempt to stop another inmate from choking him. Plaintiff’s allegations show that Housler’s use of force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. No allegations show that Housler acted maliciously or sadistically to cause Plaintiff harm. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim.

Second, the Court finds that Plaintiff may not proceed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to take “reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Balsewicz v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). “This means that a constitutional violation inheres in a prison official's ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828). Deliberate indifference has an objective component and a subjective component. Id. To satisfy the objective component, the prisoner must have been exposed to a harm that was objectively serious. Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Under the subjective component, the prison official must have known of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate's health or safety. Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–38). That is, the official must have been “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” and he must have “draw[n] th[at] inference.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). But liability does not attach if the prison official takes reasonable measures to abate the known risk. Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844).

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. Plaintiff generally alleges Housler did not appropriately respond to the fight between the inmates. Plaintiff describes the incident himself as a “brawl” between four inmates. However, the allegations show that Housler took several progressive steps to try to stop the fight. First, Housler verbally ordered the inmates to stop, and he escalated to using OC spray. When the OC spray did not work, he resorted to try to physically remove the inmate from Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s allegations show that Housler took reasonable steps to break up the fight. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff may not proceed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.

The Court will provide Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint. Plaintiff must amend his complaint on or before June 3, 2026.

When writing his amended complaint, Plaintiff should provide the Court with enough facts to answer the following questions: (1) Who violated his constitutional rights?; (2) What did each person do to violate his rights?; (3) Where did each person violate his rights?; and (4) When did each person violate his rights? Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not need to be long or contain legal language or citations to statutes or cases, but it does need to provide the Court and each Defendant with notice of what each Defendant allegedly did or did not do to violate his rights.

The Court is enclosing a copy of its amended complaint form and instructions. Plaintiff must list all of the defendants in the caption of his amended complaint. He should use the spaces on pages two and three to allege the key facts that give rise to the claims he wishes to bring, and to describe which defendants he believes committed the violations that relate to each claim. If the space is not enough, Plaintiff may use up to five additional sheets of paper.

Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.”

The amended complaint supersedes the prior complaint and must be complete in itself without reference to the original complaint. See Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1056 (7th Cir. 1998). In Duda, the appellate court emphasized that in such instances, the “prior pleading is in effect withdrawn as to all matters not restated in the amended pleading.” Id. at 1057 (citation omitted). If the amended complaint is received, it will become the operative complaint in this action, and the Court will screen it in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

3. CONCLUSION Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, ECF No. 10, be and the same is hereby GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint fails to state a claim; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint that complies with the instructions in this Order on or before June 3, 2026. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint by the deadline, the Court will screen the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint by the deadline, the Court will dismiss this case based on his failure to state a claim in his original complaint and will issue him a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk’s Office mail Plaintiff a blank prisoner amended complaint form and a copy of the guides entitled “Answers to Prisoner Litigants’ Common Questions” and “Answers to Pro Se Litigants’ Common Questions,” along with this Order; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the agency having custody of Plaintiff shall collect from his institution trust account the $326.81 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from Plaintiff’s prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to Plaintiff's trust account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this case. If Plaintiff is transferred to another county, state, or federal institution, the transferring institution shall forward a copy of this Order along with his remaining balance to the receiving institution; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Order be sent to the officer in charge of the agency where Plaintiff is confined.

Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 12th day of May, 2026.

BY THE COURT: = np N/ J.\P. StadTraueller U.S. District Judge Plaintiffs who are inmates at Prisoner E-Filing Program institutions shall submit all correspondence and case filings to institution staff, who will scan and e-mail documents to the Court. Prisoner E-Filing is mandatory for all inmates at Columbia Correctional Institution, Dodge Correctional Institution, Green Bay Correctional Institution, Oshkosh Correctional Institution, Waupun Correctional Institution, and Wisconsin Secure Program Facility.

Plaintiffs who are inmates at all other prison facilities, or who have been released from custody, will be required to submit all correspondence and legal material to: Page 8 of 9 Office of the Clerk United States District Court Eastern District of Wisconsin United States Courthouse E. Wisconsin Avenue Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202 DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE COURT’S CHAMBERS. If mail is received directly to the Court’s chambers, IT WILL BE RETURNED TO SENDER AND WILL NOT BE FILED IN THE CASE.

Plaintiff is further advised that failure to timely file any brief, motion, response, or reply may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. In addition, the parties must notify the Clerk of Court of any change of address. IF PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PROVIDE AN UPDATED ADDRESS TO THE COURT AND MAIL IS RETURNED TO THE COURT AS UNDELIVERABLE, THE COURT WILL DISMISS THIS ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE.