Prentiss v. Ledyard
Cases that cite this one
24 later published cases cite this decision.
- MacKenzie v. Miller Brewing Co. (Wis. 2001)
- Milwaukee Corrugating Co. v. Krueger (Wis. 1924)
- Runzheimer International, Ltd. v. David Friedlen (Wis. 2015)
- Bammert v. Don's SuperValu, Inc. (Wis. 2002)
- Batteries Plus, LLC v. Mohr (Wis. 2001)
- Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc. (Wis. 1998)
- Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet (Wis. 1983)
- Resener v. Watts, Ritter & Co. (W. Va. 1913)
- DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation (Wis. 2012)
- Hausman v. St. Croix Care Center (Wis. 1997)
- Koskey v. Harnischfeger Corp. (Wis. 1936)
- Brooks v. National Equipment Corp. (Wis. 1932)
- Boatright v. Steinite Radio Corp. (10th Cir. 1931)
- Loew v. Hayes Manufacturing Co. (Mich. 1922)
- Crawford v. Stewart (Haw. 1919)
- Kosloski v. Kelly (Wis. 1904)
- Raipe v. Gorrell (Wis. 1900)
- Greer v. Arlington Mills Manufacturing Co. (Superior Court of Delaware 1899)
- McKinney v. Statesman Publishing Co. (Or. 1899)
- Carthage Wheel Co. v. Kelly (Ohio Superior Court, Cincinnati 1898)
- Booth v. National India Rubber Co. (R.I. 1897)
- Kellogg v. Citizens Insurance Co. (Wis. 1896)
- Martin v. New York Life Insurance (N.Y. 1895)
- Bast v. Byrne (Wis. 1881)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
As we understand the evidence in this case, the plaintiff was to be paid for his services either at the rate of $900 or $700 a year, but no definite time of service was agreed upon. The plaintiff stated in the complaint, and so testified on the trial, that the agreement was that he was to be paid at the rate of $900 a year. The defendant, in his testimony, states the contract as follows: “ After he [the plaintiff] had been in my employment some days or weeks, we had a conversation. I told him if he would serve me faithfully and would be strictly temperate, I would give him $700 per year; and after six months, if he did not drink, and served me faithfully, I would give him $900 per year.” But, as we understand this testimony of the defendant, there was no hiring for a definite period, as for a year,,for which he agreed to pay $700. But the agreement was merely, that if the plaintiff continued in the employment of the defendant, serving him faithfully, and keeping strictly temperate, he should receive for the first six months at the rate of $700 per year; and after six months he was to receive at the rate of $900 per year, providing he did not drink, and was faithful in his service. The only disagreement between the parties, is whether, while the employment continued, the plaintiff was to receive pay at the rate of $900 or $700 per year for his services. Either party, however, was at liberty to terminate the service at any time, no definite period for which the service was to continue having been agreed upon. This view renders a consideration of .the points made by the counsel for the defendant unnecessary. It is assumed as the foundation of these points, that the plaintiff agreed to work for the defendant for a definite period, or for an entire year, and that consequently it was essential that the plaintiff show a performance of the contract on his part, as a condition precedent to his bringing the action. But we think the evidence fails to show that this was the contract.
It certainly appeared that the plaintiff was not steady and faithful in his employment, and that he occasionally left his
We therefore see no error in the case which would authorize a reversal of the judgment.
By the Court. — The judgment of the county court is affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.