Sedlack v. State

Wisconsin Supreme Court
Sedlack v. State, 141 Wis. 589 (Wis. 1910)
124 N.W. 510; 1910 Wisc. LEXIS 49
Maeshall

Sedlack v. State

Opinion of the Court

Maeshall, I.

The question of whether the plea in abatement was properly overruled must be answered in the affirmative for the same reasons as those given in respect to a similar question in Wieden v. State, ante, p. 585, 124 N. W. 509.

*591Tlie claim made that the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict cannot be allowed. It is quite evident from the brief statement of the case, that there was room in the evidence for the jury to reasonably come to the conclusion which they did. That being the case, it matters not that there was •also room for a different conclusion, or if it would seem, looking at the printed record, that the evidence rather preponderates in favor of the accused. The accused having had the benefit of an impartial trial before a jury and the benefit of the deliberate opinion of the circuit judge who presided at his trial as to whether the evidence warranted the jury’s conclusion, he is remediless on the question of fact if there is any ■credible evidence to sustain the verdict, even though there is much to discredit it.

The complaint, that the accused was prejudiced by what occurred between some members of the jury and the clerk of the circuit court shortly before the verdict was reached, is without merit. We see nothing in the occurrence but an innocent harmless impropriety. It were better if juries and court officers and all concerned would act in such situations with becoming dignity. It were better, perhaps^ if there was less of the modem ease of approach and tendency to take ad; vantage of it, between jurors and outsiders, while the former ■are acting under their solemn oaths in cases. It were better, perhaps, if jurors during such periods were better protected by restraint, from within and without as well. The writer thinks so. But that must be left very much to the judgment of trial judges. To them is committed the duty of maintaining the standard best calculated to secure just results. Upon them rests responsibility in this field, to a considerable extent where prejudicial error cannot be shown affirmatively, nor be presumed, nor appear by necessary inference, yet may possibly exist. In all such cases there is no remedy. Sec. 2829, •Stats. (1898), closes the door if otherwise there would be any. *592We are constrained to hold there is none in the circumstances-of this case, independently of the statute. This case is entirely unlike Havenor v. State, 125 Wis. 444, 104 N. W. 116 Hurst v. Webster Mfg. Co. 128 Wis. 342, 107 N. W. 666; Du Cate v. Brighton, 133 Wis. 628, 114 N. W. 103; Dralle v. Reedsburg, 135 Wis. 293, 115 N. W. 819, and similar cases-where the communication with the jury was by the trial judge. The doctrine of those cases-,cannot be extended. The tendency, perhaps, should rather be the other way in view of the re-enactment in a significantly emphatic way of the principles of see. 2829, Stats. 1898 [see Laws of 1909, ch. 192: sec.. 3072m, Stats.]

By the Court. — 'The judgment is affirmed.

Reference

Full Case Name
Sedlack, in error v. The State, in error
Cited By
5 cases
Status
Published
Syllabus
Criminal law: Appeal and error: 'Verdict, when conclusive: Jury: Misconduct: Harmless impropriety. 1. A verdict reasonably supported by credible evidence and approved by the trial judge will not be disturbed on writ of error merely because there is much in the evidence to discredit it. 2. A remark by the clerk of the court, -to one or more of the jurors. as they passed through the court room in charge of an officer after having been out all night, that their beds were all made up for the night, and the reply of one of them that he thought they would be out before night, constituted merely a harmless impropriety.