(dissenting). The trial court’s construction-of sec. 51.44, Stats. 1915, and the construction put upon it by tbe Wisconsin tax commission differ very materially, and tbe operative effect of tbe statute under these two constructions produces widely different results in the amounts *371apportioned to the taxing districts into which the property and business of the utility extend. This difference in the 'result is shown in the assessment of the plaintiff’s utility for the year here in question in the city of Hudson. Under the tax commission’s construction of the law, $43,132 of the assessed valuation of plaintiff’s plant was apportioned to the city of Hudson, and under the circuit court’s construction of the law only $26,722.50 of such valuation is apportioned to the city of Hudson, resulting in a difference in plaintiff’s tax in the city of Hudson for the year 1913 of $533.30. ■ The tax commission has construed the law as it did in this instance since its enactment and applied it as so construed for four years. Consequently if this assessment is erroneous then three other assessments are erroneous. The commission’s' brief informs us that their method of apportionment has been carried out for four years in all assessments throughout the state, amounting to at least 2,000 district assessments. It seems to me this practical construction of the law must be followed by the courts, if it is permissible, and thus avoid the perplexing and disastrous consequences of overturning the 2,000 or more tax levies and the tax payments in the different taxing districts involved throughout the state. If a statute in its administration has received a permissible and reasonable interpretation, then the courts adopt and follow that interpretation though it may not be in harmony with the meaning which the court finds the legislature had in mind. I am of the opinion that there is no good ground for holding that the tax commission gave this statute an interpretation out of harmony with or contrary to the natural and ordinary meaning of its terms. Sec. 51.43, Stats. 1915, declares that the property of water, light, heat, and power plants conducted as public utilities shall be deemed personal property for the purposes of taxation and shall be assessed as a single item. Sec. 51.44 provides for the assessment of such property, when located in two or more assessment districts, by the assessors of *372tbe districts at a joint meeting, and that tbe assessors shall “extend on tbe assessment rolls of their respective districts-tbe proportion of tbe assessed valuation thereof properly belonging to each. Such proportion shall be determined by tbe ratio which the property located and the business transacted in each district bears to the total property and business of such person, company or corporation.” The words of the statute, to my mind, signify that the proportion shall be the ratio which the property located in each district and the business transacted in each district bears to the total property and the total business. What is this ratio? The business referred to obviously means the gross earnings, and so the commission and the circuit court interpreted the word. How then is “the proportion of the assessed valuation thereof properly belonging to each” district to be calculated ? If the apportionment be made upon the ratio which the total of the property and the gross earnings of each district bear to the total of the property and the gross earnings of the entire plant, then the districts where there are no earnings whatever and the districts where the earnings are produced are given an equal proportionate share of the assessed value thereof. The object of providing a change in the method of assessment, as stated by the commission to the legislature, was to provide a method of apportionment of the assessed value of the entire plant whereby the assessment district which produced the earnings should receive such a distributive share of the whole tax as the assessed property and the assessed gross receipts of each district jointly produced. This statute was intended to increase the tax receipts from these plants in the assessment districts which produced the earnings of the business, and this for the reason the commission urged upon the legislature, that the revenue-producing districts established the actual value of the property of the entire physical plant and hence the benefit of the tax due to earnings ought in equity to be received by the districts that paid them. The tax com*373mission administered tbe law so as to accomplish tbis result so far as practicable, and tbe administration of tbe law as bere interpreted frustrates tbis purpose and object of tbe legislature, in that it transfers tbe benefit of tbe .tax receipts from tbe district where tbe business is done to tbe district where there is no business. It seems logical, reasonable, and just in tbe light of tbe history of tbe legislation on tbe subject that tbe factor of gross earnings should be treated as of equal importance with tbe factor of tbe physical property in determining a just distribution of the taxes realized from tbe enterprises, and that tbe tax commission’s method of apportioning tbe tax was calculated on a ratio 'which complied with tbe terms of tbe statute and which accomplished the result intended by tbe legislature. But it is urged that tbe commission’s interpretation of tbe statute does violence to tbe language used and is therefore not a permissible interpretation of the statute. Tbe phrasing of tbe statute is, “Such proportion shall be determined by tbe ratio which tbe property located and tbe business transacted in each district bears to tbe total property and business of such person, company or corporation.v Tbe claim is that tbe terms in their grammatical construction and their ordinary significance express but tbe idea, namely, that tbe proportion must be tbe ratio which tbe property and the business in each district, when added together, bear to tbe total sum of tbe property and business of the whole plant. These terms of tbe statute, I think, do not in their ordinary use and meaning convey only such a restricted and narrow' meaning and should not be limited in their meaning to tbis precise mathematical formula adopted by tbe court. They logically and reasonably permit of tbe interpretation that tbe proportion shall be determined by tbe ratio which tbe property and tbe gross earnings in each district, taken separately, respectively bear to tbe property and gross earnings of tbe whole plant, and that tbe result thus obtained fixes tbe percentage for apportioning tbe total tax ac*374cording to the taxable valuation of property and business in each district. This gives equal significance to the physical property and the gross earnings in determining the assessed value of the plant in the several districts into which it extends. Since this is, in my opinion, a proper and reasonable interpretation of the language of the statute, it seems to me that the court, in the light of the history of this legislation .showing the intent of the legislature in enacting the law and the practical construction given it by the tax commission in harmony therewith, should follow the practical administration given it by the tax commission, which would prevent the ■disastrous results of invalidating the assessments in a large number of taxing districts in the state. I consider that the plaintiff’s taxes were apportioned by the commission according to law and that plaintiff’s complaint in this action should be dismissed.

1. It is contended by-appellant that the action cannot be maintained because it does not appear that the plaintiff paid more taxes than it was equitably bound to pay. Even if it be conceded that it is established that the plaintiff paid more taxes in the defendant district than the just portion of the whole tax due to defendant, it does not appear that it paid more than it otherwise would have paid. If the rate of taxation were the same in the defendant city as in the other three districts, the plaintiff cannot complain, because the improper distribution of the whole valuation between the different districts could not prejudice the plaintiff or increase the whole amount of its tax. If the valuation in defendant city were $16,409 too high, the aggregate valuation in the other three districts would be that amount lower, since it is stipulated that the aggregate amount of property in all the districts is $75,000.

The rate in each district is alleged in the complaint. Rut these allegations are denied by the answer. The rate in defendant city is established in' the case, but the rate in the other districts is not. So we are unable to say from the record before us what the rate in the other districts is. If it is the same as in defendant city the plaintiff has made no case. True, it is alleged in the complaint that the rate in the other districts is about one third of the rate in defendant city, but there is no proof of this fact.

The statute, sec. 1164, under which this action is brought provides that no claim shall be allowed and no action main*367tained unless it shall appear that tbe plaintiff has paid more than its equitable share of the taxes. It does not appear from the record in the instant case that the plaintiff has paid more than its equitable share of the taxes.

2. It is further contended by appellant that the other assessment districts should have been made parties to the action. Counsel for respondent answers this contention by saying that the demurrer was not directed to defect of parties and therefore did not reach the question, and that the objection was raised in no other manner.

But the objection that there was defect of parties was raised by the answer and that was sufficient under sec. 2654, Stats. We think the other districts, namely, village of North Hudson, town of Hudson, and town of St. Joseph, were proper parties to the action. The bringing in of all parties interested in a controversy in order to avoid circuity of action under the statutes of this state and decisions of this court is favored. Secs. 2610, 2656a, Stats.; Washburn v. Lee, 128 Wis. 312, 320, 107 N. W. 649; Hurley v. Walter, 129 Wis. 508, 511, 109 N. W. 558. The court has a-broad discretionary power to bring in parties. Schmuhl v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. 156 Wis. 585, 146 N. W. 787; Kresge v. Maryland C. Co. 154 Wis. 627, 143 N. W. 668; Hemenway v. Beecher, 139 Wis. 399, 402, 121 N. W. 150; Swanby v. Northern State Bank, 150 Wis. 572, 137 N. W. 763. We think all the districts should be made parties in the present action and thus dispose of the whole controversy. It follows from what has been said that the judgment must be reversed.

3. The important question in the case, however, is the apportionment between the four districts, and this question should be decided so that upon a new trial all questions may be settled and further litigation avoided.

It appears from the undisputed facts and the court below found:.

“That on the 20th day of June, 1913, the four assessors of *368said four assessment districts duly met at tbe office of tbe city clerk in said city of Hudson for tbe purpose of assessing said electric light and power plant of said plaintiff for purposes of taxation and found and placed tbe total assessed valuation of said property at $15,000 and valued and assessed tbe same at that amount.

“That in apportioning said property among tbe four said assessment districts they valued tbe property located in tbe city of Hudson at $14,580, that amoixnt being 19.44 per cent, of tbe total assessed valuation of $75,000. They found that tbe total business transacted by tbe company for tbe year 1912 was $20,262, and that is the correct amount of tbe business transacted by tbe company in all four districts; and it was found by said assessors and tbe court here finds that $19,363 of said business was transacted in tbe city of Hudson, and that said amount of business so transacted in tbe city of Hudson was 95.56 per cent, of tbe total business transacted by said company. That said assessors added tbe percentage of property in tbe city of Hudson to tbe percentage of business transacted in tbe city of Hudsonj that is, they added said 19.44 per cent, to said 95.56 per cent., which gave a total of 115 per cent, of both property and business in tbe city of Hudson. ■ They divided that, amount, to wit, 115 per cent., by two, which gave 57.5 per cent., and apportioned to tbe city of Hudson 57.5 per cent, of tbe assessed valuation of $75,000, making an assessed valuation apportioned by them to tbe city of Hudson of $43,132, and the assessors of said city of Hudson placed upon tbe assessment roll of said city of Hudson against said plaintiff on account of its said electric light and power plant an assessed valuation of $43,132, which assessment was arrived at by the method above stated.

“That on said assessed valuation there was placed upon tbe tax roll of tbe city of Hudson for said year 1913, against said plaintiff company, a tax amounting to $1,401.79, and on tbe 15th day of January, 1914, said assessed valuation and said tax based thereon appeared upon tbe tax roll in tbe hands of tbe city treasurer of said city (is a personal property tax against said plaintiff company because of its said electric light and power plant.”

It is clear that tbe method of apportionment adopted by *369the assessors was not in compliance with the statute. Sec. 103Yc, Stats. 1911, is as follows:

“If the property or business of any such person, company or corporation extends into two or more districts the assessors of all the assessment districts in which any part of such property is located shall meet and assess all the property of such person, company or corporation, and extend on the assessment rolls of their respective districts the proportion of the assessed valuation thereof properly belonging to each. Such proportion shall be determined by the ratio which the property located and the business transacted in each district bears to the total property and business of such person, company or corporation. The amount so assessed shall be subject to the same tax rate as other property in said district.”

The assessors found that the total property of the plaintiff located in the city of Hudson was $14,580, that the total business transacted by the company in the city of Hudson was $19,363, aggregating $33,943 total property located and business done in the city of Hudson. The assessors also found that the total assessed valuation of the plaintiff’s property in the four districts was $15,000 and the total business done $20,262, making a total of property and business in the four districts of $95,262. Under the method of apportionment by the plain provisions of the statute the ratio should be obtained as follows: $33,943 the numerator and $95,262 the denominator of the fractional part of the total assessed valuation, $Y5,000, which should be apportioned to the city of Hudson. This fraction reduced to a decimal gives 35.63 per cent, of the total assessed valuation which should be apportioned to the city of Hudson. Thirty-five and sixty-three hundredths per cent, of $Y5,000 gives the amount which should be assessed to the city of Hudson as $26,122.50. The assessors placed the amount at $43,132, an excess of about $16,409. It was stipulated and found that the rate of taxation in the city of Hudson for the year 1913 was thirty-two and one-half mills on the dollar. Thirty-two and one-half mills of the ex*370cess of assessment in tbe city of Hudson would amount to about $533. Obviously tbe plaintiff did not consider tbat it was entitled to tbis amount because judgmenj; was taken for only $330.26.

All tbe facts were admitted except tbe rate of taxation in tbe three districts not parties to tbe action. Tbe material question here, therefore, is tbe proper method of apportionment, and tbe court is of opinion tbat tbe method adopted by the court below was tbe correct method and in accordance with tbe statute. Tbe method adopted by tbe assessors does not determine tbe ratio which tbe property located and tbe business transacted in tbe city of Hudson bears to tbe whole property and business done. Tbe language of tbe statute, “by tbe ratio which tbe property located and tbe business transacted in each district bears to tbe total property and business,” is plain and unambiguous, and tbe court cannot disregard it.

It follows from what has been said tbat on the main proposition, namely, tbe apportionment, tbe judgment of tbe court below was correct, but because of other errors committed tbe judgment must be reversed and tbe other districts brought in by proper amendment and made parties to tbe action, to tbe end tbat their rights may be determined and such judgment rendered as shall settle all tbe rights of tbe four districts involved in tbe matter.

By the Court. — Tbe judgment of tbe court below is reversed, and tbe cause remanded for further proceedings according to law and in accordance with tbis opinion. Tbe appellant to recover costs in tbis court.