The case presents the same issues of law that were considered in Weber v. State, 190 Wis. 257, 208 *376N. W. 923. Both the Weber Case and the case at bar arose out of business transacted by the same security company. While the defendants in each of these cases were officers of the same company in name, each served the company in fact as a mere employee who carried out the instructions of a superior officer in most of the services performed by him. The stock of the company held by each defendant consisted merely of qualifying shares. Each received a monthly salary of $150. Each was acting for the company when he received the money that was converted. In each case the receipt for the money was given in the name of the security company and the money was placed to the credit of the company and was used by the company. Neither defendant profited personally by the conversion of the money by the company. There is nothing in the facts of either case to bring it within the rule of Milbrath v. State, 138 Wis. 354, 363, 120 N. W. 252, where the defendant Milbrath owned the controlling interest in the corporation which he used as “a mere instrumentality created by him under sanction of law” for the purpose of carrying out his fraudulent designs.

Rarely are two cases presented to the court which are so nearly parallel with reference to all questions of fact or of law as are these two cases. This case comes squarely within the rule of the Weber Case and is controlled by it.

By the Court. — The judgment and sentence is reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to discharge the defendant.

(dissenting). I dissented in the case of Weber v. State, 190 Wis. 257, 208 N. W. 923, which is held to rule this case. I did not then state the grounds of my dissent. They were then and are now that the statute, sec. 343.20, in express terms declares it an offense to embezzle money for the benefit of a third party. So far as applied to the facts in the Kralovetz Case I construe the *377statute to read: Any officer or employee of a corporation who, by virtue of such office or employment, shall be intrusted with the disbursement of any money, shall embezzle or fraudulently convert to his own use or to the use of any other person except the owner thereof any such money, shall be punished, etc. The jury found that Weber, and in this case Kralovetz, with criminal intent to defraud, checked out or assisted in checking out to the use of the Sheboygan Mortgage & Security Company the funds deposited with it for a special purpose other than that for which it was checked out.

Neither opinion is based upon the ground that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict, but upon the grounds that each defendant, though an officer, was in fact but an employee; that he had but a slight interest in the company and did not profit by the fraudulent transaction, all of which grounds seem to me to be beyond the inquiry as to guilt. When one knowingly and with a criminal intent-commits or aids in the commission of an offense, it is immaterial what his profits therefrom were, or what was the grade of his employment or his interest in his employer’s business. Nor will the fact that if he had not joined in the commission of the offense he would have been discharged from his office or employment affect his guilt. Business reasons cannot justify crimes.

(dissenting). I concurred in the opinion of the court in Weber v. State, 190 Wis. 257, 208 N. W. 923, and accept full responsibility for such concurrence. It is there .said (p. 266) :

“Aside from what has been heretofore said, even assuming that the act charged and complained of could in law constitute an embezzlement, nevertheless the agreement above set forth and -the testimony of Prescott are so involved in entanglements and uncertainties as to create in our minds more than a robust, reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant.”

*378It is my view of the law that where a subordinate yields obedience to a superior officer and merely, performs in the course of his duty an act which he is directed to perform, he cannot be possessed of that fraudulent intent which is a necessary element of the crime of embezzlement. Weber, was in that situation. But if it is to be held, as it seems to me it is held in the present case, that an employee of a corporation who, by virtue of such employment, is intrusted with the disbursement of money, fraudulently converts it to the use of the corporation of which he is an employee, is not guilty of embezzlement, I cannot concur in that view.

If such is the holding in the Weber Case, it is my present conviction that it is erroneous and that the proper construction of the statute is that placed upon it by the Chief Justice in his dissenting opinion herewith.

I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Cuownhart concurs in this dissent.