Three issues are presented on this appeal. They are as follows:

1. Did the county court lack jurisdiction to approve the Bracht sale because:

(1) The guardian never applied for permission to sell the property prior to submitting the agreement to the court for approval;

(2) The petition did not set forth the statutory grounds for sale;

(3) The court never gave notice of the proposed sale to the appellants prior to approving the sale; and

(4) The court did not adjudicate claims against the guardianship estate prior to approving the sale?

2. Could the county court properly refuse the higher alleged offer of Robert Liberty for the Terrace Garden property because it was not made in a timely fashion ?

3. Should the sale to Bracht be voided because the terms of the agreement overvalue the Breaults’ homestead interest?

Objections as to Jurisdiction.

We will first consider the four objections as to the court’s jurisdiction to enter its orders approving the sale to Bracht.

(1) The appellants seek to void the sale to Bracht on the ground that the court failed to comply with jurisdictional *120procedural requirements outlined in sec. 319.19 (5) (b), Stats.,1 and secs. 296.06, 296.07, 296.10, and 296.11.2 The *121appellants argue that a proper reading of secs. 296.10 and 296.11 requires the guardian to obtain permission to negotiate a sale of real estate, in addition to court approval of a completed agreement. They contend that because the guardian appeared before the court initially with a fully negotiated agreement, seeking approval of its terms, the entire proceeding is void. But under secs. 296.10 and 296.11 the focus is upon approval of a final agreement. To require the guardian to seek permission to commence negotiations would be a superfluous jurisdictional step wholly unrelated to the guardian’s duty of intelligent management of the ward’s estate. The reasonableness of the fully negotiated agreement is the primary concern of the county court.

(2) Appellants further contend that the court’s order approving the Bracht sale is void because the guardian’s petition of March 29, 1963, did not expressly refer to the statu*122tory grounds for sale set forth in sec. 296.06, Stats.3 However, the court had been previously informed during the course of the incompetency proceeding, of the economic position of the guardian, and the need to sell the property as a means of maintaining the ward and satisfying his debts. Because the petition incorporated the terms of the Bracht-Breault agreement, the court possessed all the necessary data to determine whether the proposed sale was in the best interests of the ward. The purpose of secs. 296.06 and 296.07 was fulfilled.

(3) Appellants also object on the ground that they did not receive any notice of the proposed sale to Bracht, approved by the court on March 29, 1963, in an ex parte proceeding.

Secs. 296.07, 296.10, 296.11, and sec. 319.19(5) (b), Stats., do not make notice to interested parties a jurisdictional requirement of a valid sale of the ward’s real estate. Ch. 468, Laws of 1957, was a basic revision of the substantive rules and procedures relating to guardianships. Under sec. 319.19 (5) (b) as approved in this law, notice to interested parties of the pending sale is a matter within the discretion of the county court.4

In the case at bar, the court did not abuse its discretion by not giving the appellants notice of the pending sale. The *123appellants had never indicated that they were interested in purchasing the property themselves, either during the incompetency proceeding, or anytime prior to March of 1963. They only expressed desire that the property be sold to satisfy the claims of creditors. The county court could reasonably believe that the Bracht offer afforded reasonable protection to creditors and therefore no notice to this class of persons was necessary. Moreover, the appellants were given full opportunity to challenge the validity of the original sale on both procedural and substantive grounds and offer their own alternative proposal at the hearing on reconsideration of the Bracht proposal, held on April 16 and April 30, 1963. Notice of this proceeding was given to all creditors.

(4) Appellants finally object to the court’s jurisdiction because claims filed against the ward’s estate prior to the sale had not been adjudicated prior to the approval of the sale.

The appellants cite sec. 319.22, Stats.,5 which provides that the provisions and procedures applicable to the adjudication of claims against a decedent’s estate are applicable *124to the adjudication of claims against a ward’s estate. They also rely on sec. 316.07 6 (pertaining to claims against a decedent’s estate) which provides that a hearing on the sale of a decedent’s real estate must be postponed if the heirs or devisees challenge the validity of any claims.

In the instant case the guardian had not actually challenged any claims prior to the proposed sale and therefore the county court could properly assume that all claims filed prior to March 29, 1963, would be allowed and the court could properly evaluate whether the Bracht offer was reasonable in the light of the value of the property and the financial status of the ward’s estate.

Since no claims had been challenged up to March 29, 1963, there was no need to postpone the hearing. The essential purpose of the two quoted statutory provisions is to make sure that the county court has a clear notion of how the proceeds are to be allocated between the guardianship and the creditors before he can determine whether a proposed sale agreement is reasonable and fair to all interested parties. The trial court here had all of this information.

In any event, the statutes require a formal adjudication of claims prior to the approval of a proposed sale of real estate only when the claims have actually been contested and there was no such contest pending here.

Timeliness of, the Liberty Offer.

What of the alleged offer by Robert Liberty for the same property at the gross price of $78,000, as compared with the Bracht proposal of approximately $61,000? There is no *125question but that no one, not even Robert Liberty, had submitted any offer of purchase to the guardian prior to the presentation and approval of the Bracht sale. The Liberty offer, if it was such, was untimely. Although a guardian has a duty to seek and to support the offer which provides the most funds for the guardianship estate, assuming practical equivalence to any other offer as to the schedule and mode of payments and financial responsibility of the purchaser,7 the guardian here had already submitted the only offer she had received and one which both she and the court considered fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the ward’s estate and all interested parties.

Appellants argue that the Anderson Case, supra, required the county court in the instant case to consider and to order acceptance of the Liberty proposal even though it had already ordered approval of the Bracht proposal. In the Anderson Case, a guardian had received an offer to sell some of the ward’s real estate to a school district for $100. The county court gave the guardian permission to enter into a final agreement. Negotiations between the guardian and the school district broke down and the district resorted to condemnation proceedings to obtain the land. One year subsequent to the permission to enter into negotiations, but prior to an order approving a final agreement, another party made an offer of $300. Under these circumstances, the guardian was obliged to accept the higher offer. No such obligation exists when the county court has already approved an agreement of sale which it deems to be fair and reasonable. To hold otherwise would make it difficult for the guardian to perform his duty of intelligent management of the ward’s estate. Prospective purchasers of real estate would be hesitant to deal with the guardian if they knew that even after the court had approved a valid, binding contract with *126the guardian, such agreement could be set aside if another made a higher offer.8

Appellants’ final contention is that the sale to Bracht should be voided because the terms of the agreement overvalue the Breaults’ homestead interest.

The Bracht agreement allocates $10,000 to the Breaults in recognition of their homestead rights, and also provides for the payment of $150 per month for five years in settlement of “homestead and dower rights of the parties.” The appellants argue that the homestead interest has been overvalued by approximately $10,000. But the county court has retained jurisdiction over this matter and specifically to supervise the allocation of the proceeds of the sale. It follows that the labels attached to various payments by the agreement will not finally determine the actual distribution of the proceeds of the sale. Further hearings may be held in the county court to determine who has the paramount interest in the payments as they come due. There is no reason for us on this appeal to void the entire sale because of this contention.

By the Court. — Two orders of March 29, 1963, and order of May 6, 1963, affirmed.