This is a review of a decision of the court of appeals1 affirming a judgment and order of the circuit court for Juneau county, Raymond E. Gieringer, presiding. The circuit court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus upholding the position of the Wisconsin Law Enforcement Standards Board (LESB),2 respondent, directing the Juneau county village of Lyndon Station (Village), appellant, and its president and board of trustees to remove and discharge William G. Jessen as the chief of police of the village of Lyndon Station. The question in this case deals with the authority of a village to employ a convicted felon as police chief after the LESB has deemed him ineligible for *476appointment to this position and refused to certify him as being qualified therefor citing the Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d), prohibiting the employment of a convicted felon as a law enforcement officer.3 William G. Jessen, the chief of police is not a party to this review.

On April 27, 1973, Jessen, was convicted of 26 felony counts of misconduct in public office, contrary to sec. 946.12 (4), Stats. 1973,4 after being found guilty of falsifying uniform traffic citations while serving as the chief deputy sheriff for Juneau county.5 Jessen was sentenced to 26 concurrent one-year terms in the Wisconsin state prison at Waupun for each felony conviction, but these sentences were stayed and he was placed on probation *477for two years. He completed his probation and received a certificate of discharge from the Department of Health and Social Services effective June 5,1975.

On September 30, 1974, the village board, although aware of Jessen’s convictions for misconduct in public office, hired Jessen as chief of police, sanitary landfill area attendant and sewer operator, believing that a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1973, constituted a misdemeanor rather than a felony. The village supported its belief that a violation of this statute was a misdemeanor with two letters: one from Richard C. Kelley, the Juneau county district attorney, to Jessen and the other from the judge originally assigned to the case, the Hon. Thomas H. Barland, to the Juneau county clerk of courts.6

The board of trustees’ resolution hiring Jessen on September 30, 1974, provided that his employment as police chief would become permanent upon satisfactory *478completion of a six-month “probationary period.” During this time, the village requested the LESB to certify Jessen as a qualified law enforcement officer.7 In a letter dated December 9, 1974,8 the Enforcement Stan*479dards Board denied certification advising the village that a conviction for a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1973, was a felony and that Jessen was, therefore, ineligible for employment as a law enforcement officer, pursuant to Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d). The village board did not accept the LESB’s determination and refused to comply with the Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d). Upon determining that Jessen had satisfactorily completed his six-month probationary period, the village hired him on a full-time basis beginning April 1, 1975.

In April of 1977, the LESB, having determined some three years earlier that Jessen’s felony convictions for misconduct in public office disqualified him for employment as a law enforcement officer pursuant to the Wisconsin Law Enforcement Standards (Wis. Adm; Code LES §2.01(1) (d)), demanded that the “mayor” (president) and board of trustees of Lyndon Station remove *480Jessen from his position as chief of police. On July 5, 1977, after the village had refused to comply with the LESB’s directive regarding the discharge of Jessen as police chief, the Law Enforcement Standards Board petitioned the circuit court for an alternative writ of mandamus to compel the village, its president and trustees, to terminate Jessen’s employment or, in the alternative, to show cause why they should not do so. In its return to the writ, the village alleged that it could not lawfully discharge Jessen because such action would be in violation of the prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of a felony conviction (sec. 111.82(5) (h), Stats., effective November 1, 1977), depriving Jessen of his constitutional right of due process and equal protection. The cause was thereafter scheduled for a hearing on the merits.

While this hearing was pending, the village trustees entered into a written contract with Jessen, setting forth that his employment was permanent and that he could only be removed for cause. Cause was defined as “misconduct or malfeasance occurring in his [Jessen’s] position as chief of police of the village, or physical or mental incapacity of such nature that Jessen is no longer able to perform the duties of chief of police.” The agreement also provided that Jessen “will not be removed from his employment except upon notice and hearing before an impartial decision-maker appointed by the village board.” The written contract was executed on May 29, 1978, some three years after Jessen was hired but was made effective “as of the 1st day of April, 1975.”

Following the hearing, the trial court ruled that the village had violated Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) in employing Jessen as its chief of police and entered a judgment and order granting the peremptory writ of mandamus directing the village and its board of trustees *481to remove Jessen from that position forthwith. The issuance of the writ was stayed pending an appeal to the court of appeals. The appellate court, in affirming the trial court, based its decision that the village was required to terminate Jessen’s employment upon Wis. Const., art. XIII, sec. 3 which prohibits persons who had been convicted of “infamous crimes” from holding “any office of trust, profit or honor in this state,”9 and ignored the Law Enforcement Standard prohibiting the employment of convicted felons as law enforcement officers. In reaching its decision, the court of appeals held that all felonies are infamous crimes within the meaning of this constitutional provision, and further, that the post of chief of police for a village is an office of “trust, profit or honor” and subject to the terms of Wis. Const, art. XIII, sec. 3. Wisconsin Law Enforcement Standards Bd. v. Lyndon Station Village, 98 Wis.2d 229, 238, 244-45, 295 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1980).

The following issues are presented for our review:

1. Is a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1973, a felony?

2. Did the creation of sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats., by ch. 125, Laws of 1977, relating to discrimination in employment and licensing on the basis of arrest and conviction records invalidate or modify Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) ?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in issuing the peremptory writ of mandamus?

I. Is a Violation of see. 9^6.12(4-), Stats. 1973, a Felony ?

The court of appeals, relying on the legislative history of the penalty for a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. *4821973, held that a violation of this law constituted a felony and the village has not specifically challenged this determination in this court. In the oral argument before this court, the village’s counsel appeared to concede that the offenses for which Jessen was convicted were felonies, stating “We acknowledge that the [sic] felony was committed.” Our decision in State ex rel. McDonald v. Douglas County Circuit Court, 100 Wis.2d 569, 302 N.W.2d 462 (1981), dictates affirmance of the appellate court’s conclusion that a violation of sec. 946.12 (4), Stats. 1973, constitutes a felony.

In McDonald, this court held that a violation of a statute which does not specify the place of imprisonment, and is punishable by confinement for not more than one year is a felony. McDonald, supra, at 580. We reached this result upon an application of secs. 939.60 (definition of a felony)10 and 973.02 (place of confinement where none is specified)11 Stats., to the penalty provision at issue. We noted that an offense that fails to provide a place of confinement but which authorizes a prison sentence of one year is punishable with imprisonment in the state prisons, pursuant to sec. 973.02, Stats., and is, therefore, a “felony” as defined in sec. 939.60. Ibid.

*483In McDonald, supra, at 577-581, we re-examined State ex rel. Gaynon v. Krueger, 31 Wis.2d 609, 143 N.W.2d 437 (1966), and its progeny, and held that it is no longer necessary to engage in the legislative history analysis set forth therein when dealing with the question of whether an offense punishable with confinement of not more than one year and which fails to proscribe the institution of confinement is a felony or misdemeanor. In reviewing secs. 939.60 and 973.02, Stats., and analyzing the case law applicable thereto, we determined that the legislature intended that crimes failing to prescribe the place of imprisonment and punishable with incarceration for no more than one year, or a year or more, should be classified as felonies under these statutes. The analysis of the felony versus misdemeanor conflict adopted in McDonald was espoused in a dissent to Gaynon authored by Chief Justice CUR-RIE who stated that the classification statutes (sec. 939.60 and sec. 973.02) and the penalty provision of the offense in question were clear and unambiguous and should be applied because the legislature must be presumed to have enacted the classification statutes with full knowledge of and with reference to existing law:

“ ‘The language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy. As said in 82 C. J.S., Statutes, p. 794, sec. 362 “All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it; . . . they are therefore to be construed in connection with and in harmony with the existing law, and as part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence, that is, they are to be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which they form a part. So the meaning and effect of statutes are to be determined in connection, not only with the common law, . . . and the constitution, but also with reference to other statutes, . . .” ’ ” Id. at 625.

*484In arguing before the court of appeals, relying on Gaynon and its progeny, the village contended that a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1973,12 was only a misdemeanor for it was punishable by a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than one year with no place of. imprisonment specified. This court rendered the McDonald decision some months after the date of oral argument in the appellate court. Thus, we hold that anyone convicted of a violation of sec. 946.12 (4), Stats. 1973, when read in conjunction with sec. 973.02, is punishable with confinement in the state prisons and, therefore, a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1973, constitutes a felony. McDonald, supra; sec. 939.60.

II. Effect of Sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats., on Wis. Adm. Code LES §2,01 (1) (d).

•The village contends that the other issue in this case is whether the Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) is in conflict with ch. 125 of the Laws of 1977. Lyndon Station asserts that the aforementioned administrative rule (LES §2.01(1) (d)) conflicts with sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats., as the administrative rule prohibits the employment of nonpardoned felons in the field of law enforcement and should be rendered invalid. Whereas sec. III.32(5) (h) prohibits employment and licensing discrimination on the basis of a conviction record unless the circumstances of the offense committed are substantially related to the duties and responsibilities attending the particular position to which the applicant aspires. See: sec. 111.32(5) (h)2, a. Thus, we are called upon to determine whether Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01 *485(1) (d) can be harmonized with sec. 111.32(5) (h), when dealing with the question of possible discrimination in the employment and licensing of a law enforcement officer previously convicted of a felony.

Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) provides :

“LES 2.01 Minimum qualifications for recruitment. (1) Before an individual may commence employment on a probationary, temporary, part-time, or full-time basis as a law enforcement officer, that individual must have met recruit qualifications established by the board. The minimum qualifications for recruitment shall be:

ii . . .

“(d) The applicant shall not have been convicted of any federal felony or of any offense which if committed in Wisconsin could be punished as a felony unless the applicant has been granted an absolute and unconditional pardon.”

This provision was adopted pursuant to the broad rule-making powers granted to the LESB by the legislature in sec. 165.85(1), (3) (a), (b)13 and (4) (c). Sec. 165.85 (4) (e) empowers the LESB to adopt rules specifying the minimum qualifications including character, educational and training standards which persons desiring employment as law enforcement officers must meet:

“(c) In addition to the requirements of par. (b),14 the board may, by rule, fix such other minimum qualifi*486cations for the employment of law enforcement officers as relate to the competence and reliability of persons to assume and discharge the responsibilities of law enforcement officers, and the board shall prescribe the means for presenting evidence of fulfillment of these requirements.”

Further, the legislature has granted the Enforcement Standards Board the power of certification, sec. 165.85 (3) (c), Stats.,15 and expressly mandated that no person shall receive a permanent appointment as a law enforcement officer in the absence of the LESB’s certification that such person is qualified to serve in that capacity, sec. 165.85(4) (b),16 and entrusted the LESB with the responsibility of ensuring that law enforcement officers in this state are minimally qualified in terms of professional character, education and training:

“ (1) Findings and Policy. The legislature finds that the administration of criminal justice is of state-wide concern, and that law enforcement work is of vital importance to the health, safety and welfare of the people of this state and is of such a nature as to require training, education and the establishment of standards of a proper professional character. It is in the public interest that such standards be established and that such training and education be made available to persons who *487seek to become law enforcement officers, persons who are serving as such officers in a temporary or probationary capacity and persons already in regular service.” Sec. 165.85(1), Stats.

Surely, an administrative rule prohibiting persons convicted of felonies from receiving appointments as law enforcement officers is designed to insure that only those who possess proper professional character, education and training are appointed to protect and promote the health, welfare and safety of the people of this state.

We turn how to a discussion of sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats., effective November 1, 1977, which “prohibits discrimination in employment, membership or licensing on the basis of arrest or conviction record . . . [unless] . . . the subject of the conviction is substantially related to the ability of the person to perform the job or licensed activity.”17

Sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats., provides in part:

“. . . It is discrimination because of arrest record or conviction record:18

“2. For any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or employment agency to refuse to hire, employ, admit or license any person, or to bar or terminate any person from employment, membership or licensing, or to discriminate against any person in promotion, compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, membership or licensing, or otherwise to discriminate against any person because such person has an arrest record or a conviction record; provided, however, that it shall not be unlawf ul:

*488 ((

“b. For an employer or licensing agency to refuse to employ or license, or to bar or terminate from employment or licensing, any person who has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor or other offense the circumstances of which substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity.”

The parties do not dispute that the LESB is considered a “licensing agency”19 within the purview of sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats., as it has the exclusive power and responsibility in this state to certify persons as being qualified for employment as law enforcement officers. Next, we reach the question, Is Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) in conflict with the above-quoted statute?

According to Josam Mfg. Co. v. State Board of Health, 26 Wis.2d 587, 596, 183 N.W.2d 301 (1965), this administrative rule has the force and effect of law and the village in its briefs and arguments to this court does not contend otherwise:

“ ‘Rules, regulations, and general orders enacted by administrative agencies pursuant to the powers delegated to them have the force and effect of law, ...’ 2 Am. Jur. (2d), Administrative Law, p. 119, sec. 292.”

In Josam, this court further stated:

“In Thomson v. Racine (1943), 242 Wis. 591, 9 N.W. (2d) 91, it was held that commission orders are superior to. municipal ordinances, where the two conflict. Commission rules, established within the jurisdiction of a commission, have the effect of public law. The court said, at page 597: ‘. . . the legislative control, either directly or through its designated administrative body, is superior to any conflicting action of the legislative body of the municipality.’ ” Id. at 596.

*489The municipality (village), through its legislative body (board of trustees), has acted in violation of an administrative rule in hiring a law enforcement officer who has been denied certification by the LESB. Thus, the rule of Thomson v. Racine, 242 Wis. 591, 9 N.W.2d 91 (1943), quoted in Josam, is applicable here and the administrative rule having the force and effect of law is superior to any conflicting action of the village.

As a corollary to the rule that validly enacted administrative rules are given the effect of law, it is generally accepted that the rules and regulations of administrative agencies are subject to the same principles of construction as apply to the construction of statutes and, in this case, the applicable rule is that conflicts between statutes should be harmonized when possible:

“In order to carry out the intent of the framers of an administrative rule or regulation, the court should harmonize the various parts and provisions of such rule or regulation and give them effect, if possible, provided this may be done without violating constitutional and statutory provisions . . .

“An administrative rule should ordinarily be given that construction which will, if possible, sustain its validity, and, where alternative interpretations of an administrative rule or regulation are possible, the more reasonable of the two is to be chosen, . . 73 C.J.S. Public Adm. Bodies & Procedure, §105 at 426 (1951).

and:

“Perhaps the first rule of construction as to administrative rules and regulations is that rules made in the exercise of a power delegated by statute should be construed together with the statute to make, if possible, an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason.

“The second rule is that generally the same rules of construction and interpretation govern the construction and interpretation of rules and regulations of administrative agencies as apply to statutes in the same field. . . .

*490“. . . An administrative construction of the agency’s own regulations is controlling in determining their meaning unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations. ...” 2 Am. Jur.2d, Adm. Law §307 at 135-36 (1962).

Thus, according to the cardinal rule of statutory construction :

“. . . that conflicts between different statutes, by implication or otherwise, are not favored and will not be held to exist if they may otherwise be reasonably construed.” (citations omitted). Strong v. Milwaukee, 38 Wis.2d 564, 570, 157 N.W.2d 619 (1968).

and that:

“Construction of statutes should be done in a way which harmonizes the whole system of law of which they are a part, and any conflict should be reconciled if possible.” Muskego-Norway C.S.J.S.D. No. 9 v. W.E.R.B., 35 Wis.2d 540, 556, 151 N.W.2d 617 (1967). See also: Glinski v. Sheldon, 88 Wis.2d 509, 519, 276 N.W.2d 815 (1979); Kramer v. Hayward, 57 Wis.2d 302, 311, 203 N.W.2d 871 (1973); State v. Duffy, 54 Wis.2d 61, 64, 194 N.W.2d 624 (1972).

the Law Enforcement Standard (Wis. Adm Code LES §2.01(1) (d), and sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats., insofar as they seem inconsistent and relate to the same subject matter (conviction record as a ground for disqualification from employment or licensing) should be harmonized.

As noted, the legislature, with the enactment of sec. 165.85, Stats., has entrusted the LESB with the responsibility of establishing “minimum qualifications for the employment of law enforcement officers as relate to the competence and reliability of persons to assume and discharge the responsibilities of law enforcement officers.” Sec. 165.85(4) (c). The LESB in accordance with its delegated authority to establish minimum qualifications for persons seeking employment as law enforcement officers promulgated Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) *491prohibiting nonpardoned felons from serving as law enforcement officers. The legislature, when creating sec. 111.32(5) (h), in 1977, is presumed to have acted with full knowledge of this provision of the administrative code adopted in 1970. See: e.g., Kindy v. Hayes, 44 Wis.2d 301, 314, 171 N.W.2d 324 (1969) (holding that the legislature is presumed to act with full knowledge of the existing law, including an administrative rule that was involved in a prior decision). Indeed, the fact that the legislature, when enacting ch. 125, Laws of 1977, made the licensing criteria of a number of licensing and examining boards of both professional and trade groups subject to the provisions of sec. 111.32(5) (h), e.g., the examining board of architects and engineers, together with the barber and cosmetologists examining boards and the department of regulation and licensing of private detectives, investigators, watchmen and security guards, etc., is a strong indication that the legislature was cognizant that a felony conviction was, before the enactment of this legislation, a ground for denial or revocation of various licenses, including a Law Enforcement Standards Board certification.

Sec. 111.32(5) (h)2, b, expressly states that licensing (certification) discrimination on the basis of a conviction record does not violate this statute when the circumstances of the conviction “substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity:”

“... . [I] t shall not be unlawful:

“b. For an employer or licensing agency to refuse to employ or license, or to bar or terminate from employment or licensing, any person who has been convicted of any felony . . . the circumstances of which substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity.”

Thus, it is obvious that the statute, sec. 111.32(5) (h), modifies the administrative rule, LES §2.01(1) (d).

*492Jessen was convicted of misconduct in public office on 26 felony counts of falsifying uniform traffic citations. As a police officer for the village, Jessen would be charged with enforcing the traffic laws. See: secs. 61.31(2) Stats. Thus, under the facts of this case, it can hardly be said that the circumstances of the offense for which Jessen was convicted fail to meet the substantial relationship exception to the prohibition against employment and licensing discrimination on the basis of a conviction record set forth in sec. 111.32(5) (h) 2 b, Stats., as common sense dictates that a conviction of the felony of misconduct in public office for falsifying traffic tickets certainly bears a substantial relationship to the duties of a police officer who is called upon to issue traffic citations. Therefore, when reading sec. 111.32(5) (h), in conjunction with sec. 165.85(4) (c) (empowering the LESB to promulgate minimum competency and reliability qualifications for employment of law enforcement officers) and Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) when dealing with the certification and employment of a law enforcement officer, we hold that the circumstances of Jessen’s convictions for falsifying uniform traffic citations substantially relate to his duties as police chief for the village of Lyndon Station and thus is barred from holding a law enforcement position in Wisconsin. Further, we hold that Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d), as modified herein, and sec. 111.32 (5) (h), are not in conflict.

Public trust in the integrity of our law enforcement officials is essential to the preservation of the public peace and for the enforcement of laws and ordinances. This trust and confidence is shaken by casting even the slightest suspicion against the professional character and integrity of a police chief. If the state authorities through our court system have convicted someone of 26 *493felonies, it stands to reason that his effectiveness as a law enforcement officer will be greatly diminished. What impression would be given to an impartial jury when the police chief, as the prosecution’s primary witness in a serious criminal case, has to explain on cross-examination that he stands convicted of 26 felonies? We agree with the LESB that employment of a non-pardoned felon in a law enforcement capacity would only serve to undermine the public’s trust in its police officers as well as the ability of such persons to adequately perform the duties of officers of the law.

Mandamus

This court in Miller v. Smith, 100 Wis.2d 609, 621, 622, 302 N.W.2d 468 (1981), set forth the standard of review and the criteria governing the issuance of a writ of mandamus as follows:

“A writ of mandamus is a discretionary writ in that it lies within the sound discretion of the trial court to either grant or deny. The trial judge’s actions in either granting or denying the writ will be affirmed unless the trial judge abused his discretion. Morrissette v. DeZonia, 63 Wis.2d 429, 434, 217 N.W.2d 377 (1974); State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, supra n. 11 at 375-76. This court has set forth the following prerequisites for the issuance of the writ:

“ . . a clear legal right; the duty sought to be enforced is positive and plain; the applicant for the writ shows that he will be substantially damaged by nonperformance. of such duty; and there is no other adequate specific legal remedy for the threatened injury, and no laches on the part of such applicant, and no special reasons exist rendering a resort on his part to the remedy, under the circumstances, inequitable. . . .’ Burns v. City of Madison, 92 Wis.2d 232, 243, 248 N.W.2d 631 (1979) quoting from State ex rel. Johnson v. County Court, 41 Wis.2d 188, 192, 163 N.W.2d 6 (1968) and Neu v. Voege, 96 Wis. 489, 493, 71 N.W. 880 (1897).”

*494It is an abuse of discretion to refuse to issue the writ when the noted prerequisites are present: (1) a clear legal right; (2) a positive and plain duty; (3) substantial damages; and (4) no other adequate remedy at law. Neu v. Voege, supra. Further, “ ‘ [m] andamus is the proper remedy to compel public officers to perform duties arising out of their office and presently due to be performed.’ ” (cite omitted) Walter Laev v. Karns, 40 Wis.2d 114, 118, 161 N.W.2d 227 (1968) and State ex rel. Portage Co. D. Dist. v. Newby, 169 Wis. 208, 213, 171 N.W. 953 (1919); provided, however, the duty to act must be clear and unequivocal. On the other hand, “It is an abuse of discretion to compel action through mandamus when the duty is not clear and unequivocal and requires the exercise of discretion.” (Cites omitted.) Burns, supra, at 239.

The village contends that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the writ of mandamus without making a specific finding that Jessen’s discharge would not be unjust or inequitable. It cites 52 Am. Jur.2d, Mandamus §40 (1970), for the proposition that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the writ of mandamus without specifically considering “the urgency of the situation, the equities of the parties, the efficacy or futility of the writ if issued, the public policy or interests that may be involved and the question whether, if issued, the writ will promote substantial justice or on the contrary cause injustice, hardship or oppression.” Id. at 365-66.

In answer to this claim, we note that compelling the removal of Jessen was urgent and promoted substantial justice as well as furthered public policy for, as previously stated, allowing one who stands convicted of the felony of misconduct in public office for falsifying traffic citations to serve in a law enforcement capacity seri*495ously undermines the public’s trust in its police officers as well as such person’s ability to adequately perform the duties and responsibilities of law enforcement officers.

Further, although a court, in exercising its discretion to grant or deny the writ, should consider all the facts and circumstances, including those referred to in 52 Am. Jur.2d, Mandamus, §40 (1970), we note that the section of Am. Jur. referenced by the village does temper the court’s reliance on the noted factors in exercising its discretion in the following language:

“However, discretion should not be so exercised as to defeat rights clearly recognized and supported by established principles of law. Thus, judicial discretion should not be exercised to withhold the writ of mandamus to enforce a clear right conferred by statute, where no other remedy is available to secure such right, for the law and the right are imperative upon the court. To deny the writ in such case would amount to judicial assumption of legislative prerogatives; it would tend to emasculate or annul legislation and savor of judicial government.

“It is held that if all of the requisites to issuance of the writ are shown to be present the granting of the writ is a matter of right, but, conversely, the granting of the writ may be an abuse of discretion if the relator does not show a right to the relief requested.” Id. at 366.

The rule alluded to in this provision of Am. Jur., namely, that it is an abuse of discretion to withhold the writ when it is sought to enforce a clear right conferred by statute and when other remedies are inadequate to secure that right was set forth by this court in State ex rel. Dempsey v. Wena A.F. Co., 173 Wis. 651, 654, 182 N.W. 354 (1921), where it held that when a party seeks to enforce a right conferred by statute:

“. . . courts cannot withhold the writ of mandamus to enforce that right without thwarting the legislative will. *496Judicial discretion should not be exercised to withhold the writ of mandamus to enforce a clear right conferred by statute when no other remedy is available to secure such right. To do so amounts to judicial assumption of legislative prerogative, emasculates or annuls legislative enactments, and savors of judicial government.”

This rule is applicable to properly enacted administrative rules as they have the force and effect of law. J.osam, sur-pra.

The legislature has authorized the Law Enforcement Standards Board to prescribe minimum qualifications which persons aspiring to employment as law enforcement officers must meet. Jessen stands convicted of felonies related to his employment and as such is ineligible to serve as a police officer in this state. Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d). The village hired him as its chief of police in 1974 despite being informed that such action would be violative of LES §2.01(1) (d), and further, made his employment in such capacity permanent notwithstanding the legislative mandate that “No person may be appointed as a law enforcement officer . . . unless the person . . . has been certified by the board [LESB] as being qualified to be a law enforcement officer.” Sec. 165.85(4) (b), Stats. Thus, the Law Enforcement Standards Board has demonstrated a clear legal right to have Jessen removed from his position as police chief and that the village of Lyndon Station had a clear and unequivocal duty to discharge him. The village’s duty to terminate Jessen’s employment as its chief of police was mandatory, Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) and sec. 165.85(4) (b), and the village has never claimed that there is some other legal remedy, aside from mandamus, to adequately enforce the LESB’s right. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we hold the trial court properly issued the writ of mandamus. Nue v. Voege, supra.

*497The village has also challenged Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) and the issuance of the writ of mandamus herein on the grounds that they have caused a denial of Jessen’s constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. We do not reach these issues as well as the question of whether Wis. Const, art. XIII, sec. 3, presents a bar to Jessen’s employment as police chief for Lyndon Station as our determinations that the enforcement of Wis. Adm. Code LES §2.01(1) (d) where the circumstances of the crime substantially relate to the circumstances of Jessen’s employment as chief of police, and that the village employed Jessen in violation of the provisions of sec. 165.85(4) (b), Stats, (requiring LESB certification as a condition precedent to the hiring of a law enforcement officer on a permanent basis) are dis-positive.

Although we do not reach the question of whether Jessen was subject to removal from his position as police chief under the provisions of Wis. Const, art. XIII, sec. 3, we disavow the appellate court’s language and ruling that all felonies constitute “infamous crimes” within the parameters of this constitutional provision.

By the Court. — The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

(dissenting). William S. Jessen has served as chief of police, sanitary landfill area attendant and assistant sewer operator for the Village of Lyndon Station for more than six and one-half years.1 He also serves as the elected constable of the Village of Lyndon Station — elected April, 1977, reelected April, 1979, and reelected April, 1981.

*498The decision announced today means that Jessen can no longer serve as chief of police. He can continue to serve as constable,2 a position whose powers and duties, although unclear under the statute,3 may overlap those of the chief of police. I do not know whether Lyndon Station, a village whose population was 533 in 1970 and 375 in 19804 will continue to employ Jessen as sanitary landfill area attendant or assistant sewer operator if he cannot also perform as chief of police. Whether or not Jessen remains an employee, the Village is now without a police chief.

1 dissent because I believe it is error for this court to make the determination, as it does here, that the circumstances of Jessen’s felony convictions in 1973 substantially relate to the present circumstances of his job as police chief and that he is therefore disqualified from being police chief in 1981. In my view the Law Enforcement Standards Board (LESB), not this court, should make this determination. In making the determination itself the majority has, I believe, usurped the powers of the LESB and of the Village Board of Lyndon Station; has exceeded its appellate jurisdiction by acting as a fact-finder; and has violated rudimentary concepts of fair play.

The absence of an LESB determination of whether a substantial relation exists between the circumstances of the convictions and of the job and the need for such a determination as of this date is best shown by detailing the facts in chronological order.

*499Jessen was convicted of 26 counts of misconduct (falsification of uniform traffic citations in violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1971) while chief deputy sheriff of Juneau county.5 He was sentenced in June of 1973 to the Wisconsin State Prison at Waupun, one year on each count, sentence on all 26 counts to run concurrently. The sentence was stayed and Jessen was placed on probation for a term of two years.6

On September 30, 1974, the Village Board of Lyndon Station hired Jessen, who was then on probation, to serve as chief of police, sanitary landfill area attendant, and assistant sewer operator. Initially Jessen was hired for a six-month probationary period and then on a permanent basis. It was the belief of the Board at that time that Jessen had been convicted of misdemeanors not felonies.7 The district attorney of Juneau county had in fact represented the charges against Jessen as misdemeanors. This error was caused by the legislature’s error in failing to state expressly whether a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1971, was a misdemeanor or a felony. The trial court, the court of appeals and this *500court8 conclude that violation of sec. 946.12(4) was a felony. The soundness of the Village Board’s judgment in hiring as chief of police in 1974 a former Juneau county deputy sheriff who, 17 months earlier, had been convicted of 26 counts of falsifying traffic citations and who was on probation at the time he was hired is not the issue in this case.

In December 1974, the Village requested the LESB to certify Jessen as a qualified law enforcement officer. *501The LESB concluded that Jessen was ineligible for employment on a probationary, temporary, part-time, or full-time basis as a law enforcement officer by virtue of his having failed to comply with LES 2.01(1) (d), Wis. Adm. Code, a rule promulgated by LESB, which provides that an applicant for a position as a law enforcement officer shall not have been convicted “of any offense which if committed in Wisconsin could be punished as a felony unless the applicant has been granted an absolute and unconditional pardon.”9 Over two and one-half years later, on April 1, 1977, the office of the attorney general, representing the LESB, wrote the president of the Village Board of Lyndon Station that unless the Village Board immediately removed Jessen as Lyndon Station chief of police, the LESB would “proceed to institute the appropriate proceedings on behalf of the Board for such removal.” On July 8, 1977, the LESB initiated action against the Village Board asking the circuit court for Juneau county for relief in the form of the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the Village to remove and discharge Jessen from his employment as chief of police.

Before the matter came before the Juneau county circuit court, the legislature enacted Chapter 125, Laws of 1977, effective November 1, 1977, adopting sec. 111.32 (5) (a) and (5) (h), Stats. 1979-80, prohibiting discrimination in employment because of an applicant’s arrest record or conviction record. See also sec. 111.325, Stats. 1979-80. The Wisconsin legislature clearly set forth the public policy of the State: Prejudice and legal barriers which unfairly deny employment opportunities to ex-offenders should be eradicated.10 The legislature care*502fully provided, however, that “it shall not be unlawful . . . [f]or an employer or licensing agency to refuse to employ or license, or to bar or terminate from employment or licensing, any person who has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor or other offense the circumstances of which substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity.” Sec. 111.32 (5) (h)2.b., Stats. 1979-80.

The LESB however did not revise its rule, LES sec. 2.01(1) (d), Wis. Adm. Code, to bring it into harmony with sec. 111.32(5) (a) and (5) (h) and legislative policy.11 Nor did the LESB interpret LES sec. 2.01(1) (d), *503Wis. Adm. Code, as the majority now interprets it, as being modified by sec. 111.32(5) (h) to mean that an applicant for a position as a law enforcement officer shall not have been convicted “of any offense which if committed in Wisconsin could be punished as a felony” (LES sec. 2.01(1) (d), Wis. Adm. Code) if the “circumstances of [the felony conviction] substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity” (sec. 111.32(5) (h)2.b.) “unless the applicant has been granted an absolute and unconditional pardon” (LES sec. 2.01(1) (d), Wis. Adm. Code).12

After enactment of sec. 111.32(5) (h), the Village Board specifically considered whether there was a substantial relation between the circumstances of Jessen’s conviction and his position of police chief and concluded that there was not.13 The LESB, by comparison, proceeded in its lawsuit without reviewing its rule or its position as to Jessen and urged the circuit court to hold that the LESB had authority to exclude all unpardoned felons from law enforcement positions.

*504The Juneau county circuit court in September 1978 adopted the LESB’s position. The circuit court concluded, as a matter of law, that LES 2.01(1) (d), Wis. Adm. Code, renders convicted and non-pardoned felons ineligible to serve as law enforcement officers; that LES 2.01(1) (d) is not voided by sec. 111.32(5) (h), Stats. 1979-80; and that sec. 111.32(5) (h) is not violated by enforcement of LES 2.01(1) (d). The majority rejects these conclusions of law and affirms the order and judgment on grounds not considered by the circuit court.

The court of appeals based its affirmance of the circuit court order and judgment not on LES 2.01(1) (d), Wis. Adm. Code, or on sec. 111.32(5) (h), but on the Wisconsin Constitution. The court of appeals held that sec. 3, Art. XIII, Wis. Const., barred Jessen from serving as chief of police. The majority need not and properly does not concern itself with this constitutional issue. I disagree with the reasoning of the court of appeals on this issue and find the reasoning set forth by Judge Bablitch in her dissenting opinion, Wisconsin Law Enforcement Stds. Bd. v. Lyndon Station Village, 98 Wis.2d 229, 251, 295 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1980), legally sound and persuasive.

As this restatement of the facts demonstrates, neither the LESB, nor the circuit court, nor the court of appeals has considered the issue of whether the circumstances of Jessen’s convictions substantially relate to the circumstances of the job.

The majority — after correctly concluding that rule LES 2.01(1) (d) must be interpreted in harmony with sec. 111.32(5) (h) as barring only those felons, “the circumstances of [whose convictions] substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity” — goes on to make that determination on its own, without a factual record, and to “hold that the circumstances of Jessen’s convictions for falsifying uni*505form traffic citations substantially relate to his duties as police chief for the Village of Lyndon and thus [Jes-sen] is barred from holding a law enforcement position in Wisconsin.” Supra, p. 492.

The majority does not state its authority or rationale for this ab initio determination.

The courts may have power to review the decision of a village board or the LESB as to whether a particular applicant meets the qualifications, but a court should not, as the majority does here, ab initio determine whether or not an individual is disqualified on the basis of his conviction record. The legislature has said that the village boards and the LESB — not the courts — have the authority to determine whether an individual meets the qualifications which the village boards and the LESB have established for police officers.

The legislature has granted power to the village board to select police officers. The village board is empowered “to act for the government and good order of the village . . . for its health, safety, welfare and convenience of the public.” Sec. 61.34(1), Stats. 1979-80. The legislature makes clear that the statutory powers granted the village board are broad, and the powers granted in sec. 61.34(1), Stats., are “in addition to all other grants and shall be limited only by express language.” Sec. 61.34 (1), Stats. 1979-80.

The village board’s power to select police officers has, however, been limited by express statutory language. In 1969 the legislature created the LESB14 which is *506authorized to establish state-wide minimum educational and training standards for law enforcement officers15 and to certify persons as being qualified to be law enforcement officers.16 The legislature also empowered the LESB to fix “minimum qualifications for the employment of law enforcement officers as relate to the competence and reliability of persons to assume and discharge the responsibilities of law enforcement officers, and the [LESB] shall prescribe the means for presenting evidence of fulfillment of these requirements.” Sec. 165.85(4) (c), Stats. 1979-80. The LESB has not afforded Lyndon Station or Jessen the opportunity to present evidence to the LESB that Jessen has fulfilled the requirements set forth in LES 2.01 (1) (d), Wis. Adm. Code, as interpreted by the majority opinion announced today. The LESB has never determined — with or with*507out a hearing — that the circumstances of Jessen’s conviction substantially relate to the circumstances of the job.

The import of secs. 61.34(1), 165.85 and 111.32(5) (h), Stats. 1979-80, and LES 2.01, Wis. Adm. Code, is that the village board and the LESB, not this court, must make the determination whether the applicant meets the minimum qualifications for the job, including whether the circumstances of the conviction substantially relate to the circumstances of the job.17 In Wisconsin a conviction of a felony does not raise an irrebutable presumption of unfitness. The LESB must decide the issue of an ex-offender’s fitness on the basis of the statute, its rules and the evidence presented to it. When, as here, an agency fails to exercise the decision-making function delegated to it by the legislature, the court cannot and should not exercise it. Many cases can be cited to illustrate this well-recognized principle. Reidinger v. Optometry Examining Board, 81 Wis.2d 292, 260 N.W.2d 270 (1977), is particularly relevant to the instant case. Reidinger’s license to practice optometry was revoked by the Optometry Examining Board in 1975 pursuant to sec. 449.07 (1) (d), Stats. 1975, which empowered, but did not require, the Optometry Board to revoke a license if the licensee was convicted of any felony.18 Reidinger was convicted of federal income tax evasion. He was in*508vestigated by the Optometry Board and participated in the subsequent hearing on license revocation. The Optometry Board concluded that because Reidinger had been convicted of a felony, his license should be revoked. This court remanded the matter to the Optometry Board because the Optometry Board had failed to exercise its discretion. The Optometry Board’s duty to protect the public, we said, can only be done on facts set forth in the Board’s action based on the record before it.19 In the instant case, a mandamus action, this court cannot, as a matter of procedure, remand the matter to the LESB. The court can, however, reverse the decision of the court of appeals and quash the writ thereby enabling *509the LESB to make the essential determination which is missing in this case.20

One possible rationale supporting the majority’s making this ab initio determination is that the majority views the question of whether there is a substantial relation between the circumstances of the convictions and the position of police chief as a question of law which this court may decide ab initio.21 The application of the legal standard “substantially relates” to the facts is generally, but not invariably, viewed as a question of law for purposes of judicial review. This court might well give weight to a determination of the LESB if made after seeing and hearing the witnesses. Such a determination might well be viewed as being in the area *510of the LESB’s expertise.22 Here, however, the LESB has made no such determination.

The resolution of the issue of substantial relation, even if a legal question, must be predicated on findings of fact. A factfinder must determine the circumstances of Jes-sen’s conviction and of the duties of the job. A determination of the duties of the chief of police of Lyndon Station might involve both factual findings and conclusions of law, that is, an interpretation of the state statutes and the village ordinances. No such findings as to the conviction or the duties have been made by the LESB or the circuit court. The majority makes no mention of these missing factual determinations and apparently is prepared to act in a factual vacuum or supply the findings it needs. It is not the function of an appellate court to make factual determinations. Cf. Wurtz v. Fleichman, 97 Wis.2d 100, 107, 293 N.W.2d 155 (1980).

Even if I were to conclude, as the majority does, that this court can ab initio determine whether the circumstances of the convictions substantially relate to the circumstances of the job, I do not think that the court can on the basis of this record determine either the circumstances of Jessen’s conviction or his duties as police chief of Lyndon Station.

The record does not contain the circumstances of Jes-sen’s conviction. Essentially the record consists of the pleadings, lengthy briefs of the parties in the trial court, the decision of the trial court and the stipulation of facts entered into between the parties. The pleadings do not state facts which would be helpful, even if we *511considered the facts as admitted as true for purposes of deciding the question of substantial relation. There was no trial at which evidence was submitted and the parties’ stipulation does not supply the needed facts. The stipulation basically sets forth the chronology of events which is set forth in the majority opinion and in this opinion.23 None of these documents describes the circumstances of the offense. Certainly those circumstances exist.

I believe that Jessen and Lyndon Station might, if given the opportunity, provide relevant information about the circumstances of Jessen’s conviction. Jessen had defended himself against the charges by claiming that the sheriff of Juneau county and other employees had committed the offenses, not he. The jury obviously did not believe Jessen. After his conviction and after serving probation Jessen sought relief from the conviction, asserting that his attorney had learned that the Wis*512consin Department of Justice had not disclosed at trial information in its files which revealed that the sheriff of Juneau county had committed misdeeds in office. Jessen also asserted that a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Justice informed his counsel that the investigation against that particular sheriff of Juneau county was terminated when the sheriff resigned from office.24 Jessen’s motion for post-conviction relief came to this court. This court denied Jessen relief on procedural grounds and did not review the merits of Jes-sen’s claim that he had been denied due process of law as a result of the unconstitutional suppression of evidence by the state. This court held that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to entertain Jessen’s postconviction motion or grant him relief because he was no longer under sentence. Jessen v. State, 95 Wis.2d 207, 290 N.W.2d 685 (1980). Although Jessen was unsuccessful in reopening the convictions, his assertions might be important to the determination of whether the circumstances of his conviction substantially relate to the duties of his job.

The record is similarly devoid of facts relating to the circumstances of Jessen’s job. Is Jessen the only police officer in the Village? If not, how many officers does he command ? The duties of village police chief are probably set forth in part by law and in larger part by custom.25 Jessen has been police chief for six and one-half years. If this court is going to decide whether there is a substantial relation between the circumstances of the conviction and the circumstances of the job, as both *513the statute and the majority opinion require, it ought to look at what Jessen is doing on the job.

The majority errs, I believe, in deciding this case on a record devoid of facts or evidence regarding Jessen’s conduct prior to the convictions, Jessen’s conduct upon which the convictions are based, Jessen’s conduct after conviction, or the nature of the job of Lyndon Station police chief.

And the majority does not even consider the significant evidence there is on this threadbare record. For example the majority fails to consider that more than nine years have elapsed since Jessen committed the crimes; that Lyndon Station is prepared to prove that Jessen has successfully performed as a law enforcement officer for nearly seven years; that Lyndon Station can prove (I assume) that Jessen has had no convictions since 1973; that Jessen can continue to serve as constable; and that Lyndon Station is prepared to prove by testimony of Juneau county law enforcement officers that if Jessen is discharged law enforcement in the Village and Juneau county will be affected adversely.26 The *514only fact the majority has considered is that Jessen was convicted of felonies committed while he was a law enforcement officer. Although announcing a test which accurately reflects the statutory language, i.e., do the circumstances of the conviction substantially relate to the duties of the job, the majority in applying the test fails to recognize the difference between the circumstances of the conviction and the existence of a conviction.

Perhaps because the record lacks the necessary facts, the majority does not explain what the statutory phrase “substantially relate” means; it does not provide any guidelines for the agencies or circuit courts to use in applying the statutory test of “substantially relate;” and it does not explain how it applied the statutory test to the “facts of this case.”

In determining whether there is a substantial relation between the circumstances of the conviction and the circumstances of the job, I would consider such factors as the potential impact of the offense on job performance; whether the job provides an opportunity for the commission of similar offenses; whether the circumstances leading to the offense still exist or are likely to recur; whether the person has committed other offenses since conviction; whether the person’s conduct since conviction makes it likely that he will commit other offenses ; the rehabilitative efforts of the person including job history and reputation in the community; and the *515time elapsed since conviction.27 I do not propose at this time to give weights to each of these factors or to state further the way in which they should be balanced, but it is clear that the majority has not considered them and has not indicated what consideration these or similar factors ought to be given.

I view the majority opinion as limited to its facts— namely a felony committed nearly seven years ago by a law enforcement officer. Nevertheless, I am concerned that the opinion might be read to bar forever all un-pardoned felons from being law enforcement officers. The majority says “We agree with the LESB that employment of a non-pardoned felon in a law enforcement capacity would only serve to undermine the public’s trust in its police officers as well as the ability of such persons to adequately perform the duties of officers of the law.” The majority cannot intend this language to bar all unpardoned convicted felons from all law enforcement positions, because the majority would then be rewriting sec. 111.32(5) (h), not interpreting it. The Wisconsin legislature did not exclude law enforcement officers from the substantial relation test.28

I reluctantly conclude that the majority has violated rudimentary concepts of fair play by ordering Jessen *516removed without giving either Jessen or the Village of Lyndon Station an opportunity to present evidence on and to argue therefrom the issue of whether the circumstances of Jessen’s conviction in 1973 substantially relate to the circumstances of his job in 1981. Summary disposition of this issue by the majority without any factual record not only violates the state legislative mandate but also offends state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process. Cf. Application for Admission to Bar of Douglas Childs, 101 Wis.2d 159, 303 N.W.2d 663 (1981); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).

Because the LESB has not determined that the circumstances of Jessen’s conviction substantially relate to the circumstances of the job and because the LESB has not determined that it cannot certify Jessen as a law enforcement officer under Rule 2.01(1) (d), as interpreted by the majority, the LESB has not demonstrated that it has a clear legal right to the issuance of the writ or that Lyndon Station’s duty is positive or plain; and the LESB has not shown that it has not been guilty of laches. These showings are prerequisites for the issuance of the writ. See majority opinion, p. 494. Furthermore the record shows that special reasons exist rendering resort by the LESB to the remedy of mandamus inequitable in this case.

I conclude that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in issuing the writ of mandamus, and for the reasons I have set forth, I dissent.