This is an appeal from a Dane county circuit court declaratory judgment and order granting a permanent injunction. The circuit court declared the Town of Fitchburg’s incorporation Resolution No. 5-81 and the results of its April 7, 1981, referendum null and void and enjoined Fitchburg from certifying the referendum results to the Wisconsin Secretary of State. Fitchburg appealed and petitioned to bypass the court of appeals pursuant to sec. 808.05 and sec. (Rule) 809.60, Stats. We granted the petition to bypass.

On March 24, 1980, a petition requesting an incorporation referendum for Fitchburg under sec. 60.81, Stats., was filed with the Fitchburg Town Clerk. The petition was signed by 2,167 persons who owned real estate in Fitchburg. On March 31, 1980, the Fitchburg Town Board adopted Resolution No. 9-80 which scheduled a sec. 60.81 incorporation referendum for June 8, 1980. The resolution established notice procedures and set forth wards and boundaries for the proposed city.1 The city of Madison (Madison) sued to enjoin the referendum. The circuit court granted the injunction. Ultimately, however, this court vacated the injunction, holding that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Fitchburg. In re Incorporation of Town of Fitchburg, 98 Wis. 2d 635, 299 N.W.2d 199 (1980).

Subsequently, the Fitchburg Town Board passed Resolution No. 5-81 which rescheduled the sec. 60.81, Stats., *227referendum for April 7, 1981.2 Madison and Russell Mueller then brought this action to invalidate the resolution and enjoin the referendum. On April 2, 1981, the circuit court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary injunction. The court further ordered, however, that if the majority of votes cast were in favor of incorporation, the town clerk was enjoined from certifying the referendum results to the Wisconsin Secretary of State until it had been finally determined whether sec. 60.81 validly applied to Fitchburg. The referendum was held as scheduled on April 7, 1981. The Fitchburg residents voted by a margin of 1,637 to 304 to incorporate as a city.

Following the referendum, the merits of the case were put before the circuit court on motions for summary judgment brought by both sides. The circuit court held that Madison has standing to maintain this action but did not reach the question of Russell Mueller’s standing. The court further held that Fitchburg could not use sec. 60.81, Stats., to incorporate because it is not “ ‘adjacent to a city of the first class.’ ” On May 21, 1982, the court entered a declaratory judgment and order which invalidated Resolution No. 5-81 and the referendum results and permanently enjoined Fitchburg from certifying the referendum results to the Wisconsin Secretary of State. Fitchburg appealed.

There are two issues presented on this appeal: (1) whether Madison and Russell Mueller have standing to maintain this action for declaratory judgment, and (2) whether the incorporation procedures set forth in sec. 60.81, Stats., are available to the residents of Fitchburg.

*228I.

In order to properly maintain a declaratory judgment action, “ ‘[tjhere must exist a justiciable controversy— that is to say:

“ ‘(1) A controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it.

“ ‘ (2) The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse.

“ £(3) The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy — that is to say, a legally protectible interest.

“ ‘ (4) The issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination.’ ” Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 410, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982) ; Klaus v. Vander Heyden, 106 Wis. 2d 353, 364, 316 N.W.2d 664 (1982) ; State ex rel. La Follette v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 17, 22, 264 N.W. 627 (1936).

It is the third component of justiciability which is at issue in this case. The legal interest requirement has often been expressed in terms of standing. Tooley v. O’Connell, 77 Wis. 2d 422, 438, 253 N.W.2d 335 (1977). In order to have standing to sue, a party must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. Mast v. Olsen, 89 Wis. 2d 12, 16, 278 N.W.2d 205 (1979) ; Tri-State Home Improvement Co., Inc. v. Labor & Industry Review Commission, 111 Wis. 2d 103, 113, 330 N.W.2d 186 (1983) ; Moedern v. McGinnis, 70 Wis. 2d 1056, 1064, 236 N.W.2d 240 (1975).

Fitchburg challenges Madison’s standing on the ground that it does not have a legal interest in the sec. 60.81, Stats., incorporation proceeding. Unlike Chapter 66,3 *229sec. 60.81 does not specifically grant standing to neighboring municipalities. According to Fitchburg, this court has previously decided that without such a standing provision a city cannot maintain an action to prevent the electors of an adjacent town from choosing to incorporate.

In Schatzman v. Freenfield, 273 Wis. 277, 77 N.W.2d 511 (1956), the plaintiff brought an action seeking to enjoin an incorporation referendum by the town of Greenfield. The city of Milwaukee petitioned for leave to intervene and be interpleaded, claiming that it had a substantial stake in the controversy. Milwaukee’s alleged interests in the action were as follows: It had begun to annex certain town areas; it was already servicing those areas to some extent; Greenfield’s incorporation would thwart its expansion; and it owned property in the town. This court held that these interests did not make Milwaukee a necessary party, and, therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the petition. We also suggested that Milwaukee may not have been a proper party to the action.

We considered essentially the same question in Milwaukee v. Oak Creek, 8 Wis. 2d 102, 98 N.W.2d 469 (1959). In that case Milwaukee challenged the incorporation of Oak Creek under sec. 60.81, Stats. Oak Creek demurred to the complaint alleging, among other things, that Milwaukee lacked standing to sue. The trial court sustained the demurrer. On appeal Milwaukee contended that it had standing by virtue of its ownership of property in Oak Creek and an annexation attempt. This court upheld the ruling of the trial court, finding that no *230rights or interests of Milwaukee were adversely affected by Oak Creek’s incorporation.

Fitchburg argues that under Greenfield and Oak Creek, Madison is without standing to maintain this action. We disagree. Those cases do not compel such a result.4 Since the Greenfield and Oak Creek decisions, the Wisconsin rules of standing have been liberalized. In Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade, Inc. v. PSC, 69 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975), we held that “the law of standing in Wisconsin should not be construed narrowly or restrictively.”5 Indeed we have recently recognized that even a trifling interest may be sufficient to confer standing. State ex rel. First National Bank v. M & I Peoples Bank, 95 Wis. 2d 303, 309, 290 N.W.2d 321 (1980). Thus interests which were not sufficient to establish standing when Greenfield and Oak Creek were decided may enable a party to maintain an action under current notions of standing.

Madison has the same interests in this controversy as Milwaukee had in Greenfield: It owns property in Fitch-*231burg; it has instituted annexation proceedings for parts of Fitchburg; Fitchburg residents receive certain services from Madison and make use of Madison’s facilities; and Fitchburg’s incorporation will hinder Madison’s growth by precluding future annexation of the Fitchburg area. Madison’s stake in this case is not, however, limited to these interests. The incorporation of Fitchburg under sec. 60.81, Stats., would extinguish Madison’s extraterritorial zoning and plat approval jurisdiction in the Fitch-burg area. These powers, which are conferred by secs. 62.23 (7a), 236.02(2), and 236.10, enable Madison to protect itself from hazardous or undesirable land uses within three miles of its corporate limits. Madison’s extraterritorial jurisdiction is limited, however, to unincorporated lands by sec. 66.32.6 Thus, if Fitchburg becomes a city, Madison will be precluded from regulating land use for its general welfare within this extraterritorial zone.

Madison also has an interest in protecting its city classification status. If Madison were elevated from a city of the second class to the first class, it would be required to make changes in its governmental structure and operations. Although Fitchburg does not attempt to force Madison to become a city of the first class, its effort to incorporate under sec. 60.81, Stats., implies that Madison has reached that status.

We conclude that, taken together, the aforementioned interests establish that Madison has a personal stake in *232the outcome of this controversy. Therefore, under the current law of standing Madison may properly maintain this action.

Fitchburg also contests Russell Mueller’s standing. Mueller contends that he has a legal interest in this controversy because by incorporating under sec. 60.81, Stats., Fitchburg will deprive him the opportunity to participate in the pending incorporation proceedings under Chapter 66. Mueller further maintains that several procedural irregularities committed by Fitchburg in implementing the sec. 60.81 incorporation process injured him. Lastly, Mueller joins Madison in the assertion that sec. 60.81 violates Article IV, Sections 23 and 31 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Even assuming these allegations would establish a legal interest7 in the controversy, we find that Mueller is without standing to maintain this action. Mueller's standing is dependent upon his being a resident of Fitchburg. Before this case was submitted to the trial court, Mueller moved out of Fitchburg. Therefore, his claim of standing was extinguished.

Having determined that one party has standing to maintain this action, we next turn to the merits.

II.

Sec. 60.81, Stats.,8 establishes a special incorporation procedure for towns which satisfy certain statutory re*233quirements. The requirements of sec. 60.81 are as follows : The town must have a resident population exceeding 5,000; must be adjacent to a city of the first class; *234must have an equalized valuation exceeding $20,000,000; and a petition requesting an incorporation referendum must be signed by at least 100 persons who are both *235electors and taxpayers of the town and by at least one-half of the town’s real estate owners. With one exception, the parties agree that Fitchburg meets the requirements of sec. 60.81. The only matter in dispute is whether Fitchburg is “adjacent to a city of the first class.” Thus this case turns on the interpretation of this statutory requirement.

In Wisconsin, cities are divided into four classes based on population. Sec. 62.05, Stats.9 The first class consists of cities with a population of 150,000 or more. Sec. 62.05 provides that a city’s classification shall change when (1) its population places it in a different class, (2) it provides for any necessary changes in government, and (3) when a proclamation of the mayor declaring the classification change is published according to law. Madison has had the requisite population (150,000) for first-class status since at least 1968. It has not, however, undertaken the two remaining procedures neces*236sary to effect a classification change.10 Therefore, we have determined that Madison is not a city of the first class within sec. 62.05. In re Incorporation of Town of Fitchburg, 98 Wis. 2d at 644 n. 3.

Although Madison technically does not have first-class status, it does not follow ipso facto that Fitchburg has failed to satisfy the requirements of sec. 60.81, Stats. This court has consistently stated that the spirit or intention of a statute should govern over the literal or technical meaning of the language used. Town of Menominee v. Skubitz, 53 Wis. 2d 430, 437, 192 N.W.2d 887 (1972) ; State ex rel. Jackson v. Leicht, 231 Wis. 178, 183, 285 N.W. 335 (1939) ; Board of Regents v. Mussallem, 94 Wis. 2d 657, 668, 289 N.W.2d 801 (1980).

A 1923 opinion of the attorney general aptly discussed the distinction between the intended and technical meaning of a statutory reference to city classifications. 12 Op. Atty. Gen. 344 (1923). In 1923 the population of Stevens Point had exceeded 10,000, but the city had not taken the necessary steps to change from a fourth- to a third-class city. The Wisconsin Highway Commission asked whether Stevens Point was still a fourth-class city for purposes of the statute governing apportionment of bridge construction costs. The attorney general stated that under sec. 62.05, Stats., Stevens Point technically remained a city of the fourth class. However, the attorney general went on to say that, when a statute refers to a city’s classification, it does not always mean the technical classification of sec. 62.05. Interpreting *237city classification in its technical sense for purposes of the bridge cost apportionment statute would allow a city, which by population qualifies for third-class status, to decline to make the classification change and thereby remain a city of the fourth class for bridge cost apportionment. The attorney general stated that this was not the intention of the legislature. Rather, he suggested that by referring to city classifications in the statute the legislature contemplated the population ranges of such classifications. This interpretation accords with the statute’s intended purpose — to progressively apportion bridge costs based on the size of cities and their concomitant ability to pay. Thus he concluded that, with respect to the bridge cost apportionment statute, Stevens Point should be considered a city of the third class, notwithstanding its technical fourth-class status. The attorney general reaffirmed this reasoning in 19 Op. Atty. Gen. 437 (1930).

Although attorney general opinions are not controlling precedent, we believe that 12 Op. Atty. Gen. 344 (1923) is a correct analysis of the law. Accordingly, we conclude that the legislature’s intended meaning of the phrase “city of the first class” within sec. 60.81, Stats., controls — for purposes of that statute — over its technical meaning under sec. 62.05.11

The conditions giving rise to a law along with the problems the law sought to cure are instructive in determining legislative intent. Foth v. Macomber & Whyte Rope Co., 161 Wis. 549, 551-52, 154 N.W. 369 (1915). *238Therefore, in construing sec. 60.81, Stats., we turn to its historical context.

For more than a decade following World War II, urban areas throughout the United States experienced vast increases in population.12 z The Milwaukee metropolitan area grew rapidly during this period, resulting in a wave of annexations, incorporations, and consolidations. These changes often resulted in “jigsaw” boundary lines and caused numerous disputes between neighboring municipalities. Residents of towns adjacent to Milwaukee frequently resisted the city’s annexation efforts. To preserve their local government and community identity, many towns sought to incorporate. The conflict between these suburban incorporation attempts and Milwaukee’s annexation efforts resulted in a great deal of costly, protracted litigation and uncertainty. Meanwhile, as the population of these suburban areas increased, the local governments were faced with new problems. However, their rural-oriented town government system was not properly equipped to handle the effects of urbanization. A city government structure was needed.

In an effort to quickly solve the problems stemming from Milwaukee’s rapid growth, local government officials from areas such as the town of Oak Creek worked to change the laws governing incorporation. As a result, sec. 60.81, Stats., which is sometimes called the Oak Creek law, was enacted in 1955.13 Sec. 60.81 was designed to bring stability, certainty, and an end to the bickering and litigation between Milwaukee and the contiguous towns. In order to accomplish these objectives, the statute provided a special incorporation mechanism for such suburban communities.

*239In short sec. 60.81, Stats., was the legislative solution to the unique problems facing populous towns adjacent to large cities. As the conditions giving rise to the statute suggest, it is the size of a city which creates the need for the special incorporation procedures of sec. 60.81, not whether the city is technically of the first class. Indeed, the mayoral proclamation and governmental changes necessary for a classification change under sec. 62.05, are irrelevant to the problems the legislature sought to cure through sec. 60.81. Moreover, unlike the population requirement, these two conditions are satisfied through city governmental action. Clearly the legislature did not intend to allow a city with a population of 150,000 or more to frustrate the purpose of sec. 60.81 by refusing to take the steps necessary to effect a formal classification change. Therefore, we conclude that the legislature intended the phrase “adjacent to a city of the first class” within sec. 60.81 to be a reference to cities with a population of 150,000 or more.

As noted earlier, Madison’s population exceeds 150,000. Thus for purposes of sec. 60.81, Stats., Madison is a city of the first class even though it has not formally attained that status within sec. 62.05. We conclude that Fitchburg has satisfied the requirements for incorporation under sec. 60.81.

The plaintiffs, however, contend that sec. 60.81, Stats., is invalid under Article IV, Sections 2314 and 31,15 of *240the Wisconsin Constitution. Without reaching' the merits of this constitutional attack, we conclude that it must fail for lack of standing on the part of both plaintiffs. We have already determined that Russell Mueller is without standing to maintain the lawsuit. While Madison has standing to bring this action, it cannot raise this constitutional issue. It is well settled that a municipality, being a creature of the legislature, does not have legal capacity to challenge the constitutionality of a statute. City of Madison v. Ayers, 85 Wis. 2d 540, 544, 271 N.W.2d 101 (1978) ; Town of Germantown v. Village of Germantown, 70 Wis. 2d 704, 709, 235 N.W.2d 486 .(1975). Although there are exceptions to this rule, they are not applicable to suits between two creatures of the state. Kenosha v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 317, 331, 151 N.W.2d *24136 (1967). Thus the plaintiffs’ constitutional claim is without merit.

The plaintiffs’ final claim, that the referendum results are invalid because of several alleged procedural irregularities, is also without merit.

We hold that Fitchburg is entitled to incorporate under sec. 60.81, Stats.

By the Court. — Declaratory judgment and order reversed.

(dissenting). The majority has gullibly given credence to Fitchburg’s underlying claimed right to incorporate — a claim that should have been dismissed out of hand as frivolous.

I completely agree with Justice Abrahamson’s thoughtful and well crafted dissent, but she takes the majority too seriously. The frivolity of the majority opinion mirrors the frivolousness of the town’s claim and deserves to be treated by the public and the legal community for the absurdity it is.

I differ from Justice Abrahamson only to the degree that she asserts that the majority’s error stems from ignoring the literal language of the statute. I am compelled to conclude that the problem is not one of literalness, but of literacy. The majority’s conclusion defies the expressed will of the legislature and a common sense understanding of the English language.

I dissent.

{dissenting). A few years ago, a new crop of bumperstickers sprang up in Madison and its environs. These bumperstickers carried a message to the judiciary: FREE FITCHBURG. The majority apparently took the message to heart. In its zeal to free the Town of Fitchburg from the grasp of second-class city of Madison and to liberate Fitchburg in*242to city-dom, the majority also freed this court from having to apply a statute with which it disagrees and from adhering to its own prior opinion.

The majority reads the statutory phrase “adjacent to a city of the first class,” appearing in sec. 60.81, as if the legislature had written “adjacent to a city with a population of 150,000 or more” (supra, p. 239), even though the legislature has provided that a city’s first-class classification is not dependent solely on population. Sec. 62.-05(2) provides: “. . . Cities shall pass from one class to another when [the] census shows that the change in population so requires, when provisions for any necessary changes in government are duly made, and when a proclamation of the mayor, declaring the fact, is published according to law.” (Emphasis added.)

In interpreting a statute the function of a court is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. The legislative intention, as reflected in the clear words of sec. 62.05(2), is that Madison is not a first-class city for purposes of sec. 60.81. To overcome the clear words of secs. 60.81 and 62.05, the majority apparently adopts as a canon of statutory construction that “the spirit or intention of a statute should govern over the literal or technical meaning of the language used.” Supra, p. 236. The majority attempts to derive this canon from the Leicht, Skubitz, and Mussallem cases, the last two of which rest on Leicht. These cases do not stand for the proposition that this court can be guided by the statute’s “spirit” when it chooses to ignore the statute’s words. These three cases set forth the canon of statutory construction this court invariably uses: when the literal language of the statute is ambiguous, thwarts the manifest purpose of the statute, or leads to an absurd, unreasonable, or unjust result, obscurity of meaning exists calling for judicial construction. State ex rel. Jackson v. Leicht, 231 Wis. 178, 183-85, 285 N.W. 335 (1939). See *243also Llewelyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules on Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 403 (1950).

In this case, the court does not — and can not — say that the statutory language is ambiguous, thwarts the manifest purpose of the statute, or leads to an absurd result. Thus the plain meaning rule, a rule which has its critics,1 including myself, but which this court invariably uses, see The State Historical Society of Wis. v. Village of Maple Bluff,2 decided today, governs. If there ever was a situation for application of the rule, this is it. I am concerned that the court fails even to attempt to establish a coherent approach to the problem of statutory interpretation. This case and the State Historical Society case cannot help but confuse lawyers and legislators.

The majority opinion by ignoring the literal language of the statute renders the statutes ambiguous, thwarts the manifest legislative purpose, and reaches an absurd result. The result of the majority opinion is that Madison, which the majority recognizes as a city of the second class, becomes a first-class city for purposes of sec. 60.-81. Although the majority tries to limit the effect of its opinion (n. 11), its reasoning opens the courts’ doors to those who wish to make Madison a city of first class for other statutory purposes, as well as to those who wish to change the classifications of other cities without com*244plying with the procedures set forth in sec. 62.05(2).3 There are at least eleven fourth-class cities that meet the population standards of third-class cities4 and at least two third-class cities that meet the population standards of second-class cities.5 1981-82 Blue Book, State of Wisconsin. Indeed, even Fitchburg may be more liberated than it wants to be; it intends to incorporate as a fourth-class city, but it has the requisite population to be a third-class city. This court’s opinion will cause a great deal of confusion, as the amicus curiae brief of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities points out.

If this court may, contrary to the plain meaning rule, look outside the statute to see if there is persuasive evidence of a clear legislative intention different from that to which an ordinary reading of the plain words of the statute would lead, and I think it may, I conclude that the legislative history in this case would not guide this court to the interpretation it adopted. See Johnson, The Wisconsin Experience with State-Level Review of Municipal Incorporations, Consolidations, and Annexations, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 462; Cutler, Characteristics of Land Required for Incorporation or Expansion of a Municipality, 1958 Wis. L. Rev. 6; 1977 A.B. 694; 1979 A.B. 1180, Sen. Amend. 28.

*245Finally, before I read this majority opinion, I, like the trial court in this case, thought that this court had decided the issue in this case in In re Incorporation of Town of Fitchburg, 98 Wis. 2d 635, 644, n. 3, 229 N.W.2d 199 (1980). In that case we stated that we concurred with the trial court which had determined that for purposes of interpreting sec. 60.81 “the City of Madison is not a city of the first class.” See 98 Wis. 2d at 644 and n. 3. Although this court’s statement in the first Fitchburg case did not decide the primary issue in the case, it “was plainly germane to that issue and . . . ‘when a court of last resort intentionally takes up, discusses, and decides a question germane to, though not necessarily decisive of, the controversy, such decision is not a dictum but is a judicial act of the court which it will thereafter recognize as a binding decision.’ ” State v. Kruse, 101 Wis. 2d 387, 392, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981). We ought to abide by our decision in the first Fitchburg case.

For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Bruce Beilfuss joins in this dissent.