Jones v. Thorn
Jones v. Thorn
Opinion of the Court
On the 30th day of August, 1877, Nimrod Toothman sold four undivided ninths of a tract of land situated in Marion County, containing sixty acres, to Mary A. Jones, wife of H. Frank Jones, in consideration of eight hundred and fifty dollars, subject to the dower of Phoebe J. Swisher, widow of John W. Swisher; and on the 16th of December, 1879, James N. Swisher and Sarah C. Swisher, his wife, Nimrod Toothman and Sisson M. Toothman, his wife, and Phoebe Jane Davis, late widow of John W. Swisher, conveyed two undivided ninths of said sixty acre tract to said H. Frank Jones, said Jones also purchasing from said Phoebe Jane Davis her dower interest in said four undivided ninths of said land conveyed as aforesaid to Mary A. Jones. On December 29, 1880, said Jones was indebted to one John Core in the sum of five hundred and fifty dollars, payable October 1, 1880, and on December 29, 1880, said Jones and Mary Jones, his wife, executed a deed of trust on the four-ninths of said tract conveyed as above stated to Mary Jones, and the two-ninths of same conveyed by said H. Frank Jones to A. S. Hayden, trustee, to secure the payment of said sum of five hundred and fifty dollars to said John Core, and in this way the four-ninths of said tracts which had been conveyed to said Mary A. Jones became pledged for the debt which her husband owed to John Core. On the 4th of July, 1881, said Mary A. Jones died, leaving four infant children, to wit, Bessie L. Jones, Andie L. Jones, Edith E. Brand, and Reno Jones. Said debt to John Core became due October 1, 1881, and default was made in the payment thereof. On November 19, 1881, A. S. Hayden, trustee, sold the four-ninths of said tract conveyed to said Mary A. Jones, together with the two-ninths which had been conveyed to said Frank Jones under the deed of trust, and said H. Frank Jones became the purchaser at six hundred dollars, which sum was sufficient to pay said Core debt; and thereupon said trustee deeded the entire property described in the trust deed to H. Frank Jones, who afterwards acquired some additional interests in said sixty acre tract, and contracted a considerable indebtedness, and, to secure the payment of the
Now, the fact that foui'-ninths of the sixty acre' tract of land was the separate property of Mary A. Jones must be conceded when we consider that the record discloses that said four-ninths were conveyed to said Mary A. Jones by Nimrod Toothman on August 30, 1877, and at that time our statute pi'O'dded that any married woman might take by inheritance, or by gift, grant, or bequest, from any person other than her husband, and hold to her sole and separate usé, and convey and devise, real and personal property, and any interest or estate therein, and the rents, issues, and profits thereof, in the same manner, and with like effect, as if she were unmarried, and they should not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his debts. By joining with her husband, Mary A. Jones gave a deed of trust upon said four-ninths to secure the debt of five hundred and fifty dollars to Core, which her husband owed; and in the same deed he executed a trust upon the two-ninths owned by him to secure the same debt. After the death of said Mary A. Jones, said H. Frank Jones suffered the entire six-ninths of said property to be sold, and became the purchaser himself for the amount of the Core debt. In his deposition said Jones states that he went to the trustee, Hayden, with the money to pay the Core debt, but the trustee advised him to allow the property to be sold under the trust; his wife being dead, he could purchase at the sale, and in that way, it would become his land, — that is, the entire six-ninths. The legal title was then in the trustee, Hayden, and the equity of redemption as to the four-ninths belonging to Mary Jones at the time of her decease was in her four children, and the equity of redemption of said two-ninths was in said H. Frank Jones. In the circumstances equity would consider that in purchasing said property for the amount of his debt to Core he merely redeemed the same, relieving the entire six-ninths from said trust lien. It would also appear to be in accordance with
As to the suggestion in the above assignment of error that, Mary A. Jones, one of the grantors in said deed of trust being dead, leaving infant children, no sale should have been made without the intervention of a court of equity, this Court has passed upon this question in the case of Spencer v. Lee, 19 W. Va., 179 (Syl. point 6), where it .is held that “a court of equity will in no case set aside a sale made by a trustee simply because it was made after the death of the grantor.” See, also, Burke v. Adair, 23 W. Va., 159. After becoming the owner of other portions of said sixty acres, said H. Frank Jones executed another deed of trust upon said six-ninth of said sixty acres, and the other portions he had acquired, to the same trustee, to secure certain indebtedness therein specified. Subsequently, a chancery suit was brought by said H. Frank Jones against said Hayden, trustee, and others, in which such proceedings were had that said Hayden, as trustee, was directed by a decree therein rendered to make sale of said land mentioned in said trust deed; in pursuance of which said land was sold by Hayden, trustee, at which sale Jesse G. Floyd and Hiram Kent became the purchasers of the land described in said last-named deed of trust, including the four-ninths which was the separate estate of Mary Jones, deceased, and which was conveyed by said Hayden, trustee, to said Floyd and Kent, and by them conveyed to Benjamin Thorn. It is contended by the appellants that the deed executed by A. S. Hayden, trustee, to H. Frank Jones, was void as to the four-ninths of said land belonging to the estate of Mary A. Jones; and while there is no allegation of fraud on the part of said Hayden, or of collusion between him and said H. Frank Jones, yet it appears from the deposition of said Jones that he went to said trustee to pay the debt secured by the trust, and the trustee advised him to allow the land to go to sale, and become the purchaser of it for himself; which he after-wards did. Now, the very serious question here pre
In the absence of any alleg-iations of fraud or collusion between said H. F. Jones and Trustee Hayden, can we, in response to the prayer of the bill, declare the deed from said trustee to said Jones void? We must presume that the land was property advertised and regularly sold. The deed appears to be formal and regular on its face; and while, in the circumstances, it may not have conveyed to said Jones the title of the heirs at law of Mary A. Jones to said-four-ninths would not equity treat it as a release of the trust lien on said four-ninths, and not consider the deed absolutely void? I cannot believe that the title of these remainder-men was extinguished by the sale of this property under said trust deed by Hayden, trustee, and by H. F. Jones bidding it in, and obtaining a deed by paying his own debt and the costs of sale, or that H. F. Jones, by reason of that transaction, acquired title to the four-ninths of said sixty acre tract, which was the separate estate of his wife, subject only to the dower right of Phoebe J. Swisher. Now, as to the effect of the sale under the second trust deed to Hayden, trustee, who was the same trustee that sold the property under the first trust, said Hayden had notice of all the facts connected with the former transaction, and, in addition, Jones could only convey to him such title as was vested in him; and in selling under the trust said trustee would convey with special warranty, andtoFloydandKent, the purchasers undersaid second trust deed, the principle of caveat emfitor, applies. So, in the case of Fleming v. Holt, 12 W. Va., 162, Greek, Judge, in delivering the opinion of the Court uses the following language: “In considering this question, we must
In this case the land of the heirs of Mary Jones was included in the sale with a view to conferring title upon H. F. Jones, when it appears that the two-ninths owned, by him was sufficient to pay the trust debt, and by inducing the trustee to sell the entire six-ninths he obtained an ostensible title to said four-ninths, without paying any consideration therefor, for the reason that the two-ninths owned by him were worth more than the trust debt. My conclusion, therefore, is that the circuit court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ bill, and, as the evidence in the
Reversed.
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