State v. Sergent
State v. Sergent
Opinion of the Court
This suit was manifestly begun and prosecuted by the commissioner of school lands at the instance of - the defendant Caroline Sergent, to enable her to apply for redemption of the tract described in the bill as the-first tract, and containing one hundred acres, more or less, in Geary District of Roane County,, and which the bill alleges and she admits was forfeited in her name. The answfet of the United Fuel Gas Company, however, if not that of the defendants W. F. Cook and H. C. Simmons, not found in the record, denies the forfeiture thereof by the owners thereof.The decree complained of shows the filing of the joint and several answers of Cook and Simmons, but these are not found in the record, and some advantage is sought by the appellant on this ground, she insisting that the plaintiff’s bill ought to be taken for confessed as to them. The State is not complaining of the decree, and she can not rely on the supposed pro confesso of .the State’s bill.
Prior to the filing of the bill of the State- the appellant Caroline Sergent had instituted her suit in equity in the same court against the said W. F. Cook, Ephriam Ser-gent, her husband, Henry D. Sergent, United Fuel Gas Company and South Penn Oil Company. In her bill she undertook to deraign her supposed title to the tract she sought to redeem, and therein and thereby sought to correct a certain deed made by her and her husband Ephriam Sergent to said W. F. Cook, dated April 5, 1915, in so far as said deed purports to convey any part of the tract of 211 acres claimed by her other than the part thereof conveyed by her and her husband to James Hall and W. F. Cook, by deed of December 8, 1906; also to correct another deed made by her and her husband to Henry D. Sergent, dated May 14, 1916, purporting to convey to the said Ser-
The bill in this case was answered by defendants, wherein all the allegations material to the alleged rights of the plaintiff to the relief prayed for were denied, who also and by way of estoppel pleaded and relied on the deeds of plaintiff which she sought to have corrected, set aside, con-celled and annulled, and other deeds and contracts executed by her, and certain conduct on her part wholly inconsistent with her present claims to relief.
In appellant’s petition ánd answer filed in the present suit of the commissioner of school lands she admits the forfeiture of the 100 acres, the first tract, as alleged in the bill, and then undertakes to show the manner of the forfeiture, alleging this land to be a part of the aforesaid 211 acres, that 61-1/4 acres thereof remaining after prior con-
In the petition and answer of appellant she referred to the pendency of her suit against Cook and others, and asked that the original, amended and supplemental bills therein, together with all exhibits therewith, ■ and the answers of the defendants thereto, and all exhibits therewith, and all depositions taken on behalf of plaintiff and defendants, together with all exhibits filed therewith, and all orders and decrees of the court made and entered therein, and papers filed therein, might be taken, read and treated as a part of her said answer and petition.
The answer of the defendant United Fuel Gas Company to the bill of the State also refers to the preceding suit of appellant and likewise prays that said suit may be consolidated or heard together with this suit. It alleges that the 100 acres sought to be redeemed was and is a part of a tract of 450 acres known as the MeClaskey land, and that it was never any part of the 211 acres once owned by appellant; but was the residue of the 450 acres of MeClaskey land left after three prior conveyances by the MeClaskeys out óf the same, and which Virginia MeClaskey conveyed to W. F. Cook and James Hall by deed of May 6, 1905, and thereafter leased by them to the South Penn Oil Company, by deed of lease of July 18, 1906, which lease by subsequent assignment came to respondent.
The decree appealed from shows that the cause was heard upon the pleadings and proofs in both suits, with the stipu
To entitle appellant to redeem said land from the forfeiture thereof, pursuant to sections 16 and 17 of chapter 105 of the Code, it was necessary for her in her petition to set out fully her title thereto, accompanied by the evidence thereof, and by full and satisfactory proof show that at. the time the title became vested in the State she had good and valid title thereto, legal or equitable, superior to any other claimant thereof. The only title upon which she apparently relied was the deed to her from W. H. Ser-gent and wife, dated May 12, 1902, calling for 211 acres, by metes and bounds, apparently covering the greater part of the 100 acres sought to be redeemed, a part of a 700 acre tract which was conveyed by W. H. Sergent and wife to Smith and Rader, January 12, 1856. But the record shows that the said W. .TI. Sergent had not owned any part of this larger tract since that date, and therefore had nothing remaining within said 700 acre boundary to convey to any one on September 14, 1901, and moreover, that the petitioner, prior to the filing of her petition, had sold and conveyed away to others all of the land outside of the boundary of said 700 acre Smith and Rader tract, and certainly had no title to any land within that boundary. The record further shows that the particular tract of 100 acres was part of lot No. 34, containing 450 acres, allotted to Smith or his daughter Virginia McfOlaskey in the partition of said 700 acres, and out of which she had subsequently conveyed three parcels as follows: 262 acres to W. H. Justice, 133 acres to Peter Looney, and 165 acres adjoining the 100 acres here involved to appellant’s husband Ephriam Ser-gent; that the residue thereof, supposed to contain about 80 acres, but actually containing 104 acres, becoming delinquent, was sold by the State and purchased by the heirs of Virginia McClaskey, who on May 6, 1905, conveyed the same to W. F. Cook and James Hall, who afterwards finding the Sergents laying some claim to the land, instituted their suit in ejectment against them, which was compromised and
It was the purpose of appellant’s bill to set aside, cancel and annul the said compromise deed of herself and husband of December 6, 1906, and the deed of said W. F. Cook to Ephriam Sergent of April 15, 1915, and the assignment of the said Ephriam Sergent to Henry D. Sergent of his interest in the oil and gas under the 52 acres aforesaid, as clouds on her alleged title to the whole of the said 211 acres- or that part thereof covered by the boundary of 80 acres, her theory being that these deeds on her part amount-; ed to nothing more than the relinquishment of her dower in the lands covered thereby, and were not intended to convey her title to or any interest in the 211 acres or any part thereof.
It is perfectly plairn to us from the record recited, as well as from other portions thereof not recited, that ap-
Much stress was laid upon the question of the true eastern and western boundary line between the W. H. Sergent and the so-called McClaskey or' Smith and Rader tracts, and wide scope was taken in the pleadings and proofs, and in the briefs and argument’ of counsel, on this question. But as we view'the case and the facts developed, this question is quite unimportant. The parties by contemporaneous and subsequent construction have placed this division line substantially where the appellees and their predecessors in title claim it to be, so as to conclude and estop appellant and her husband from asserting anything to the contrary. Ap-< 'pellant wholly failed to show right, legal or equitable, to correct, reform, modify or remove her deeds or the deeds of any of the other «parties as clouds upon her title, and without this concededly she could have no right to redeem the land in controversy or any part thereof. We see no reason for citing authority for any of the familiar legal principles involved, and our conclusion is to affirm the decree.
Affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.