This is a suit brought by the widow and children of James S. Jones, deceased, ag'ainst his administrator. Its purpose is to recover from the administrator the proceeds of a U. S. Adjusted Service Certificate in favor of the deceased. The administrator seeks to pay the debts of the estate out of the *56 proceeds. Tbe circuit court found in favor of tbe administrator.

In tbe first instance, tbis certificate is not properly a part of tbe decedent’s estate and tbe administrator was not entitled to collect it. Under tbe express provisions of section 661 of title 38 Mason’s U. S. Code, Ann., the amount of tbe adjusted service credit in sucb case, shall be paid, not to the veteran’s estate, but to his dependents, tbe widow being preferred.

In tbe second place the sum payable to tbe dependents is expressly exempted by section 618 of same title from “attachment, levy or seizure under any legal or equitable process.” It is settled law, that as payments sucb as tbis are mere bounties which tbe government may grant or withhold at pleasure, Congress may surround these gratuities with such conditions as it deems proper to impose. Hissem v. Johnson, 27 W. Va. 644, 652; Kellog v. Waite Tr., 94 Mass. (12 Allen), 529, 530; U. S. v. Hall, 98 U. S. 343, 357. In discussing an exempting phrase similar to tbe one above, tbe court said in Hissem v. Johnson, supra: “Tbe exemption here declared is absolute and unqualified.” Congress has manifestly intended to so surround this fund with protection that creditors cannot take it away from dependents. It was well said in a recent Iowa decision: “In other words, during tbe course of human events, tbe thought became developed among states and nations that for tbe good of mankind there are instances when it is best that creditors go unpaid in order that certain individuals in society may have a particular source of income dedicated to personal or family sustenance, maintenance and enjoyment.” Andrew v. Bank, 219 N. W. 62, 64. Congress having dedicated tbis bounty exclusively to tbe dependents of tbe decedent, tbe administrator is without any authority whatsoever to divert it to bis creditors. See, generally, Crotty v. Eden, 35 W. Va. 143.

Tbe decree of tbe circuit court is accordingly reversed and tbe cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.