Helen Morris; a.k.a. Helen King, appel-lanVdefendant (hereinafter Ms. Morris), appeals her criminal conviction by a jury in the Circuit Court of Harrison County. Ms. Morris was convicted of third offense shoplifting. She was sentenced to 1-10 years imprisonment. In this appeal, Ms. Morris argues that the trial court committed reversible error by: (1) denying her motion to stipulate to prior shoplifting convictions; (2) denying her motion to exclude evidence of her prior shoplifting convictions; (3) allowing her to be impeached through the use of prior shoplifting evidence; (4) admitting evidence by a court clerk; (5) denying her motion to suppress certain evidence; (6) denying her motions for a mistrial and new trial; and (7) denying her motions to set aside the verdict and enter a judgment of acquittal. Following a review of the parties’ arguments, the record of the proceedings below, and the pertinent authorities, we affirm the decision of the Circuit Court of Harrison County.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On November 26, 1995, Ms. Morris was in the J.C. Penney store at the Meadowbrook Mall.1 Ms. Morris was at the store with her daughter and three friends. A store employee, Robert Waybright, observed Ms. Morris remove a white sweatshirt from a rack, kneel on the floor and place the sweatshirt into a bag. Ms. Morris moved through the store with the sweatshirt concealed and approached another store employee, Eric Smith. Ms. Morris began questioning Mr. Smith about store hours. Mr. Smith testified that Ms. Morris then began yelling and cursing at him. She further accused him of watching her.2 Ms. Morris turned from Mr. Smith and left the store with the sweatshirt concealed in her bag. Mr. Smith followed Ms. Morris out of the store and once outside the store, Mr. Smith informed her of his suspicions. After a heated verbal altercation by Ms. Morris, Mr. Smith convinced Ms. Morris to return inside the store. Upon returning to the store, another shouting match ensued. Mr. Smith, who had been threatened by one of the individuals accompanying Ms. Morris, left the scene to call the police. As soon as Mr. Smith left, Ms. Morris dropped the white sweatshirt3 and left the store. She went to another part of the Mall.

After placing a telephone call to local police, Mr. Smith found Mall security and located Ms. Morris and her companions. Another verbal confrontation ensued. Eventually, Sergeant C.E. Springer of the Bridgeport Police Department arrived. Sergeant Springer requested that Ms. Morris return *506to the J.C. Penney store. Ms. Morris agreed. Based upon statements from the J.C. Penney employees, Sergeant Springer issued a shoplifting citation to Ms. Morris.4

A grand jury subsequently indicted Ms. Morris for the felony crime of third offense shoplifting.5 After a two-day jury trial, Ms. Morris was convicted on September 24, 1996, of third offense shoplifting. On November 21,1996, the trial court sentenced Ms. Morris to 1-10 years imprisonment. This appeal followed.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issues presented in this case concern objections by Ms. Morris to the admission of certain evidence by the trial court. It is a well established principle of law in West Virginia that “[rjulings on the admissibility of evidence are largely within a trial court’s sound discretion[.]” State v. Louk, 171 W.Va. 639, 643, 301 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1983). In syllabus point 6 of State v. Kopa, 173 W.Va. 43, 311 S.E.2d 412 (1983), this *507Court held that “[t]he action of a trial court in admitting or excluding evidence in the exercise of its discretion will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears that such action amounts to an abuse of discretion.” See Syl. pt. 3, State v. Oldaker, 172 W.Va. 258, 304 S.E.2d 843 (1983); Syl. pt. 2, State v. Rector, 167 W.Va. 748, 280 S.E.2d 597 (1981); Syl. pt. 5, Casto v. Martin, 159 W.Va. 761, 230 S.E.2d 722 (1976); Syl. pt. 10, State v. Huffman, 141 W.Va. 55, 87 S.E.2d 541 (1955).

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Prior Shoplifting Convictions

Ms. Morris has assigned as error three issues involving her prior shoplifting convictions. Ms. Morris asserts that the trial court committed error in (1) denying her motion to stipulate to prior shoplifting convictions; (2) denying her motion to exclude evidence of her prior shoplifting convictions; and (3) allowing her to be impeached through the use of prior shoplifting evidence. These issues are controlled by our recent decision in State v. Hopkins, 192 W.Va. 483, 453 5.E.2d 317 (1994) (Cleckley, J. dissenting).6 We held in Hopkins that “[b]ecause evidence of the prior convictions [for shoplifting] is a necessary element of the -crime charged, the evidence is admissible for jury purposes.” Id. at 489, 453 S.E.2d at 323. Because Hopkins made clear that prior shoplifting convictions were elements of the crime of third offense shoplifting, the State must prove those elements to a jury.

Hopkins clearly articulated that the State is not obligated to stipulate to the prior shoplifting convictions. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to stipulate.7 Also, it was not error to deny Ms. Morris’ motion to exclude the evidence of her prior shoplifting convictions. In fact, Hopkins requires the State to prove the prior shoplifting convictions as an element of the offense upon which Ms. Morris was indicted. In State v. Cozart, 177 W.Va. 400, 402 n. 1, 352 S.E.2d 152, 153 n. 1 (1986) this Court discussed whether the State improperly admitted evidence of a defendant’s two prior convictions for driving under the influence and concluded that “where a prior conviction is a necessary element of the current offense charged ... it is admissible for jury purposes[.]” See State v. Barker, 179 W.Va. 194, 199 n. 12, 366 S.E.2d 642, 647 n. 12 (1988). Finally, Ms, Morris’ contention that she was improperly impeached, with prior shoplifting evidence, by the State during her testimony is without merit. As part of its proof, the State asked Ms. Morris if she had been convicted for shoplifting on two prior occasions. Ms. Morris admitted to the prior convictions. The trial court gave a limiting instruction to the jury wherein it cautioned the jury that the testimony was to be considered for the sole purpose of proving the prior offenses as an element of the third offense shoplifting. Ms. Morris’ testimony was not evidence of the commission of the current shoplifting charge. This Court noted, in the context of cross examining a defendant regarding prior DUI convictions, that “[t]he defendant’s credibility is not the issue.... The issue is whether the defendant was guilty of a third offense[J” *508Cozart, 177 W.Va. at 402 n. 1, 352 S.E.2d at 153 n. 1. Hence, we affirm the decision of the Circuit Court of Harrison County as our law clearly concludes that prior shoplifting convictions are an element of third offense shoplifting.

B. Admitting Evidence By Court Clerk

Next, Ms. Morris argues that the trial court committed error by permitting Marion County Magistrate Court Clerk Cathy Gower to introduce evidence of Ms. Morris’ second prior shoplifting conviction.8 Ms. Gower testified regarding certified magistrate court documents. The documents clearly established that Ms. Morris had a prior conviction for shoplifting.9 Over the hearsay objections of Ms. Morris, the trial court admitted the evidence under Rule 803 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence as testimony of a public record.

Ms. Morris contends that the evidence by Ms. Gower should have been excluded under Rule 803(8)(B), which provides that matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel contained in public records are inadmissible. Rule 803(8)(B) has no application to public records of a conviction.10 This Court has held that the contents of a public record to be an exception to the hearsay rule. The contents are assumed to be trustworthy, unless the opponent establishes that the report is sufficiently untrustworthy. See Hess v. Arbogast, 180 W.Va. 319, 376 S.E.2d 333 (1988). See also W.Va. R.Evid. Rule 902(4) (public record self-authenticated). “Official reports of ... court-ordered judgments and sentences kept in the court’s files ... are included within this exception.” Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence, § 8-3(B)(8)(c), pg. 233 (1994). In the instant proceeding, the public records complained of were clearly admissible under Rule 803(8)(A) as records, reports, statements or data setting forth the activities of the clerk’s office. We find no error in permitting the introduction into evidence, through Ms. Gower of Ms. Morris’ second prior shoplifting conviction.

C. Denial of Motion to Suppress Evidence

Ms. Morris contends that the trial court committed error in denying her motion to suppress evidence of the contents of her purse because she was not given Miranda warnings prior to her purse being examined by Sergeant Springer.11 This Court noted in syllabus point 1 of State v. Preece, 181 W.Va. 633, 383 S.E.2d 815 (1989), that “Miranda warnings are required whenever a suspect has been formally arrested or subjected to custodial interrogation, regardless of the nature or severity of the offense.” The trial court determined that Ms. Morris was not in custody when she returned to the J.C. Pen*509ney store with Sergeant Springer. The trial court also concluded that the officer’s questions regarding identification did not amount to interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. We agree.

The evidence is clear that Ms. Morris was asked by Sergeant Springer to accompany him back to the J.C. Penney store. She freely returned with him. While at the store, Sergeant Springer asked Ms. Morris for identification. Ms. Morris stated that she did not have any identification. When the officer commented that everyone carries some type of identification, Ms. Morris voluntarily invited the officer to look in her purse. While looking for identification, the officer found several empty plastic shopping bags with the names of various stores on them. Sergeant Springer’s observations of the bags came as a result of Ms. Morris’ invitation to him to examine the contents of her purse. In view of the circumstances surrounding this observation, Sergeant Springer’s trial testimony regarding the bags was properly admitted.12 See Hopkins, 192 W.Va. at 486-488, 453 S.E.2d at 320-322.

IV.

CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing, we find no error. Therefore, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

Affirmed.

dissenting:1

For the reasons so eloquently expressed by Justice Cleckley in his separate opinion in State v. Hopkins, 192 W.Va. 483, 453 S.E.2d 317 (1994) (Cleckley, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting), I respectfully dissent.

dissenting:

In State v. Hopkins, 192 W.Va. 483, 453 S.E.2d 317 (1994), this Court held that prior shoplifting convictions are elements of the crime of third-offense shoplifting, and are therefore admissible before the jury. I am in full agreement with Justice Cleckley when he said, in his dissent to Hopkins, “I think this case is wrong.” 192 W.Va. at 495, 453 S.E.2d at 329 (Cleckley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority opinion, in following Hopkins, is also wrong in the present case.

The majority opinion in this case and in Hopkins simply ignores Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.1 It is undeniable that a jury will be more inclined to convict once they hear that a defendant has previously been convicted of similar conduct. Rule 404(b) was designed to keep such evidence of other crimes away from a jury, thus focusing the jury on the proper question: did the defendant commit the crime with which he is currently charged? Whether a defendant was previously convicted of similar conduct goes to the defendant’s penalty; this evidence should not be admissible to show that “if he did it before, he must have done it this time.”

As Justice Cleckley cogently stated in Hopkins, “prior convictions are not elements of the current charge; they are elements of penalty enhancement.” Hopkins, 192 W.Va. at 496, 453 S.E.2d at 330. Therefore, the trial in second- or third-offense shoplifting cases should be bifurcated, and evidence of prior convictions should only be admitted into evidence if and after guilt has been found on the underlying offense.

In footnote 1, the majority opinion suggests that because Hopkins was “decided just four years ago,” this Court is bound by stare decisis and cannot revisit and overrule Hopkins. The binding effect of a judicial opinion on future generations should not be based on the number of years that have passed since the opinion was issued by a Court, but rather should be found in the strength of the Court’s reasoning in the opinion, and the fairness of its result.

Because Hopkins reached an unfair result, and because its holding was “a torture of sound legal reasoning,” Id., I would overrule that opinion and grant the defendant in this case a new trial. I am confident that the unfair approach adhered to in Hopkins cannot stand continued scrutiny. I therefore urge the bar to continue to present similar bifurcation issues to this Court, so that we will have ample occasion to consider the issue and examine its fundamental unfairness.

I therefore respectfully dissent.