This is an appeal by Donna Jean O’Brien (hereinafter “Appellant”) from an order of the Circuit Court of Roane County denying her motion for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motion to set aside the verdict, and motion for a new trial. The jury verdict held the Appellant liable for injuries inflicted upon an infant, Lee M. Atkins, by a dog alleged to have been owned or kept by the Appellant. We find that hearsay evidence regarding ownership of the dog was improperly admitted and reverse and remand on that basis.

I.

The Appellant and her ex-husband, Mr. Samuel O’Brien, purchased a dog during their marriage.2 They divorced in 1988, and the dog remained with Mr. O’Brien.3 Mr. *459O’Brien lived on a farm owned by the Appellant, in exchange for the performance of caretaking duties by Mr. O’Brien at that farm. Mrs. O’Brien testified that she visited the property only about once per year.

On March 24, 1992, a two-year old neighbor, Lee Atkins, was attacked by the dog and incurred multiple injuries and permanent facial scarring. In 1993, the Atkins filed suit, alleging that Mrs. O’Brien was the owner of the vicious dog and that Mr. O’Brien knowingly harbored the dog at his residence even though both the Appellant and Mr. O’Brien had reason to know that the animal was vicious.4 The Atkins did not make an allegation of strict liability in their complaint. Subsequent to trial on October 8, 1996, the jury found the Appellant and Mr. O’Brien jointly and severally liable and awarded $25,-000 in damages to the parents and $20,000 to the infant child. The lower court denied post-judgment relief requested by the Appellant, and the Appellant appeals to this Court.

II.

The Appellant maintains that the lower court erred in admitting hearsay statements concerning ownership of the dog. The victim’s mother, Appellee Lisa Atkins, and grandmother, Mrs. Zana Conley, both testified that they had been told by a veterinarian 5 following the incident that the dog was registered to Mrs. O’Brien. They had also allegedly learned during their telephone conversations with the veterinarian that the dog had received its rabies shots. The lower court permitted the hearsay testimony regarding the veterinarian’s alleged statements regarding the ownership of the dog under Rule 803(4) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence6 as an exception to the hearsay rule involving statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. The Appellant argues that the statements regarding ownership of the dog did not fall within the parameters of the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule and should not have been permitted.

The Appellees maintain that the hearsay was admissible due to the Appellant’s repeated failure to comply with discovery requests regarding ownership and her refusal to authorize the release of the dog’s veterinary records. Such request for a release of the dog’s medical records was made in April 1994, and the release was not supplied until February 1996, approximately eight months prior to trial.

We conclude that the lower court’s admission of the hearsay evidence was improper. The Rule 803(4) exception clearly contemplates only that information which was stated for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. We quoted the language of Rule 803(4) in syllabus point four of State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W.Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990), recognizing:

The following [is] ... not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the déclar-ant is available as a witness: ... (4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. W.Va.R.Evid. 803(4).

In syllabus point five of Edward Charles L., we explained: “The two-part test set for admitting hearsay statements pursuant to W.Va.R.Evid. 803(4) is (1) the declarant’s motive in making the statements must be consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment, and (2) the content of the statement must be such as is reasonably relied upon by a physician in treatment or diagnosis.”

The testimony regarding conversations with the veterinarian in the present ease was *460introduced in an attempt to prove the ownership of the dog, the dispositive issue in the case. We find the admission of such evidence improper; thus, reversal and remand are necessitated, especially in light of the fact that ownership was the key issue at trial.7

Reversed and remanded.