This appeal was filed by Michelle Fuller, appellant/plaintiff below1 (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Fuller”), from an order by the Circuit Court of Raleigh County granting summary judgment in favor of Alice E. Riffe and Ellis Riffe, appellees/defendants below (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Riffes”). The circuit court granted summary judgment concluding that Ms. Fuller filed her complaint after the two year tort statute of limitations. Ms. Fuller argues that the discovery rule for torts was applicable, thus defeating the two year statute of limitations. Alternatively, she contends that the circuit court’s ruling was error because the statute of limitations for contracts governed her ease. Based upon the parties’ arguments on appeal, the record designated for appellate review, and the pertinent authorities, we reverse the decision of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Guy Meek, deceased, executed a will on March 15, 1995, devising all of his estate to Ms. Fuller and naming her as the executrix of his estate.2 On August 22, 1995, Mr. Meek executed a deed conveying his residence to the Riffes.3 The deed stated that $60,000 was paid as consideration for the property. Six days after conveying his residence to the Riffes, Mr. Meek died.

Both parties agree that no consideration was actually paid for the property. The Riffes contend that the property was an inter vivos gift. In contrast, Ms. Fuller argues that the property was not a gift. Ms. Fuller instituted this action, on behalf of Mr. Meek’s estate and individually, to recover the $60,000 or to have the property reconveyed to the estate.

The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Riffes based on its conclusion that the action was a tort and that it was filed after the running of the two year statute of limitations.4 From this ruling, Ms. Fuller now appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have held that “[a] circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). *211“A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.” Syl. pt. 3, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). We have similarly stated that “[u]n-der Rule 56(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper only where the moving party shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Painter, 192 W.Va. at 192, 451 S.E.2d at 758.

III.

DISCUSSION

Ms. Fuller contends that her cause of action sounded in contract5 and in tort.6 Therefore, under existing principles of law the statute of limitations for torts was not applicable.7 In contrast, the Riffes contend that the complaint sounded only in tort. Thus, the circuit court correctly applied the tort statute of limitations.

Our cases have held that “[a] complaint that could be construed as being either in tort or on contract will be presumed to be on contract whenever the action would be barred by the statute of limitation if eon-strued as being in tort.” Syl. pt. 1, Cochran v. Appalachian Power Co., 162 W.Va. 86, 246 S.E.2d 624 (1978). Accord Syl. pt. 4, Smith v. Stacy, 198 W.Va. 498, 482 S.E.2d 115 (1996). The relevant provisions of the complaint filed in this action provide as follows:

12. Defendants, and especially defendant Alice M. Riffe, took unlawful advantage of her fiduciary relationship with Guy Meek and exerted undue influence over Guy Meek when she procured his signature on the August 22, 1995 Deed six days prior to his death.

13. Under these circumstances, plaintiff is entitled to have the defendants pay the Estate the sum of $60,000, plus interest, which represents the fair market value of the property in question on August 28, 1995.

Based upon our review of the above cause of action provisions, and the complaint as a whole, we are unable to say that the complaint invoked exclusively a tort cause of action. The complaint could be read as stating a cause of action in contract, as well as in tort. For example, the complaint could be reasonably interpreted as a contract action because no money was actually paid for the property in question. Additionally, the type of relief requested in the complaint sounds in contract. Finally, the complaint could be *212also read as stating a cause of action in tort based upon the manner in which Mr. Meek’s signature was obtained on the deed. “We therefore conclude that this action sounds in tort and contract and should not be precluded by a tort statute of limitations.” Smith v. Stacy, 198 W.Va. 498, 503, 482 S.E.2d 115, 120 (1996). Consequently, the trial court committed error in applying the tort statute of limitations to bar the action.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained in the body of this opinion, the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded for additional proceedings.

Reversed and Remanded.