concurring:

I agree with the Court’s ruling and write separately to expand on the issue raised in footnote one of the majority opinion. After reviewing this issue, it is clear that a tenant found to be in wrongful occupation of residential rental property, whose tenancy has expired, may not remain in possession of the rental property throughout the pendency of his appeal.

Magistrate Brenda Marshall entered an order of “Possession/Removal: Wrongful Occupation of Residential Rental Property” against Rhonda Bay following a hearing in magistrate court brought by Ms. Bay’s landlord. The magistrate awarded immediate possession of the rental property to the landlord. Ms. Bay argued that the magistrate erred when ruling that Ms. Bay was not permitted to remain in possession of the rental property throughout the pendency of her appeal. During oral argument before this Court, counsel for Ms. Bay stated that she no longer sought to occupy the rental property. This issue is therefore moot but since it frequently arises in magistrate and circuit courts throughout the state, I will address Ms. Bay’s argument.

Ms. Bay argued that the magistrate’s ruling that she could not remain in possession of the rental property during the pendency of her appeal violated the automatic stay provision set forth in W.Va.Code § 50-5-12(a), whose last sentence states “[t]he filing or granting of an appeal shall automatically stay further proceedings to enforce the judgment.” This statute must be read in conjunction with W.Va.Code § 55-3A-l et seq.1, entitled “Remedies For Wrongful Occupation of Residential Rental Property” (hereinafter “Wrongful Occupation Act”). The Wrongful Occupation Act was passed in 1983 “to provide the landlord with a quick procedure to remove a hold-over tenant[.]” Criss v. Salvation Army Residences, 173 W.Va. 634, 638, 319 S.E.2d 403, 407 (1984).

The controlling language of the Wrongful Occupation Act that governs the issue before us is found in W.Va.Code § 55-3A-3(g), which states:

In the event an appeal is taken and the tenant prevails upon appeal, the relief ordered by the appellate court shall be for monetary damages only and shall not restore the tenant to possession if the term of the lease has expired, absent an issue of title, retaliatory eviction, or breach of warranty. During the pendency of any such appeal, the tenant is not entitled to remain in possession of the property if the period of the tenancy has otherwise expired.

(Emphasis added).

In the present case, Ms. Bay and her landlord had a month-to-month verbal tenancy agreement. The landlord was required to give her a full rental period’s notice to vacate, which he did. Therefore, Magistrate Marshall found that Ms. Bay was in wrongful occupation of the premises and awarded monetary damages against her. Ms. Bay was not permitted to remain in possession of the property during the pendency of her appeal because her tenancy had expired.

The Wrongful Occupation Act does not permit a tenant found to be in wrongful occupation of residential rental property, whose tenancy has expired, to remain in possession of the property during the pendency of his appeal. The Act was passed to provide a landlord with a quick mechanism to remove a hold-over tenant. To allow a tenant to remain in possession pending the appeal would defeat the purpose of the Act and would create an incentive for a tenant to *686delay the appellate process. The Wrongful Occupation Act does not even permit a tenant in a wrongful occupation proceeding to seek a continuance without paying rent into court as it becomes due. W.Va.Code § 55-3A-3(d), states, “[i]f a continuance is granted upon request by a tenant, the tenant shall be required to pay into court any periodic rent becoming due during the period of such continuance.”

In view of the purpose of the Wrongful Occupation Act and the plain language of W.Va.Code § 55-3A-3(g), a tenant found to be in wrongful occupation of residential rental property, whose tenancy has expired, may not remain in possession of the property during the pendency of his appeal.

In the consolidated cases examined by the Court in this matter, tenants have sought relief in the form of writs of mandamus and prohibition in cases originating separately in Wood County and Roane County. In State ex rel. Rhonda Bay v. Honorable Brenda K. Marshall, Magistrate of Wood County, et al., tenant Rhonda Bay seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Magistrate Court of Wood County to accept the filing of her appeal to the Circuit Court of Wood County without requiring her to post an appeal bond.1 In State ex rel. Ashleigh and Daniel Jurkovich v. Honorable Jason Bennett, Magistrate of Roane Co., et al., Ashleigh and Daniel Jurkovieh seek a writ of mandamus to compel the Magistrate Court of Roane County to allow them to file an appeal without the payment of a filing fee. Subsequent to thorough review of the arguments of counsel, records submitted for review by this Court, and applicable precedent, this Court finds that the requested writs of mandamus should be granted as moulded. The Magistrate Courts of Wood County and Roane County failed to perform a non-discretionary duty by requiring the posting of an appeal bond in Ms. Bay’s case and the payment of a filing fee in the Jurkoviches’ case.

I. Factual and Procedural History

A. Bay v. Magistrate of Wood County

In the first of these two consolidated matters, Rhonda Bay, a tenant of landlord Albert Pryor, leased property in Parkersburg, West Virginia, through a month-to-month verbal rental agreement for $695.00 per month. According to the record in this matter, a water pipe on the premises broke in August 2010. Responding water company personnel ultimately reported unsafe conditions, and citations for violation of health and safety codes were issued.

Mr. Pryor filed an unlawful detainer action 2 against Ms. Bay in Magistrate Court in September 2010. Ms. Bay denied the allegations and asserted that she had not received notice of the hearing3 held on October 6, 2010, during which immediate possession of the leased premises and costs of $387.22 were awarded to Mr. Pryor. When Ms. Bay sought to appeal this holding, she was informed that she would be required to pay an appeal bond despite the fact that she had been permitted to submit a financial affidavit pursuant to West Virginia Code § 59-2-1 (1999) (Repl.Vol. 2005),4 allowing her to pro*682ceed informa pauperis and waiving the payment of a normal circuit court filing fee.

In her request for relief with this Court, Ms. Bay maintains that the Magistrate Court lacked authority to require the posting of an appeal bond where a financial affidavit pursuant to West Virginia Code § 59-2-1 had been submitted and approved, waiving the payment of the circuit court filing fee. Specifically, Ms. Bay emphasizes that West Virginia Code § 50-5-12(a) (1994) (Repl.Vol. 2008) provides that “[n]o bond shall be required ... of a person who has been permitted to proceed without prepayment in accordance with the provisions of’ West Virginia Code § 59-2-1.

B. Jurkovich v. Magistrate of Roane County

Mr. and Mrs. Jurkovich instituted a civil action against their landlord, Mr. Clark Crider, seeking compensation for the loss of use of rental premises due to flea infestation, allegedly caused by pets of a neighboring tenant. Subsequent to the filing of a counterclaim and a separate action by Mr. Crider claiming damages to the rental unit, Mr. Crider was awarded $1,298.60. Mr. and Mrs. Jurkovich sought to appeal the magistrate court determination to the Circuit Court of Roane County. Prior to the initiation of their civil action, Mr. and Mrs. Jurkovich had filed a financial affidavit pursuant to West Virginia Code § 59-2-1 and had been permitted to proceed informa pauperis, waiving the requirement for payment of a magistrate court filing fee. However, upon their attempt to appeal, they were informed by court personnel that they would be required to pay the $146.00 filing fee to appeal from magistrate court to circuit court.

Mr. and Mrs. Jurkovich now seek a writ of mandamus to compel the Magistrate Court of Roane County to allow them to file an appeal without the payment of circuit court filing fees.

II. Standard of Review

This Court has consistently held that “[petitioners in mandamus must have a clear legal right to the relief sought therein and such right cannot be established in the proceeding itself.” Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Kucera v. The City of Wheeling, 153 W.Va. 538, 170 S.E.2d 367 (1969). In syllabus point two of Kucera, this Court also stated: “A writ of mandamus will not issue unless three elements coexist — (1) a clear’ legal right in the petitioner to the relief sought; (2) a legal duty on the part of respondent to do the thing which the petitioner seeks to compel; and (3) the absence of another adequate remedy.”

III. Discussion

In State ex rel. Deblasio v. Jackson, 227 W.Va. 206, 707 S.E.2d 33 (2011), this Court recently addressed the procedures available to qualified indigent litigants to initiate civil actions without the prepayment of fees, costs, and security. In Deblasio, this Court explained that a proceeding in forma pauperis is permitted through the procedures identified in West Virginia Code § 59-2-1, as quoted above, and is implemented through Rule 77(e) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 22 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the Magistrate Courts of West Virginia, and the Financial Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Waiver of Fees, Costs, or Security in Civil Cases, approved by this Court on April 29, 2003.5 In syllabus point three of Deblasio, this Court explained:

The Financial Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Waiver of Fees, Costs, or Security in Civil Cases, require the clerk of the court to make the initial determination whether the disclosures in an applicant’s financial affidavit meet the Guidelines to proceed in forma pauperis. A writ of mandamus will issue to compel the clerk to perform that non-discretionary administrative duty.

*683Syllabus point four of Deblasio provides as follows:

Where a clerk of a court has denied an application to proceed in forma pauperis, and the applicant has requested a review of that denial by a judge, the sole issue to be determined by the judge reviewing the application and financial affidavit is whether the applicant meets the Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Waiver of Fees, Costs, or Security in Civil Cases.

The guiding language of West Virginia Code § 59-2-1 expressly provides that the statute applies to individuals “financially unable to pay the fees or costs attendant to the commencement, prosecution or defense of any civil action or proceeding, or an appeal therein----” Thus, fees associated with an appeal may also be waived upon the filing of a financial affidavit for the waiver of fees under the procedures of West Virginia Code § 59-2-1.6 An additional financial affidavit may be required under certain circumstances, as identified in West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 77(e)(1),7 explaining as follows:

A person seeking waiver of fees, costs, or security, pursuant to Chapter 59, Article 2, Section 1 [§ 59-2-1] of the Code of West Virginia, shall execute before the clerk or a deputy an affidavit prescribed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals, which shall be kept confidential in divorce and domestic violence proceedings. An additional affidavit of indigency shall be filed whenever the financial condition of the person no longer conforms to the financial guidelines established by the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals for determining indigency or whenever an order has been entered directing the filing of a new affidavit.

This Court also addressed this matter in footnote ten of Deblasio, explaining that “our rules and precedent permit a judge or magistrate to conduct a review, after the complaint is filed, as to whether a litigant is indigent and entitled to proceed in forma pauperis.” 227 W.Va. at 213 n. 10, 707 S.E.2d at 40 n. 10.

These circumstances typically arise where information becomes available to the court that a litigant has greater assets than listed in the financial affidavit or where the litigant receives additional assets as a result of the litigation. Examples of this latter category are, e.g., marital distribution in a divorce case or a settlement or award of damages in the civil case in which the litigant had previously been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. In these circumstances, the court may require the payment of fees, costs, or security previously waived, and require the timely *684payment (in accordance with the rules of the court) of any additional fees, costs, or security that may subsequently be incurred as a result of the litigation.

Id. at 213 n. 10, 707 S.E.2d at 40 n. 10.

With specific regard to the appeal bond requested in Ms. Bay’s case, this Court explicitly held as follows in syllabus point two of Rosier v. Rosier, 162 W.Va. 902, 253 S.E.2d 553 (1979): “The appeal bond required by the Rules of the Supreme Court of Appeals is a cost within the meaning of W.Va.Code, 59-2-1, and a poor person, within the meaning of that statute, may prosecute an appeal on his own recognizance, rather than by posting a money bond.”8 Moreover, West Virginia Code § 50-5-12 provides that “No bond shall be required of any ... person who has been permitted to proceed without prepayment in accordance with the provisions of section one, article two, chapter fifty-nine of this code [59-2-1].”

The financial affidavits required for proceeding in forma patiperis were properly filed in each of the two consolidated cases examined herein.9 In Ms. Bay’s case, she filed the financial affidavit and was informed that the circuit court filing fee would be waived. Despite that waiver, however, she was required to pay the appeal bond to proceed with her appeal in circuit court. Similarly, Mr. and Mrs. Jurkovich proceeded in forma pauperis and had their magistrate court filing fee waived, but they were thereafter informed that a filing fee would be charged to appeal from magistrate court to circuit court. Applying the statutory guidelines to the present factual scenarios, this Court finds that Ms. Bay should not be required to pay an appeal bond. Her financial affidavit, approved for the waiver of filing fees, should also have been accepted for waiver of the appeal bond, pursuant to authorities enumerated above. Likewise, the Jurkoviches should not have to pay a filing fee to appeal. Their financial affidavit, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 59-2-1, had been approved prior to the filing of the original action.

The statutory and rule authority for proceeding in forma pauperis provide the petitioners herein with a clear legal right to compel the clerks, by mandamus, to perform a nondiseretionary administrative duty. Although the courts could, at any point, require the submission of an additional affidavit of indigency,10 the denial by the Magistrate Courts of Wood County and Roane County of the litigants’ right to proceed without payment of the requested fees was in error. A writ of mandamus will therefore issue in each of these two consolidated cases.

Writs granted as moulded.