In this appeal from the Circuit Court of Monroe County, we are asked to consider whether a person may lose his/her driver’s license because, while under the influence of alcohol, he/she operated a vehicle1 solely upon private land. West Virginia Code § 17C-5-2a(a) [1983], at its core, prohibits intoxicated driving “anywhere within the physical boundaries of this State.” Through the adoption of this statute, the Legislature extended West Virginia’s driving-under-the-influence statutes to proscribe driving while intoxicated upon private property. Hence, we hold that an individual may lose his/her driver’s license if they are found driving a vehicle anywhere within the physical boundaries of West Virginia while under the influence of alcohol (and/or drugs), even if the vehicle is driven only upon private property not open to the general public.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The essential facts in this ease are undisputed. Around 1:00 a.m. on February 4, 2012, respondent Joshua Beckett was driving an unlicensed all-terrain vehicle (“ATV”) on family-owned farm land, in a field that was not open to the public, in Monroe County, West Virginia. Mr. Beckett wrecked the ATV and was injured. A companion called 911 and then transported Mr. Beckett to a highway to be loaded into an ambulance. An emergency medical technician in the ambulance noted the smell of alcohol on Mr. Beckett, and later testified that Mr. Beckett said he had consumed alcohol before he wrecked.

At the hospital, tests allegedly showed Mr. Beckett’s blood alcohol content was 0.17%.2 A sheriffs deputy thereafter charged Mr. Beckett with the criminal offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”) with a blood alcohol content greater than 0.15% (also called aggravated DUI).3 That charge was ultimately dismissed by a magistrate.

While the criminal charge was pending, the sheriffs deputy notified the petitioner, the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (“Commissioner”), that Mr. Beckett had been driving a motor vehicle in West Virginia while under the *356influence of alcohol. Effective May 9, 2012, the Commissioner entered an order revoking Mr. Beckett’s privilege to drive for 45 days. Mr. Beckett appealed and the revocation was stayed.

A hearing was conducted by the Office of Administrative Hearings. Mr. Beckett argued to the administrative law judge that his license could not be revoked because he was driving the unlicensed ATV only upon private, family-owned land, and there was no evidence he was driving on a public street or highway. The administrative law judge rejected his argument and upheld the Commissioner’s revocation order.

Mr. Beckett then appealed to the circuit court and made the same argument. In an order entered September 30, 2015, the circuit court reversed the decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings. The circuit court concluded that because Mr. Beckett’s “actions did not occur on land open to public use,” the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to revoke Mr. Beckett’s driving privileges.

The Commissioner now appeals the circuit court’s September 30, 2015, order.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“On appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained in W.Va. Code § 29A-5-4(a) and reviews questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong.”4

m.

ANALYSIS

The Commissioner may administratively revoke a person’s license to drive if the Commissioner determines that the person violated a criminal DUI statute.5 The statute under which Mr. Beckett was charged, W.Va. Code § 17C-5-2(e) [2010], criminalized being a “person who drives a vehicle in this state” while being under the influence (emphasis added). The parties’ arguments center upon what it means to drive a vehicle in this State. The question presented by the parties is this: does the Commissioner have the authority to revoke the license of a person who drives a vehicle under the influence anywhere within the physical boundaries of this State? Or is the Commissioner’s administrative jurisdiction limited to DUI offenses that occur only on public streets, public highways, and those private thoroughfares open to public use?

West Virginia Code § 17C-5-2a(a) [1983] provides the following definition of the phrase “in this State,” when it is used in a DUI statute:

For purposes of this article [pertaining to criminal DUI] and article five-A [pertaining to administrative license revocation for DUI] of this chapter, the phrase "to this State” shall mean anywhere within the physical boundaries of this State, including, but not limited to, publicly maintained streets and highways, and subdivision streets or other areas not publicly maintained but nonetheless open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.

(Emphasis added).

Mr. Beckett argues that the circuit court correctly found that any interpretation of “in this State” within W.Va. Code § 17C-5-2a(a) must be limited by this Court’s 1980 holding in State v. Ball.6 In Ball, the Court found that a defendant could not be charged for driving while intoxicated on a private parking lot, because the law then in effect limited the application of the DUI statutes “exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon streets and highways[.]”7 The circuit court was persuaded by our statement in Ball that “if chapter 17C [containing our DUI law] is to apply elsewhere than upon streets and highways a *357different place must be specifically set forth” by the Legislature.8 The circuit court applied this language from Ball interpreting the DUI laws from the 1970s to conclude the Commissioner has no jurisdiction to apply our DUI laws to an intoxicated defendant driving on private farm land.

The Commissioner points out that in 1981, subsequent to Ball, the Legislature amended the DUI statutes, adopted W.Va. Code § 17C-5-2a(a) to give an expanded meaning to the phrase “in this State,” and effectively overruled Ball. The Commissioner contends that the plain meaning of this statute, which has not been amended since 1983, is that a person cannot drive anywhere within the physical boundaries of this State while under the influence. We agree with the Commissioner that the statute is unambiguous.

In deciding the meaning of a statutory provision, “[w]e look first to the statute’s language. If the text, given its plain meaning, answers the interpretive question, the language must prevail and further inquiry is foreclosed.”9 “Where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and applied without resort to interpretation.”10 “A statute is open to construction only where the language used requires interpretation because of ambiguity which renders it susceptible of two or more constructions or of such doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning.”11

W.Va. Code § 17C-5-2a(a) is clear and unambiguous. Through its definition of the phrase “in this State,” the Legislature made the act of driving while intoxicated a revocable offense “anywhere within the physical boundaries of this State.” The Legislature chose to structure our DUI statutes to regulate the condition of the driver, not the locale in which the driving is taking place. Thus, the Legislature expressed its plain intent to prohibit an intoxicated person from driving a vehicle anywhere in West Virginia, whether on public roads or across private land.

Mr, Beckett cites a ease from the State of Washington, involving DUI laws similar to West Virginia’s, where the court concluded that it was an unreasonable extension of the legislature’s police power to prohibit intoxicated persons from driving on private land.12 He argues that the same reasoning applies here: while drunk drivers are generally a menace to society whose conduct should be regulated, this Court should read the statute to say that a driver on private land, who poses no danger to the general public, is exempt from regulation.

Our research, however, reveals court cases from nearly two dozen jurisdictions that have reached the exact opposite conclusion: if state law criminalizes the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and the law contains no geographic constraint, then the courts will not read into the statute a requirement that the vehicle be operated exclusively on a public highway.13 These courts *358have generally concluded that the phrase “within this state” is not ambiguous and indicates the legislature’s intent to prohibit operation of a vehicle while intoxicated anywhere •within the boundaries of the state, whether upon public or private land. Courts in all of our neighboring states have reached the same conclusion.14

*359We conclude that the Legislature’s definition of the phrase “in this State” in W.Va. Code § 17C-5-2a(a) [1983] extends the reach of our DUI laws to any individual.driving a vehicle within the physical boundaries of West Virginia, even if the vehicle is driven only upon private property not open to the general public. Furthermore, State v. Ball15 is overruled to the extent that it conflicts with this opinion.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The circuit court in this case determined that, because of this Court’s ruling in Ball, Mr. Beckett’s operation of an ATV on private family-owned land could not be regulated by the Commissioner under W.Va. Code § 17C-5-2a(a). This conclusion was plainly a wrong interpretation of our DUI statutes and must be reversed.

The circuit court’s order of September 30, 2015, is reversed, and the ease is remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

dissents, and reserves the right to file a separate opinion.

The most solemn duty of an American court lies in its pledge to protect the rights and liberties of private citizens from encroachment by the State. Here, the Majority not only badly misread applicable statutory law, it also sanctioned the infringement of two of our most basic natural rights: the right to do what one wants to do in the privacy of one’s estate so long as another is not harmed and the right to be left alone. As trustees of the wisdom and vision of our founders, this Court failed mightily.

It is unquestioned that Joshua Beckett’s use of his property was a matter of his own free choice. That it may be said that operating an all-terrain vehicle (“ATV”) exclusively on one’s private property, ie., the family farm, after having consumed alcohol was a “stupid” use of the property misses the point. So long as Mr. Beckett did not infringe upon the rights of others or put others at risk, it was his choice to act “stupidly.” As set forth by Justice Potter Stewart:

The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth, a “personal” right .... In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other.

Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).

The essence of our rights lies not in words on a paper, but in their full realization from the enjoyment we experience in the pursuit of our daily affairs.1 Indeed, it is the use of one’s estate from which life and liberty take form.2 In classic Jeffersonian thought, embodied in the opening sentences of the Declaration of Independence, the legitimate end of government is to protect the private realm whereby citizens may freely embrace their *360natural rights, not to intrude into such private estates thereby frustrating the exercise of such rights.3

It is from this proposition of natural law, upon which our society is founded, that one has the unfettered right to act as he will in the privacy of his home and property, whether that be smart or stupid, save only that he be competent and that he not infringe the rights of others.4 The West Virginia Legislature, in expressly limiting by definition the reach of West Virginia Code § 17C-6-2(e) (2010), understood this. The Majority of this Court did not.

Driving under the influence of an intoxicant may be a serious threat to the individual rights of other citizens. The power of the State to monitor and regulate the behavior of a given citizen with respect to such driving derives from the obligation of the State to protect the health, safety and general welfare rights of its other citizens. This is commonly referred to as the “police power” doctrine and is based in the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as restricted by the Privileges and Immunities Clause made applicable to the various states by the Fourteenth Amendment.5 In other words, government control and regulation over an individual’s private use and enjoyment of his or her property must be reasonable and have a clear relation to some legitimate purpose which protects the rights of other citizens; otherwise, the State’s actions constitute an unwarrantable invasion of that individual’s natural rights.

Proper governmental action is calculated to prevent a conflict of rights and to insure to each citizen the uninterrupted enjoyment of his or-her own rights, so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others, Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 572 (Little, Brown & Co. ed., 1868). Thus, the exercise of one’s rights should not be restricted by the state unless such a restriction is both necessary and proper. West Virginia’s Legislature understood this in enacting West Virginia Code § 17C-5-2(e) (2010), by utilizing language, defined elsewhere in the statutory section, which expressly excludes Mr. Beckett’s private behavior herein from coverage under the statute.

West Virginia Code § 17C-5-2(e) (2010), in effect at the time Mr. Beckett operated his ATV, proscribes any intoxicated person from driving “a vehicle in this state.” At issue is whether Mr. Beckett’s conduct comes within this language. It does not. The Majority focuses exclusively on the phrase “in this state,” misapplying its statutory definition. The Majority fails completely to consider the statutory definition of the term, “vehicle.” This was error upon error.

The Majority correctly looks to West Virginia Code § 17C-5-2a(a) to define “in this state.” In so doing, however, the Majority *361ignores the clear import of the Legislature’s limiting language that for there to be applicability of West Virginia Code § 17C-5-2(e), the use of a subject vehicle must be in a location “nonetheless open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.” By the addition of this instructive language, the Legislature understood the limitations of its police powers, consistent with the rights of private property owners. Mr. Beckett’s use of his ATV was purely private, on private family land, for purely private purposes. There is no evidence in the record whatsoever that this private use had any impact on other citizens. Likewise, there is no evidence that Mr. Beckett’s behavior in any way would have any adverse impact on any other citizen. To the extent that the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) contends that the State has an interest in regulating or constraining Mr. Beckett’s private behavior on his private family farm, it failed to introduce such evidence by which a consideration of reasonableness for state action might be made. An interest in saving Mr. Beckett from the consequences of his own stupidity, though admittedly a tempting endeavor, is insufficient to overcome Mr. Beckett’s right to do as he pleases.

The Majority opinion furthermore fails because, by statutory definition, an ATV does not come within the definition of “vehicle” under West Virginia Code § 17C-5-2(e) (“drives a vehicle in this state”). The term, “vehicle,” is defined by West Virginia Code § 17A-l-l(a) (2010) as “every device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway" (Emphasis added). Here, Mr. Beckett was not transported or drawn upon a highway, so the term “is” is not applicable. The term “may,” being permissive, requires that the transportation device may properly be used upon a highway. By statutory definition, however, an ATV is neither designed for nor permitted to be used on highways. West Virginia Code § 17A-l-l(ii) defines an “ATV” as “any motor vehicle designed for off-highway use.” (Emphasis added). Furthermore, West Virginia Code § 17F-l-l(a) (2004) provides:

No all-terrain vehicle may be operated in this state:

(1) On any interstate highway except by public safety personnel responding to emergencies; or

(2) On any road or highway with a center line or more than two lanes except for the purpose of crossing the road, street or highway ....

An ATV may not be used upon a highway—a necessary requisite to- applicability of West Virginia Code § 17C-5-2(e) to the conduct at issue. While Mr. Beckett’s use of an ATV on his family farm after consuming alcohol may be condemned on any number of moral and health-related grounds, his use of the ATV simply is not covered by the statute for DUI purposes.

To support its expansive creativity, the Majority asserts that its research, listed in a footnoted string citation, shows that “nearly two dozen jurisdictions” support its logic. A careful review, however, reveals that none of the cited cases, save one, supports the Majority’s conclusions that the private use of an ATV by an individual on his private property while intoxicated is criminal conduct.6

*362By no measure does the Majority opinion find legitimacy in constitutional, statutory, or common law. While the rights with which we are endowed are scarcely a topic of measured circumspection in our fast moving society, it falls to our courts to be vigilant that such natural rights are protected. This includes, as here, the importance of protecting the right to the private use and enjoyment of one’s private property.

In 1816, Jefferson wrote to his friend, Samuel Kercheval, a Virginia writer: “The true foundation of republican government is the equal right of every citizen, in his person and property, and in their management.” Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Ker-cheval, June 12, 1816, Writings, v. 10, p. 39. This quotation crowns the courtroom of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. How ironic.