In re K.V.
Opinion
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
FILED June 6, 2024 released at 3:00 p.m. In re K.V. C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA No. 23-102 (Kanawha County 20-JA-459)
MEMORANDUM DECISION
This is an appeal filed by Intervenors S.V. and H.V. (“petitioners”), who are the maternal grandparents of the child K.V.1 Petitioners seek reversal of the February 3, 2023, order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County that dismissed the petition for abuse and neglect2 against the child’s father, J.V., based upon a lack of clear and convincing evidence that the child was abused or neglected by J.V. or that J.V. was a neglecting3 parent. The circuit court also ordered that the child K.V., who had lived with petitioners for more than two years, be immediately returned to respondent J.V.’s physical and legal custody in lieu of a gradual transition of custody, as requested by petitioners.4 Petitioners raise an array of alleged errors that they contend warrant reversal of the circuit court’s order. Upon our review, we find no reversible error and determine that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.5
On September 14, 2020, DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition naming J.V. and K.V.’s biological mother, E.V., as respondents. The petition also named as a respondent B.W.-1, who is the biological father of K.V.’s half-sibling, C.W. The petition alleged that, at birth, C.W. tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamines, and THC; that mother E.V. also tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines after C.W.’s birth; that E.V. admitted to using drugs while pregnant with C.W.; that E.V. wanted to breastfeed C.W. despite testing positive for drugs; and that E.V. had little to no prenatal care during her pregnancy with C.W. The petition further alleged that, at times, the respondent parents failed to provide the children with the necessary food, clothing, supervision, and housing, including financial support, and that they are not sufficiently motivated and organized to provide for the children’s needs on an ongoing basis. The children were placed with petitioners, S.V. and H.V., their maternal grandparents.
A preliminary hearing was held on September 22, 2020. According to the preliminary hearing order, caseworker Jasmine Duiguid testified that the petition was filed due to “Respondent Mother giving birth to a drug affected infant . . . , no prenatal care, and that the Respondent Mother attempted to breastfeed the infant while having drugs in her system.” The order specifically found that “[t]he Respondent Father, [J.V.], is non-abusing/neglecting.”6 The children were ordered to remain in the custody of DHS and in their placement with petitioners.
On October 30, 2020, DHS filed with the circuit court a court summary prepared by CPS caseworkers indicating that the respondent parents had been scheduled for random drug screening and that “[a] walk through of [respondent J.V.’s] home was done by [a CPS caseworker]. His home was appropriate and clean. [K.V.] will be placed back with [J.V.] as soon as he works out childcare. . . . [J.V.] has been compliant with services.” The circuit court subsequently granted respondent J.V.’s motion that “would give [DHS] the discretion to move [K.V.] into the physical custody of [J.V.] if he is able to arrange child care while he works.”
The circuit court held an adjudicatory hearing with respect to mother E.V. on December 1, 2020. Based upon mother E.V.’s testimony admitting to drug use, the circuit court found mother E.V. to be an abusing and neglecting parent and the children, K.V. and C.W., to be abused and neglected children. The children were ordered to remain in their current placement with petitioners. Mother E.V. was granted a post-adjudicatory improvement period.
In a court summary filed by CPS caseworkers on March 4, 2021, it was reported that respondent J.V. had complied with services and participated in random drug screening, all of which were negative. Regarding his relationship with mother E.V. and the other adult respondent, B.W.- 1, respondent J.V. informed the CPS caseworker that mother E.V. and B.W.-1 were staying with J.V. at his home. The caseworker noted that J.V. has “taken up [for] [E.V.] and [is] making excuses for her failing drug screens.” Regarding the status of the child K.V., it was reported that visits between the child and respondent J.V. “are going well[,]” and that “it is recommended [K.V.] be returned to the care and custody of [respondent J.V.].” Because J.V. had not yet secured childcare, the child K.V. was ordered to remain in his placement with petitioners.
On March 19, 2021, DHS filed an amended petition. As it related to respondent J.V., the petition alleged that “almost all of [K.V.’s] teeth are completely rotten” and that “[J.V.] frequently allows [mother E.V.] and [B.W.-1] to stay in his home.”7
Subsequent court summaries prepared by CPS caseworkers and filed with the circuit court on May 3, 2021, and July 14, 2021, respectively, indicated that both respondent J.V. and mother E.V. explained that certain medications had caused K.V.’s tooth decay. The summaries reiterated that respondent J.V. had been compliant with services and had participated in random drug screens, all of which had been negative, and that J.V. “[took] up for [mother E.V.] and [made] excuses for her failing her drug screens.” The May 3, 2021, court summary also reiterated that the plan is for K.V. to be returned to respondent J.V.’s custody whenever J.V. is able to secure childcare.8
An adjudicatory hearing on the amended petition (concerning the respective fathers, J.V. and B.W.-1) was held on July 14, 2021, at which respondent J.V. agreed to place K.V. in a guardianship with petitioners. The circuit court accepted J.V.’s consent to guardianship and by order entered July 19, 2021, ordered that respondent J.V. be dismissed from the proceedings. As to B.W.-1., the child C.W.’s father, the circuit court found him to be an abusing parent.
Upon the birth of a subsequent child (the child B.W.-2) to mother E.V. and B.W.-1, a second amended petition was filed on September 2, 2021, alleging that mother E.V. admitted to using methamphetamine during her pregnancy. The second amended petition named J.V. as a respondent. It requested that the parental rights of mother E.V. and B.W.-1 be terminated.9
On February 2, 2022, respondent J.V., self-represented, filed a petition seeking revocation of petitioners’ guardianship of the child K.V. In his petition, respondent J.V. represented that “[s]ubstantial changes have been made. I have completed parenting classes and pass all my drug screens. I own my home and have transportation. I work and have worked full time at a hospital and have obtained childcare for my son upon his return.” DHS objected to the petition because, according to a March 31, 2022, court summary, respondent J.V. “has not been participating in services since his relinquishment [sic], and due to this the [DHS] has not [sic] knowledge of his current situation regarding his ability to adequately parent.” However, the summary also noted that there have been “no issues” with the supervised visitation between respondent J.V. and the child K.V.
On June 2, 2022, respondent J.V. filed a motion to set aside the circuit court’s order of guardianship. A dispositional hearing was held on June 8, 2022, at which the circuit court granted respondent J.V.’s motion.10 and ordered J.V. to submit to random drug screens. The circuit court also terminated the parental rights of mother E.V. and B.W.-1 to their children. The matter was set for an adjudicatory hearing with respect to respondent J.V.
The circuit court held a hearing on September 28, 2022, at which it ordered that respondent J.V. have supervised visits with the child K.V. and further ordered that the guardian ad litem “shall have the discretion [to] modify said visitation, including to permit unsupervised visitation[.]” The circuit court further ordered that J.V. was no longer required to submit to random drug screens because he had consistently screened negative. The court continued adjudication “to allow the parties to hold [a Multi-Disciplinary Team meeting].”
On November 16, 2022, petitioners, by counsel, filed a motion to intervene arguing that as K.V.’s foster parents and biological grandparents who have had custody of K.V. for the preceding twenty-six months, they should be permitted to participate as parties and to adopt the child K.V.11 By order entered on December 8, 2022, the circuit court denied petitioners’ motion.
A court summary filed by CPS caseworkers on December 9, 2022, indicated that respondent J.V. “has current visitations with [K.V.] once weekly.”12
On January 6, 2023, petitioners filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with this Court, seeking to prohibit enforcement of the order denying their motion to intervene and, as additional relief, petitioners requested that this Court halt enforcement of orders granting services to respondent, permit petitioners to attend hearings and MDT meetings, and schedule a dispositional hearing.
Subsequently, on January 25, 2023, petitioners also filed with this Court a motion to stay the underlying abuse and neglect proceedings until the petition for a writ of prohibition that was previously filed has been resolved.13 By order entered that same day, the circuit court, sua sponte, vacated its prior order denying petitioners’ motion to intervene and entered an order granting the motion.
The circuit court held an adjudicatory hearing concerning respondent J.V. on January 31, 2023. At the commencement of the proceedings, petitioners, by counsel, made an oral motion to stay the proceedings until a decision was rendered by this Court on their petition for a writ of prohibition. Petitioners argued that because the issues before both tribunals were the same, the circuit court should not proceed until this Court rendered a decision on the petition. The circuit court denied the motion.
During the adjudicatory hearing, DHS advised the circuit court that it had no evidence of abuse or neglect to present against respondent J.V., stating,
This petition was filed, at least originally entirely based on allegations pertaining to the other two parents, . . . whose parental rights were long ago terminated.
At some point sometime [sic] ago, the Petition was amended to include some allegations that kind of pertained to [respondent J.V.].
But really the only issue that, those allegations were . . . that we had reason to believe that he was continuing to associate with the other two parents. That, that although may have been true at one time, that has not been an issue for quite sometime [sic]. At least well over a year, probably at least a year and a half, Your honor.
....
There was one other allegation about the child’s teeth and numerous dental problems. But, that was, you know, that could have been just as much the mother’s fault, . . . as well as [respondent J.V.].
The guardian ad litem likewise presented no evidence of abuse or neglect against respondent J.V. Petitioners were permitted to present evidence.14 Petitioner S.V., the child K.V.’s grandmother, testified concerning the condition of the child K.V.’s teeth as depicted in photographs alleged to have been taken by petitioners at the time K.V. was placed in their custody. Petitioners failed to present any expert medical testimony as to the cause of the tooth decay. Petitioner S.V. also testified that respondent J.V. had never cared for the child K.V. on his own; however, she admitted that the child lived with respondent J.V. and mother E.V. for the five years prior to his removal and that she (Petitioner S.V.) could not know whether J.V. ever cared for the child K.V. without help. Respondent J.V. also testified. He stated that, prior to K.V.’s removal from the home, he took K.V. to the dentist to address the condition of his teeth, which he believed was caused by certain medications K.V. had been taking. Respondent J.V. also testified that he brushed and flossed K.V.’s teeth.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court stated,
All I have is [sic] pictures that someone has dental decay. No basis for why it [sic] decayed. . . . [DHS] is required [to prove] by clear and convincing evidence that [J.V.] abused or neglect this child . . . to cause him to have dental decay to the point that . . . it could be considered neglect. I have no expert testimony that that occurred.
I have, although I have testimony that “[J.V.] never took care of the children without someone’s help.” So it’s clear to me that he never had sole custody of the child or completely, singularly in his custody or care.
The circuit court ultimately concluded that neither DHS nor petitioners proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent J.V. neglected the child K.V. or that K.V. was an abused or neglected child and, accordingly, dismissed J.V. and K.V. from the proceedings. Over petitioners’ objection, the court ordered that K.V. be returned to the physical and legal custody of respondent J.V. forthwith, thereby denying petitioners’ motion to gradually transition K.V. to J.V.’s physical custody.15 It is from this order that petitioners now appeal.16
Our standard of review for abuse and neglect cases is well established:
Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.
Syl. Pt. 1, In the Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).
We first address petitioners’ argument that the circuit court erred in its ultimate conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to adjudicate respondent J.V. as a neglecting parent. Petitioners argue that there was clear and convincing evidence that K.V.’s teeth were in significant decay at the time the amended petition was filed thereby proving that K.V. was a “neglected child” 17 within the meaning of West Virginia Code § 49-1-201. Therefore, petitioners argue, the circuit court clearly erred in concluding that J.V. was not a neglecting parent and in dismissing the petition against him. We disagree.
At the adjudicatory hearing, respondent J.V. testified that during the year preceding K.V.’s removal from the home, he took K.V. to the dentist to address the condition of his teeth, which J.V. believed was caused by certain medications K.V. had been taking. Respondent J.V. further testified that he brushed and flossed K.V.’s teeth. Neither DHS nor the guardian ad litem presented evidence of neglect against J.V. and did not oppose J.V.’s motion to dismiss the petition. Based upon the limited evidence presented, the circuit court determined that, although there was evidence that K.V.’s teeth were in decay, no expert testimony was presented opining that the decay was the result of dental neglect. We are similarly restricted by the evidence (and lack of evidence) presented. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that respondent J.V. was not a neglecting parent and in dismissing the petition against him.
We next address petitioners’ argument that the circuit court erred in ordering that K.V. be immediately transferred to the custody of respondent J.V. Petitioners argue that K.V. had spent more than two years in their continuous care, and so a gradual transition of physical custody was required.
We agree with petitioners that “it has been long understood that the law governing child custody directs that a child’s best interests are best served by a gradual transition to a new home.” Kristofer O. v. Mazzone, 227 W. Va. 184, 194, 706 S.E.2d 381, 391 (2011). Indeed, we have recognized:
It is a traumatic experience for children to undergo sudden and dramatic changes in their permanent custodians. Lower courts in cases such as these should provide, whenever possible, for a gradual transition period, especially where young children are involved. Further, such gradual transition periods should be developed in a manner intended to foster the emotional adjustment of the children to this change and to maintain as much stability as possible in their lives.
Syl. Pt. 3, James M. v. Maynard, 185 W. Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991). Despite this long- standing admonition, the January 31, 2023, hearing transcript reflects that the circuit court abruptly rejected petitioners’ request for a gradual transition of custody without any discussion or apparent consideration of the effects that decision might have on K.V., who, by all accounts, had developed a close relationship with petitioners during the two years he lived with them in their home. The circuit court failed to consider the best interests of K.V. in this regard.
We are mindful, however, that “the over-arching purpose of our abuse and neglect statutory construct continues to be the correction of conditions of abuse and neglect and the return, if reasonably possible, of the children to their homes.” State ex rel. C.H. v. Faircloth, 240 W. Va. 729, 741, 815 S.E.2d 540, 552 (2018). Respondent J.V., who was found to be neither abusing nor neglecting, had an inherent right to be reunified with K.V. See In re Antonio R.A., 228 W. Va. 380, 390, 719 S.E.2d 850, 860 (2011). Indeed, from the commencement of the underlying proceedings, the recommendation by caseworkers was to reunify K.V. with his father whenever he was able to secure childcare, as he was employed; had submitted to random drug screenings, all of which were negative; was consistently compliant with services; had a clean and appropriate home; and enjoyed supervised visits with K.V. with “no issues.” We have held:
In the law concerning custody of minor children, no rule is more firmly established than that the right of a natural parent to the custody of his or her infant child is paramount to that of any other person; it is a fundamental personal liberty protected and guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the West Virginia and United States Constitutions.
Syl. Pt. 1, In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973).
The obvious quandary the Court faces is that the abrupt transition of physical custody has, at this point, long-ago occurred. By the same token, we have generally recognized that “[a] child has a right to continued association with individuals with whom he has formed a close emotional bond . . . provided that a determination is made that such continued contact is in the best interests of the child.” Syl. Pt. 11, in part, In re Jonathan G., 198 W. Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d 893 (1996). See Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Treadway v. McCoy, 189 W. Va. 210, 429 S.E.2d 492 (1993) (“The best interests of a child are served by preserving important relationships in that child’s life.”). Accordingly, in the event petitioners, in a separate proceeding, seek regular visitation with K.V. in the future,18 we strongly encourage the circuit court to consider whether, and to what extent, a continued association between K.V. and petitioners may be in K.V.’s best interests.19
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s order.
Affirmed. ISSUED: June 6, 2024 CONCURRED IN BY:
Chief Justice Tim Armstead Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice John A. Hutchison Justice William R. Wooton Justice C. Haley Bunn
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.