In re Estate of James
Opinion of the Court
On the 29th of January, 1895, there was filed in this court by A. C. Freese, public administrator, a petition alleging that one Charles A. James died in this city and county on the twenty-eighth day of January, 1895, being a resident herein and hereof, and leaving estate consisting of real and personal property of value unknown to the petitioner; that said James died intestate and left, so far as known to petitioner, as heir at law a nonresident niece; and that to collect and preserve the estate a special administrator was needed.
Upon the petition thus presented the special letters were granted and issued to the public administrator, and he thereupon immediately entered upon the premises and took possession of the property, real and personal, no one appearing to oppose or obstruct him in the exercise of the duties of his office or claiming paramount right or authority by virtue of relation to decedent or in any other manner.
Thereafter, and on the 31st of January, 1895, the said public administrator filed a petition for letters of administration, reciting the day and date of death of the said decedent, the place of death and of residence, as stated in the petition for letters of special administration; and that the said decedent left real and personal estate exceeding $10,000 in value, not exactly how much in excess was known to petitioner.
Thereafter, and on the 8th of February, 1895, a petition was filed in this court signed “Mattie E. James by M. C. Hassett and George Hudson, attorneys for petitioner,” reciting the facts of death and residence -as in the preceding petitions and laying the value of the estate at about forty-five thousand dollars, and alleging that the next of kin and heir at law of the decedent “is Mattie E. James, of legal age, residing in said city and county, a niece of said” decedent; that diligent search and inquiry for a will developed no such document; that deceased died intestate; and that as niece, next of kin, and heir at law said Mattie E. James was entitled to
On January 29, 1895, as appears by the record, when the special letters were granted to the public administrator there was present in court and sworn and examined but one witness, Mr. B. F. Mogan, who also acted as attorney on that occasion for the applicant.
On February 21, 1895, as appears by the same record, when the petition of Mattie B. James was withdrawn in open court and the petition of the public administrator for general letters was granted, there were present and sworn and examined as witnesses upon the hearing the said Mr. B. F. Mogan, Mrs. Laura Milen James, and Mr. George D. Shadburne. Mr. Shadburne had been appointed attorney to represent absent heirs, minors, and others generally under the statute in such case made and provided, by an order of the court dated January 31, 1895; the heirs or persons for whom he was to appear were in that order described as “at present unknown”; he served his notice of appearance the same day. On February 26, 1895, one Annie B. Moss, formerly Annie B. James, a widow, entered an appearance by Isaac Joseph, attorney, of Sacramento, California.
On April 15, 1895, the official appraisement of the property was filed, by and from which it appeared that the total value of the property was $46,617.86.
The real property, 925 Howard street, valued at $15,000.00
Cash on term deposit in savings union........ 28,750.88
Other cash, in hands of administrator........ 2,128.18
Furniture and other mixed personal property.. 738.80
$46,617.86
On April 22, 1896, a petition for distribution was filed by George D. Shadburne, as attorney for P. M. James, Charles T. James, Nathan W. James, Francis T. Broughton, Lucy A. Nichols, William J. Clark, Lydia E. Hoxie, George W. Clark, Hannah A. Wadsworth, Amy A. Reisch, William Henry Barber, Mattie B. James, Daniel M. James, Elizabeth E. Barber, Lydia L. Hopkins and Willard B. James, claiming to be next of kin and heirs collateral of the deceased Charles A. James,
On May 5, 1896, a petition signed “Laura Hilen James, petitioner, W. H. H. Hart, George W. Fox, attorneys for petitioner, Aylett R. Cotton, of counsel for petitioner,” was filed, in which petition, after the necessary formal allegations in reference to the condition of the estate and its readiness for settlement and distribution, petitioner averred that she was the wife of the decedent intestate at and before the time of his death, and thereafter and thereby became his widow; that she was over the age of eighteen years; that Hilen James, an infant under the age of one year, is the only child of deceased, and that she and the said Hilen James are the only heirs at law of said decedent, and that they are entitled to distribution in equal shares. To each of these petitioners’ claims, answers and denials were presented in due season and proper form by the respective parties and issue was joined.
The petitioner Laura claims that she intermarried with the decedent, Charles-A. James, on the sixth day of January, 1895, by a contract in writing signed by both parties; the body of it is written by her at his dictation, and the whole of it being in words and figures as follows:
“San Feancisco, Cal., January 6th, 1895.
“We the undersigned, Charles A. James aged 60 and Laura Hilen aged 19 do hereby mutually bind ourselves unto each other as husband and wife. This agreement or contract to be authority for same before God and man.
“CHAS. A. JAMES.
“LAURA HILEN.”
According to the testimony of the petitioner this contract was consummated on the evening of the day of its date and the conjugal relations were continued and repeated every night until the decedent expired on the 28th of January, 1895.
Assuming for the nonce the formal and verbal efficiency of this exhibit, such a document was at that time valid under the statutes of this state, but happily for the concord of the community, the sanctity of the domestic relation, and the security
The document in dispute, however, is not within the purview of this amendment, having antedated the approval of the amendatory act: Civ. Code, secs. 55, 57, 68.
If the allegations of the petitioner Laura be established as facts, and if the contentions of her counsel be correct as law, she is entitled to one-half of this estate and the minor is entitled to the remainder.
It is contended by counsel for claimant Laura that as no particular form is prescribed by section 55 of the Civil Code, and as no written form is necessary when the intent of the parties to become husband and wife is apparent from their subsequent acts, therefore the language of the alleged contract should be construed in the light of the evidence produced on the trial in this case.
Accepting this contention as the true theory, what is the evidence to support the allegations and claim of petitioner Laura ?
It is argued by counsel for her that the consent to marriage and the fact of marriage are proved by the testimony of Laura, who had actual knowledge thereof, by Dr. Milen and by Mrs. Milen, who saw the written consent and heard the admission of Dr. James, also by Dr. Terry and son, to whom Dr. James admitted the marriage, and by George Williams and John Bigley and by Mrs. Lulu Dickman, sister of claimant.
The petitioner Laura at the time of the taking of her testimony upon the hearing of this application, December 10, 1896, testified that she was twenty years of age, having been born on the 2d of April, 1876, in Cleveland, Ohio; her father was Theodore Milen, her mother died about 1890; the present Mrs. Milen was her stepmother; about six years ago the family, consisting of her father, her stepmother, her sister and herself came to California and went to reside at 321 Ellis street; Laura went to school at Blake’s Seminary in Oakland; she has been a little deaf in her left ear since infancy; she
This is in brief the story of Laura as to the courtship and marriage, the consent and the contract, the consummation and the cohabitation—all covering from the inception to the temporal termination, little more than a month; the first meeting on the 13th or 14th of December, 1894; the catarrhal treatment daily thereafter, and the tentative tenderness and increasing interest in her exhibited by him until his proposal in his office by the fireside on the eve of Christmas, 1894; her discreet evasion of an immediate response to his ardent avowal of affection and continuance of the case until she had opportunity of consultation with her absent father and her present stepmother; the result of advice and deliberation; the culmination of the courtship in the contract on January 6, 1895; the marital assumption immediate and continuous thenceforward; the end—January 28, 1895. If this outline express or indicate the facts in proof, marriage is established as alleged.
It is claimed that' the contractual relation has been proved, and that under it the decedent and his surviving spouse (1) lived together in the same house, (2) ate together at the same table, (3) slept together in the same bed, and (4) introduced and recognized each other as husband and wife. Proof of these facts is prima facie evidence of the assumption of the marital rights, duties and obligations, and is the grand total of marital relations expressed in the term "cohabitation' ’ from which marriage may be presumed.
How have these facts been proved? It is said (1) by the positive testimony of witnesses as to seeing the contract on January 6, 1895, and (2) by the testimony of the admissions made by deceased to certain persons at different times.
We have outlined the testimony of the surviving principal to this agreement, and she is supported primarily by her stepmother, Mrs. Milen, whose name in full as given by her under
“Bight thro’ his manful breast darted the pang That makes a man, in the sweet face of her Whom- he loves most, lonely and miserable.”
Dr.. James was especially fond of music, seemed to dote on the renditions of Laura; his favorite was “Love’s Sorrow”— he liked a dreamy piece, soft, sad and sweet; he made her sing the same love song several successive times, he liked it so much, and she sang and played on, and still he seemed not surfeited with this food of love, and for him it seemed as he listened to the melody and contemplated the “happy melodist, unwearied, forever singing songs forever new,” that
“Love took up the harp, and smote on all the chords with might; Smote the chord of self, that, trembling, passed in music out of sight”
into the heart of this ancient and ardent lover, whose rheumy eyes were moist with emotion as he picked up the sheets of music and passionately kissed them, complimenting Laura on her beautiful vocal and instrumental execution, and, verily, she did execution upon her admirer when she chanted for him again and again his favorite selection that seemed to give ‘ ‘ a very echo to the seat where love is throned” and dallied with the innocence thereof in his old age.
“GOLDEN EAGLE HOTEL.
“Spelman & Son Proprietors.
“Redding, Cal., 12, 30, 1894.
“Dear Wife: Your surprise letter of Saturday noon is just here. • Pet I wish I knew what to do for your leg but I do not. The trouble is with the ovary certainly, just keep on trying is all I can advise. Well I don’t know what to think of Dr. and LAURA. I can easily understand the Doctor, for any one could love her and could not help being kind to her, and there is no question about her doing her part as a faithful wife, but Pet what does she get in return, money is all very nice but money without love and respect on her part. I am afraid will not bring happiness and again JESSIE, you know a wife expects certain duties from a Husband and if he is unable to perform those duties (or only in a way) the wife is soon dispondent. LAURA is not amorus and never will be yet she will have her passions and if not satisfied she will soon disslike her husband, you two must talk over this matter plainly, use plain language, reason every way. LAURA is of age and can do just what she pleases, but be sure she understands well, JESSIE, what married life means. One great advantage to a young Girl in marrying an Old Gentleman such as he is. She would be treated kindly she would be cared for. Well, you two must do as you think best. I dont know what to think is best.
“Pet, if your leg is no better and you have told the Doctor the Ovarian Cause of it and he cant relieve it send for Doctor PRESTON or GIBERSON dont wait any longer. I am free to acknowledge that I am not sure what will stop it, and I will be glad to find some one that does know what to do for it.
*143 “Well, I got an other beautiful nose didy last evening in a handsome didy box nicely inscribed in some foreign Language so it must be imported (the box) I think from EGYPT for it speaks of Corn on the box, and then it says Plasters, I suppose that is some City in EGYPT. Well I have so many silk handcherchiefs now that I have to count them two or three times per day to see that they are all here. I will soon have to carry an extry man to look after my baggage for its has increased wonderfully, when I come here I only had one pair of socks, now I counted them and there is three pair and four silk handerchiefs besides my big black one, but since I have a box to put them in they will be easier to look after.
“You ask why we did not stop at the Temple? on account of those exposed stairs persons would hesitate about coming to see us when all the loafers could see just who did come, here the stairs is not so long and don’t pass through the Office, the People here are very nice and kind. I don’t believe I told you yet that I am well I feel just splendid and am getting to eat quite natural again.
“We expect to remain here until about Jan. 7. I do hope my Pet is well by this time, I will not send you any money again until perhaps Thursday. I will try to get some to you by the time the scraps of your last purchase is used up.
“Lovingly yours,
“THEO.”
On the afternoon when she received this letter from her husband, who was then in Redding, California, she saw Dr. James and showed him the letter and he read it; in about an hour and a half afterward Mrs. Milen saw him in his office in the back parlor and they had a conversation upon the topic of the letter; he said, “I love Laura and want her to marry me, and I wish you would intercede for me.” Mrs. Milen told him to do his own courting; he was very gallant toward Laura; Mrs. Milen remembered the 6th of January, 1895. when Dr. James came to her room and said, “Plere’s a dollar and a half; you and Mrs. Dickman go to the matinee at Moroseo’s and afterward to the Creamerie; the matinee is very good—Laura and I were there yesterday. ’ ’ Mrs. Dick-man and Mrs. Milen went to the matinee and returned at about 6 o’clock; on the same evening, in the front parlor,
It is claimed by counsel that these recited attentions paid to Laura prior to January 6, 1895, and the gifts bestowed upon her and her stepmother indicate that he intended to marry her, and especially when his attentions to her were exclusive, and it was not his habit to make presents, for Dr. James, even when he listened to the joyous “melodies of love,” and though on marriage he “was bent he had a.frugal mind” and did not care to spend a cent. This point is relied upon to show the probability of petitioner’s pretensions, for this close and penurious man who, according to a witness, Maria Mangan, adverse to this claimant, was willing to sell his deceased wife’s clothes, who gave no presents to anyone, presented Laura with valuable garments to be worn next her person, a certain token of affection, and he placated his prospective mother in law, Mrs. Milen, with a rich silk dress; he was exceptional in his attentions to this attractive little woman, showing extreme devotion to her, giving to her and her stepmother dainty luncheons of cheese, crackers, pickles, and sour wines; taking them to dinner and the theater. These marks and manifestations of fondness showed that he must have contemplated marriage prior to January 6, 1895-contemplation culminating in consummation on the evening of that day. So the counsel for claimant considered that they started out in this case with circumstances constituting a hypothesis perfect in its proportions and paragonal in its probability, supported by proof positive and plenary of the existence of the contract and of the declarations made by the deceased, Dr. James, that he was married to Laura Milen, and, the counsel claims, this evidence came from unimpeached
Dr. Milen bestowed all the care that he could over the boobs and education of Laura; he never gave his wife any special instructions about the moral culture of his children; he considered that his wife was competent to care for them in that respect, and he did not think it necessary to dictate to her in the matter of their intellectual and ethical training; in 1894 Laura was past eighteen years of age, Lulu was sixteen years of age, Hrs. Jessie Milen, their stepmother, wife of Dr. Milen, twenty-five years of age; Dr. Milen’s first wife died in 1887; he married again in 1890; his second wife, the present Hrs. Jessie Milen, had been previously married to one Milo Harris, when she was sixteen years old, with whom she lived for a year or more and of whose current existence she entertains dubiety; both Dr. Milen and his wife Jessie regarded with aversion the form of marriage by
As to the visit of Dr. James to Dr. Terry on Sunday, January 13, 1895, testimony comes from George Elisha Terry, son of the latter, who appears to have been providentially present when the visitor came in and said to father, Dr. Terry, “I have good news to tell you; I have been married.” The elder Terry said, “Well, I have seen nothing about it in the papers,” to which Dr. James made answer, “I was married by contract, which I consider better than a marriage by a notary or minister, as I don’t want publicity in my affairs.” Dr. Terry inquired, “Who is the fortunate lady?” Dr. James replied, “Miss Laura Milen, the young lady to whom I introduced you.” Dr. Terry responded, “I congratulate you on marrying a young lady who will take care of you,” to which Dr. James retorted, “Oh, no! I don’t need anybody to take care of me; I can take care of her.” So the Terrys chimed in with each other as to the eventful interview of January 13, 1895.
In further fortification of the case of petitioner, and to clinch, as it were, the demonstration of the declarations of decedent, two witnesses are presented, George Williams and John Bigby, the first of whom testified he knew the deceased
These items of evidence with the statement of Mrs. Lulu Blanche Dickman that Dr. James asked her about a week before his death, “Has Laura told you of our marriage?” to which she answered “Yes,” constitute the sum total of affirmative declarations of the decedent; and it is stoutly contended by counsel for claimant that they afford irrefragable proof of the marital relation, in conjunction with the contract and its concomitant and consequent circumstances; they cannot be overcome by contrary conduct and by negative declarations; the status once established is forever fixed, and cannot be gainsaid by any quantity of declarations or any amount of acts of decedent that are inconsistent therewith. He told Dr. Terry on the 13th of January, 1895, that he did not put the notice of the marriage in the papers nor have it celebrated by a notary or minister, because he did not want publicity in his affairs, and then, within a day or two, “the forepart of January, 1895,” between the 12th and 15th, he introduces her publicly on a main thoroughfare to Bigby and Williams. Counsel for claimant concede that contradictions have arisen in this case, but insist that the court must esti
Mrs. Lulu Blanche Dickman tells a long story of the incidents connected with the courtship and circumstances of the marriage, but her husband, Henry Dickman, cuts another facet upon the brilliant tale told by his wife; although Dr. Milen introduced him to his sister in law Laura as “Mrs. Dr. James,” Dickman did not take it seriously, thought it was a “josh,” to use his own elegant and expressive vernacular. That he took no stock in the combination is quite clear from the telegram he sent to the niece of deceased on the 31st of January, 1895, addressed to “Mattie James, Port Madison, Iowa,” in these words: “Your uncle Dr. James died yesterday at my house. Letter mailed to-day with full particulars. You need an attorney at once to represent you, and I recommend you to telegraph at once to Judge Levy, Nevada Block, to represent you in the meantime. Henry G. Dickman. ’ ’ He also sent letters to Mattie James and a form of a full power of attorney to her, constituting him her agent to do “every
“San Francisco, January 31st, 1895. “Mattie James, Fort Madison, Iowa:
“On last Monday night your Uncle Dr. Charles James died at the place in which myself and wife reside. Myself and wife being his nearest friends in the City and County of San Francisco, I thought it would be no more than right to immediately advise you of the status of the matter. I understand that you are his only relative and it becomes therefore necessary that you act immediately. Tour uncle died leaving considerable money and as you are his only relative as I understand it becomes necessary that you should have a representative out here to look after your interests. As you
*158 understand the public administrator is already after the estate, so that I have been advised after consulting my attorneys been advised to send the enclosed power of attorney to you, and if you will sign it and acknowledge and send it to me I can protect your interests and save you a great deal of expenses. If you decide upon doing this please sign the said power of attorney and acknowledge it before a commissioner of the State of California and return it immediately, and as I said before being the nearest friend of the Doctors out here I am better acquainted with his desires than any other person. Please let me hear from you immediately.
“Respectfully,
“H. G. DICKMAN, “925 Howard St.
“San Francisco.
“Received Feb. 4, 1895,
“M. E. JAMES.”
The able and learned counsel for claimant contend that “Dr. James and she who was Laura Milen assumed marital rights, duties and obligations, and these were well evidenced for the short period between the time of marriage and his death. Her relatives knew of the marriage.” Now, here is Henry Diekman, the husband of the only sister of Laura, living in the same house, on the very day of the burial of deceased, sending the telegram quoted and this eloquent epistolary exposition of their domestic understanding that the niece, Mattie James, was the “only relative” of the deceased, and advising her of the predatory purpose and pursuit of the public administrator!
The relatives of Laura knew of the marriage, say the counsel, and yet, according to this letter, Diclcman and his wife were the “nearest friends” of the deceased and the “better acquainted with his desires than any other person”; they wanted to be empowered to “protect the interests of the only living relative,” the niece Mattie James, although there was then in the house whence this document was dated the widow of the “father of the prospective offspring.”
“Others knew of the marriage,” say the counsel for the claimant. We have considered seriatim Dr. Theodore Milen, Mrs. Jessie Milen, the Terrys, George Williams, John Bigby,
Next we have, as the completing links in the chain of circumstances bringing us down to the last scene of all, the testimony of Patrick Kelly and his pal, Richard Edmund Saunders. Kelly testifies that he was undertaker’s assistant for Joseph Hagan, the funeral director and embalmer who buried the body of Dr. James. When Kelly went to the house of mourning he heard a childish voice say, “Oh, my poor husband!” and he turned and saw the young lady whom he identified at the trial as the claimant, and Mr. Saunders, who went to the same place with his' friend, Mr. Kelly, testified that he was working at that time for Hagan, the undertaker, and that he was a pall-bearer at the funeral; that he saw Hagan embalming the body; he and Hagan and a man named Williamson, and another man whose name he
In connection with this testimony as to what took place at the time of the laying out of the corpse and the funeral, we have the statement in evidence of the funeral director who embalmed the body and who went to the house 925 Howard street upon request and inquired for relatives and was told that there were none. There were four ladies present; he went about the task of preparing the remains; this was on the 29th of January, 1895. At the time of the funeral Mrs. Milen asked him who was to ride in the mourners’ carriage. Hagan said that in the absence of relatives thé housekeeper would be the proper person. Mrs. Milen said that she did not know who was better entitled than the lady to whom the deceased was engaged to be married. That was the first Hagan had heard of any such person, and he assented to the proposition. This seems to account, in a measure, for the claimant’s riding in the carriage next the hearse—a fact by which her counsel sets some store. Hagan saw no signs of sorrow or any wailings or manifestations of woe. No one said, “Oh, this is my poor husband!” This did not occur at any time, Kelly and Saunders to the contrary notwithstanding. These two men assisted Hagan at the time. There was no emotion at all displayed. A short Episcopal service was read by a clergyman, but there was no tear shedding; the ceremony was brief, with no signs of sorrow:
“Pew and short were the prayers that were said, And they spoke not a word of sorrow, Not a tear was shed, not a funeral note As his corse to the graveyard they hurried.”
At the time of the funeral George Hudson testifies that he was present; a minister was there who read the service; there were also a Miss Weygant and her mother, Mrs. Weygant, the widow of an old friend and early employer of the deceased; also a Mrs. Sarah Williams, an old friend of Dr.
Mrs. Vica Mabel Fitzgerald, a young lady formerly Miss Vica Coon, was one of the roomers in the house at the time of the death of Dr. James. Miss Coon was a working girl, a shoe-fitter by trade, steady and diligent at her calling. She lived in a front room on the third floor, occupying an apartment adjoining that of Miss Maria Mangan, separated by doors usually kept open, and Miss Maria Mangan and she were companions in the evening and usually kept pretty close to their rooms. Miss Coon was out of work when the Milens came to 925 Howard street in the middle of December, 1894; she did not meet them, however, until the 28th of January, 1895. Miss Coon was acquainted with the deceased, Dr. James, from June, 1894, until he died; she was there a few minutes after he died; she had lived in that house from June 17, 1894, There were liv
Miss Maria Mangan, at the time of the trial and of taking her deposition Mrs. Davis, having become a married woman since the death of Dr. James, lived in his house, 925 Howard street, on the 28th of January, 1895, and had been his housekeeper for two years and three months prior to his death, and had been intimately acquainted with him. On the date specified there were living in that house Mr. and Mrs. Biro, Mr. 0 ’Neill, Mr. Ott, Mamie Dalton, Katie Dalton, Vica Coon, the Milen family and Mr. Dickman. The Milens came about the 13th or 14th of December, 1894. The members of the Milen family were Dr. and Mrs. Milen, Miss Laura Milen, and Mrs. Lulu Dickman. Miss Maria Mangan conversed with Dr. James every day about business and family matters; he spoke of the Milen family to her on several occasions; he spoke to her the Sunday before he died; he said that Laura Milen had gone up to Market street and he had invited them to dinner, and he told Maria to wait and put the dinner in the oven until Laura returned. Maria had prepared the dinner and he told her to wait until Laura’s return. Dr. James did not tell Maria if anyone but Laura was to be his guest on that occasion. She
The local life history of the deceased is perhaps best epitomized from the testimony of George Hudson, a somewhat venerable attorney at law, who once occupied a judicial position in the early times of San Francisco, and has been since, accustomed as the citizens and natives are to such honorary titles, commonly called “Judge” Hudson. This gentlemen so titularly distinguished had the longest continuous acquaintance with the deceased of anyone who appeared as a witness in this contest. We have already referred to his testimony as to what occurred before his eyes at the time of the funeral and immediately preceding, and we shall now revert to his narrative to make the connection complete; Judge Hudson first made the acquaintance of Charles A. James in 1854; Hudson was then about thirty years of age and James a youth of about nineteen years and a clerk at the Crescent City Hotel on San-some street, and continued in that capacity at the Tremont and International. Afterward James went into the real estate business for several years. Hudson has lived at 226 Fifth street, corner of Clementina, for quarter of a century; he and James were intimate. Hudson knew the first wife of James; she died in 1891. He conversed with James often about his condition in life; they exchanged confidences. After an interview he had with Dr. James in the latter part of December, 1894, Hudson used to see him very frequently. James visited Hudson up to the 20th of January, 1895, almost daily. The next time when he talked with him about his condition in life and the subject of marriage was a week before Dr. James died, on Monday or Tuesday, January 20 or 21, 1895. Hudson had
Mrs. Mary Gallagher, formerly Mamie Dalton, roomed in Dr. James’ house, 925 Howard street, at the date of his death and for some time previous to that event. She was not in the room at the moment he expired but shortly after. Mamie Dalton, Yica Coon and Maria Mangan were upstairs in their beds when the bell rang, and in response they all came down together and found the doctor dead, and Mrs. Milen, Laura and Mrs. Dickman were there in the room. Mrs. Milen said that she and Laura had just returned from the theater and asked the doctor if there was anything he wanted and he said, “No,” that if he wanted anything he had told Maria he would ring the bell, and with that Laura took a small bell from the mantel and rang and the three girls came down. Mrs. Milen told the undertaker that they were perfect strangers and that the doctor had no relatives here. Mrs. Dickman told Mamie Dalton, this witness, that it was too bad the doctor had died as he was engaged to her sister; Laura was not present at this remark.
Mrs. Annie Carter saw Dr. James three days before he died; she called at his house to see her sister, Mamie Dalton. Dr. James opened the door and as she entered she heard a piano playing in the parlor and said, “Doctor, I thought you had sold your piano.” He said that he had but that it was Laura Milen who was playing; that as Laura had not space enough in her room for the piano he allowed her to move it into the parlor. Mrs. Carter was formerly a roomer in the James house but left on October 9, 1894, and was married from there October 10,1894. Mrs. Carter had seen Laura Milen on a previous occasion to that testified to as to the incident of the piano playing. About nine days before the doctor died she had seen Laura passing through the hall in a low-necked dress and she remarked that the girl was finely dressed for a person who occupied but one room; he said, “Yes, and could not pay their rent at that.”
Among those present at the time of the funeral of Dr. James was Newell Winants, an old friend, who had been acquainted with him since about 1865, when James was clerk for F. E. Weygant, proprietor of the Tremont House, on Jackson
Why James should have been so effusively communicative to the Terrys about his marriage and prospective paternity and about the same time conceal from old and confidential friends of more than thirty years' acquaintance these facts, and go further and give as a reason why he did not marry his impotency, is a proposition that is sought to be answered by the result of a solution of sophistry that attempts on the one hand to prove this marriage by circumstances of publicity, such as street introductions and the like, and on the other, hand endeavors to destroy the effect of the doctor’s denial by claiming that the “time, disposition, and circumstances of this case did not permit, nor was it necessary for Charles A. James to proclaim his marriage from the housetops, at the corners of the streets, or in the newspapers; the laws did not require it nor
John O’Neill was a roomer in the house of Dr. James. He was very familiar with the deceased and they conversed frequently in the evenings, sometimes from 7 to 10 o ’clock in the evening. Two weeks before James died O’Neill had a conversation with him and remarked that he must be lonely since he had lost his wife, whom O’Neill had known. Dr. James replied that he was going to sell out there and move down town into a private hotel. 0 ’Neill was in the house when Dr
Alphonse Astorg, a butcher at 108 Fifth street knew the deceased for about fifteen years before his death. Dr. James was a customer and used frequently to talk with Astorg, when the butcher was not busy, for fifteen or twenty minutes at a time. Astorg used to sell his medicine by the bottle; he never visited the house of Dr. James. Astorg was not dealing in mineral waters at that time. Astorg had a talk with Dr. James on the Saturday prior to his death, which would have been January 26, 1895, at about 9 or 10 o’clock in the evening. Astorg asked James why he did not get married. James said, “No marriage for me.” Dr. James said that he was sick, had kidney disease, bladder trouble, dropsy. Dr. James had come into the shop of the butcher to buy meat and Astorg joked with him because he had seen him walking with a lady that afternoon, and remarked to Dr. James that he was quite a young man, and the doctor said that he had been at the .matinee with the lady.
That Dr. James was and had been for some time in poor physical condition is clear from this testimony, if it be truthful. He had several ailments—dropsy, asthma, catarrh, bladder affection, kidney trouble, Bright’s disease; many maladies conspiring to the collapse that occurred. He told Dr. A. Nusbaum on Thursday of the week before he died that he had anasarca, which is defined as a dropsical affection of the cellular tissue, and Bright’s disease, an organic affection of the kidneys which does its 'work of destruction by inducing other diseases, and the effect of this disease is impotency in such a case as that of Dr. James, according to Dr. Nusbaum.
Patrick Lawlor, a grocer on the same block, saw Dr. James at 8 o’clock on the morning of the day of his death. Lawlor was accustomed to buy medicine of Dr. James, and on that day, at the hour indicated, he went to the doctor’s office apartment and found him sitting in front of the fireplace alone; no one was with him. Dr. James said that he was deathly sick; he had been sick all night. He thought he had eaten too much on the night before. The last previous occasion on which Lawlor conversed with.Dr. James was the Thursday prior, when he told him he had a young lady under treatment. Joseph McGrath kept a store for groceries and varieties at 921% Howard street at and before the time of the death of Dr. James, and he was acquainted with the
Y7illiam J. Herrin, an attorney at law and until lately a partner in the firm of Shadburne & Herrin, visited the house, 925 Howard street, on the second day of February,
On February 21, 1895, when the petition of the public administrator for letters of general administration was heard and granted, the claimant here was present in court but made no application for letters on her own behalf and made no opposition to the claim of the public officer. She was sworn and examined as a witness on that occasion, and testified that the contract was drawn up and both signed it in the presence of each other, and then Dr. James took the document and placed it in his desk; that transaction took place on the 6th of January, 1895, and subsequently she had not seen the paper. This was the story she told in this court on the 21st of February, 1895, but on the 9th of March, 1897, although she says she cannot recall exactly what she testified on the first date, she distinctly denies that she made the sworn statement imputed to her; and yet again, after further examination, upon
In view of this testimony it may well be asked, When and how came into the desk of the deceased this document? The claimant swore with the utmost particularity and precision on the 10th of December, 1896, in the trial of this cause, that on the sixth day of January, 1895, after the paper-writing was completed and signed, James said to her that she was now his wife, and “then he took the paper and tore it off the tablet and put it in his pocket, and said that he was going to carry that next to his heart; he placed it in his pocket on the left-hand side,” she did not remember whether it was his vest or coat pocket, but “he must have put it in his vest pocket.” This is straight, direct, positive and absolutely at variance with the testimony given by her on February 21, 1895, when she swore that when the contract was drawn up and signed, “then Dr. James took the document and placed it in his desk.” When this contrariety of statement is brought home to her and established on the ninth day of March, 1897, she makes a lame and impotent attempt to reconcile the conflicting elements of her evidence. Plainly, there is a screw loose somewhere. On the.21st of February, 1895, about forty-five days after the making of this alleged contract, when the facts must have been fresh in her memory, she solemnly swears that the deceased spouse placed this precious paper in his desk. She had known nothing of such contracts before, neither had her father nor her stepmother. Such an anomalous sort of
Counsel for claimant argue that the marriage by contract and consummation and circumstances having been established, the child is presumed to be legitimate, the husband’s potency having been demonstrated; “but if for any reason this court should hold that the alleged marriage contract is invalid or not proved, nevertheless the child is entitled to inherit under the code”: Civ. Code, sec. 1387; Graham v. Bennett, 2 Cal. 503.
The issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent, is indisputably presumed to be legitimate: Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1962, subd. 5. Counsel claim that the infant Theodore is the son of Charles A. James, bom in lawful
It is claimed that Dr. James was the father of this child, because claimant testifies that he was its carnal cause and her testimony is truthful; but if the infant was not delivered in normal time, if the birth occurred in advance of the usual period of gestation, which is nine months or from two hundred and seventy-five to two hundred and eighty days, then if James was the father, the conception having been on the 6th of January and the birth on the 16th of September, 1895, the babe was brought forth prematurely, in eight months and a third instead of nine calendar months, according to the highest authorities, the proper term; and to support this theory Dr. Walton Preston testified that he attended the lady and delivered her, with instruments, of a seven pounds child, and that he noticed that' the infant had undeveloped finger and toe nails, abbreviated and attenuated nails, which indicated that the complete limit had not elapsed. This item of the shortened nails signified that the babe had been sent “unfinished before its time into this breathing world.” In no other respect was it curtailed of nature’s fair proportions; the child was as healthy as the average child, and the trained nurse, Miss Mary Adelaide Waterman, a very intelligent woman, one who observes facts and reports them to the attending physician, saw nothing beyond these slightly undeveloped nails to indicate a premature birth. Miss Waterman said, “The nails indicated a slightly premature birth”; it was her duty as nurse and she did observe such details and call them
The child still lives, and upon this question of the vitality and continued health of this infant, as affecting the proposition of its being born in full time, we have some medical testimony. Dr. Preston says that the idea that an eight months’ child is less likely to live than one born in seven months is exploded. Dr. Frederick Walter Harris says that the consequence of conception immediately after menstruation is premature birth. A seven months’ child has no advantage over an eight months. When we find a fact we generally look for a cause, and medical men when they can find no other assignable cause would accept the lack of development of nails as a sign of premature birth. Doctor Harris has known eight months’ children who lived. The usual period of gestation is forty weeks; the ordinary period is two hundred' and seventy days, according to this doctor’s experience of twenty years, in which he has had four instances of actual observation of gestation and has devoted much time to the study of the theory. In the case put to him Dr. Harris said the child would be a weakling from the beginning. Dr. John Leffler, “a physician of the old and only school,” allopathy, performed an operation on the claimant on May 24, 1896, at 925 Howard street, in presence of Dr. Preston, Dr. Cox, and another doctor. Dr. Leffler was called in by Dr. Preston to assist him; it was a case of laceration of perineum. The German calculation of the period of gestation is two hundred and seventy-six or two hundred and seventy-eight days. No reason is assigned why German gestation should differ from any other, and it may safely be assumed that nature develops her processes alike here and there.
Dr. John F. Dillon practices in a fertile district, as appears from his testimony, for in the course of three years he has had about one thousand cases in obstetrics, averaging more than one case a day, excluding Sundays, for it is supposable that this bright and energetic young doctor (who belongs also to “the old and only school”) had an occasional Sunday off from his general delivery business at the corner of Fourth and Harrison streets. Doctor Dillon gave his opinion that attenu
Dr. Washington Ayer may be considered as a patriarch among the physicians of the regular old school, for fifty years engaged in active practice of medicine and surgery, modest withal in his enumeration of achievements in his art, for he simply says that although in a general family practice for half a century he has “had many aceouchments during that time”; he says that the usual period of gestation is nine months or two hundred and seventy-five to two hundred and eighty days. The signs of premature birth are lack of development, the general appearance of the child without noting any particular marks upon it; there is no infallible sign. If it is seven or eight months there would be an arrest of development of nails; as it approached toward the full period, eight months say, there would be nothing that would be reliable whatever, except the general appearance of the child would indicate the period of maturity, the term of gestation. A seven months’ child has been generally considered more likely to live than an eight months’ child. Where an eight months’ child is born, it is usually almost invariably where women have borne children and the womb becomes enfeebled, the appendages changing place in the structure of the membranes of the womb, producing fatty degeneration or calcareous formation— this would bring about a condition of malnutrition, with the consequence of premature birth, and the child would carry that feebleness with it and would die of inanition. Dr. Ayer says that so far as his observation has extended in the course of his fifty years of experience, children born at a period of eight months’ gestation survive but a short time, about nineteen out of twenty perish; hardly five per cent of survivals. The first child is less likely to be eight months than the after-born children. Assuming that a man and woman are married on January 6, 1895; the man dies on January 28, 1895; there is a child born to the woman on September 16, 1895; a period of gestation of two hundred and fifty-three days,
There is a somewhat musty proverb as to the effect of the disagreement of doctors; in this case the court must decide upon the apparent conflict of evidence. There are three physicians who testify one way, one who expresses a contrary opinion—three to one; no difficulty if numbers count. But the law says that numerical force must yield to superior quality; hence, we have undertaken a sort of analysis qualitative and quantitative of the doctors’ dicta. Dr. Preston says that it is an exploded idea that an eight months’ child is less likely to live than one born in seven months. Dr. Harris considers the chances equal; Dr. Dillon thinks the eight months’ child has a vital advantage. Dr. Preston has practiced twenty-three years, Harris twenty, Dillon three; the sum of the experience in years of these three medical gentlemen is forty-six; the extreme estimate of the number of eases attended by them is eighteen hundred. Dr. Ayer, opposed in opinion to these three, has been fifty years in active practice as a general family physician, forty-eight years continuously in San Francisco, and has attended over two thousand births. All other things being equal, credit, character, capacity, what principle of evidence turns the scale 1 It is that which is expressed in the statute, that the court is not bound to decide in conformity with the declarations of any number of witnesses against a less number or against a presumption or other evidence satisfying the judicial mind; and the application of this principle gives greater force to the opinion of Dr. Ayer than that of the three learned doctors who differ from him.
Doctor Ayer has spent more years in the practice of his profession and has had more experience in the obstetric art than all the others combined, and he is certainly their professional peer. In endowment of education and character he is, on this record, at least equal to his younger brethren who have testified and outranks them in the duration and area of his practice, and he declares that he has never known a case of an eight months’ child that has survived more than a short time; out of two thousand cases in the course of fifty years he could not recall a single case of such survival; and the shortness of nails is in itself a matter of no importance.
It is claimed by counsel for the claimants that the genuineness of the signature of Dr. James to the written consent is proved by the testimony of Laura, who saw him sign it; by his admission of the writing to Dr. and Mrs. Milen; by the admission of the marriage by Dr. James to Mrs. Diclanan and to Dr. Terry and son, as this admission comprehended the signing of the written consent to marriage, and by the introduction to Williams and Bigley of his wife, which also involved an admission of the marriage and of the written consent connected therewith; by the written consent having been found in the desk of Dr. James, which desk was locked and sealed the day after his death, and by the testimony of Rufus C.' Hopkins, an eminent expert and respected octogenarian and pioneer, a man of half a century’s experience in the examination of handwriting, well known to the court and to the community for his exalted character and prime capacity in his specialty.
Against the opinion evidence of Mr. Hopkins is the testimony of Mr. Gustav Folié and Mr. Albert M. Whittle, connected as paying teller with two savings banks in which the decedent was a depositor, each of whom knew Charles A. James and saw him often sign his name for many years in the books of their banks, and both of whom from that knowledge and comparison with admittedly authentic signatures pronounce the signature “Chas. A. James” on the alleged marriage con
Written on a printed heading:
“ (16)6@,Please send answer by Wells, Fargo & Co.’s Express.
“San Francisco, Jany. 16th, 1895. “T'heo. Milen, M. D.
“Inclose I send you money order on W. F. & Co.,
San Jose, for Twenty-five dollars at your and wife’s request. Please return at your earliest convenience and oblige
“CHAS. A. JAMES,
“925 Howard St.,
“San Francisco.
“(Mem. The original was written in black ink on yellow paper. This is here inscribed in red ink to indicate it as an exhibit.)”
Mr. Folté, of the German Bank, examined both papers and came to the conclusion that the signature to the alleged marriage contract is not genuine, but a copy of the signature to the authentic document herein immediately above transcribed; “there are scarcely two millimeters difference,” an almost infinitesimal appreciation of space. One twenty-fifth part of an inch of our English measurement is equal to one millimeter. Mr. Folté does not think the signature on the contract is a tracing but a copy. The general character of the signature on Exhibit 8A, the letter to Dr. Milen, is that of freedom, regularity and lack of hesitation; in the subscription to the alleged contract there is an absence of regularity and marks of hesitation. No man writes a signature twice alike.
Mr. Whittle, of the Savings Union, familiar for nineteen years with the signature of Chas. A. James as a depositor in that institution, was of the opinion that the signature to the alleged marriage contract was a copy of the signature to the paper “Mrs. James’ Exhibit 8A.” It was not a tracing but an imitation and a very close one. Mr. Rufus Clement Hopkins, to whom, as an expert, counsel and court have paid
In the entire length of the name from the beginning of the point in the capital letter “C” to the end of the point in the letter “s” in “James” there is a difference of one-sixteenth of an inch.
Exhibit 8A being one-sixteenth of an inch longer than that of Exhibit 3. The cause being that the tail in the “s” is longer in 8A than in 3.
The length of the capital “C” in Exhibit 3 is one-sixteenth of an inch longer than in Exhibit 8A.
The length of the loop of the capital “C” is one thirty-second of an inch longer than in Exhibit 8A.
There is a slight difference in the ending of the capital “C,” the one in Exhibit 8A ending with a sort of a curve.
The “s” in “Chas.” in Exhibit 3 is one thirty-second of an inch longer than in Exhibit 8A.
The capital “A” is one thirty-second of an inch-longer in Exhibit 8A than in Exhibit 3.
The upper loop in the letter “ J” in the Exhibit 3 is somewhat flat in comparison with that of Exhibit 8A.
The lower loop in the capital “J” in the Exhibit 8A is one-sixteenth of an inch longer than in the Exhibit 3.
In the word “James” the letters “a” and “e” in Exhibit 8A are more in a direct line than in Exhibit 3.
In Exhibit 3 it will be observed that these two letters are somewhat elevated above the line.
It is also noticeable that the “s” in “Chas.” in Exhibit 3 ends with a tail thus, “Chas.,” while there is scarcely any caudal appendage in the terminal “s” in Exhibit 8A: “Chas.”
A remarkable feature of the two signatures is that the angles of the different letters are identical. This can be more readily observed by measuring the distance from the edge of both documents to the beginning of the name, or any part thereof, and it will be noticed that there is not the slightest difference in any part of the name,
This alleged contract is a forgery beyond any shadow of doubt; there is no escape from this conclusion upon the evidence as presented and herein examined and analyzed. But how, asks counsel for claimants, did that contract get into the desk of the deceased? It is patent from the circumstances that it was put into that desk between the 2d and 22d of February, 1895. The testimony of Cluen and Herrin shows that it was not there when the desk was first examined after the death of Dr. James, on the 2d of February, 1895, when a thorough examination was made of the contents. Then the desk was locked by the public administrator’s clerk and he put his official seal, a common stamped circular paper seal, over the keyhole. Afterward, on February 25, 1895, there was another examination and an exhibition in which there was dramatically developed from that self-same secretary the desired document. Claimant knew of its existence and whereabouts on the 2d of February, 1895. She knew when the public administrator presumed to take possession of her premises that the paper attesting her right was in that receptacle, and once produced no one would dare to trespass upon her domain. She saw her husband after the contract was executed place it in that repository, so she testified on February 21, 1895, and it was either there or next his heart in his vest pocket, yet it was sought out in neither place; nor was its existence proclaimed either from housetops or in the silent sanctuary wherein lay the enshrouded body of her departed husband and father of her prospective child. Neither at the wake nor at the funeral from the house nor at the interment in the cemetery was there aught to indicate that claimant was wife or widow. She was present when Dr. James died, say her counsel, but the evidence is. uncontradicted that she made no sign of mourning-such as a suddenly bereaved wife would naturally exhibit. Unless she were a very clod, instead of a young and tender woman, made widow without warning, she would have given vent to uncontrollable
The condition of the desk and the appearance of the seal indicate that they were tampered with. The seal could easily have been removed and replaced, and no such flimsy affair should be employed by a public officer for so important a purpose. The inference from the evidence is irresistible that this forged paper was inserted in that desk and the seal taken off and, when the purpose was accomplished, reattached; the whole-scheme is artificial and apparent. Meanwhile the story of the marriage was concocted, “a story of love and passion”; fatuous old December engaged in dalliance futile, perhaps fertile, with blithe young May; the antique tale of Winter lingering in the lap of Spring—all very romantic, but quite untrue; mere material for a new novel in which may be inwrought the letters so carefully contrived to support claimant’s case and put up the same as any other prescription by the doctor in this drama. This claimant never asserted herself as widow until about February 13, 1895, when the telegram was sent to Dr. Milen in San Jose that she was pregnant. Prior to that time no such pretension was put forth; even in her own household her brother in law Dick-man ridiculed the idea, as his testimony shows. He never believed the story, and knew it was an invention. As his telegram and letter to Miss Mattie James in the east clearly establish, he had no faith in any such preposterous pretensions, and he clearly wanted to corner the heirs by obtaining a power of attorney carefully prepared for that purpose and in evidence here.
The testimony on both sides of this case has been reviewed with care, and I think the abstract given in this opinion omits no matter -essential to a correct conclusion, and contains nothing irrelevant or immaterial. It has not been deemed necessary to condense character evidence or to allude to it; the facts of the case are here. The claimant and her stepmother have in about every instance where the respondents intro
Upon the record here presented, this court pronounces judgment: 1. That the alleged, contract is not legal in form, according to the decisions of the supreme court; 2. That the alleged contract is a forgery; 3. That there was no mutual assumption of rights, duties or obligations marital, and that they never lived together as husband and wife; 4. That the child claimant is not the child of the decedent, Charles A. J ames.
Application denied as to Laura Hilen James and Theodore Hilen James; granted as to absent heirs.
FINDINGS.
The applications for distribution herein came on regularly for hearing before the court sitting without a jury, a jury trial thereof having been duly waived, Messrs. W. H. H. Hart, Geo. W. Fox and Aylett R. Cotton representing Laura Milen James (so called) and Theodore Milen James (so „ called), and Geo. D. Shadburne, Esq., representing the absent heirs of said deceased, on the ninth day of December, 1896, and was on hearing from day to day until the twelfth day of Harch, 1897, during which time the evidence, oral and documentary, of the contestants was educed and presented, whereupon after the argument of counsel said applications were duly submitted to the court for its decision, and now after mature deliberations the court finds the following:
FACTS.
I. That Charles A. James died intestate in the city and county of San Francisco, state of California, on the twenty-eighth day of January, 1895, leaving him surviving: 1. P. M. James; 2. Chas. T. James; 3. Nathan W. James; 4. Francis
1. P. M. James, Chas. T. James, Nathan W. James, Francis T. Broughton, and Lucy A. Nichols, who are the issue of Peleg W. James, a deceased brother of said Charles A. James, deceased.
2. William J. Clark, Lydia E. Hoxie, Geo. W. Clark, Hannah A. Wadsworth and Amy A. Reisch, who are the issue of Rocellany E. Clark (née James), a deceased sister of said Charles A. James, deceased.
3. William Henry Barber, who is the issue of Mary A. Barber (née James), a deceased sister of said Charles A. James, deceased.
4. Mattie E. James, who is the issue of Thomas A. James, a deceased brother of said Charles A. James, deceased.
5. Daniel M. James, who is a brother of said Charles A. James, deceased.
6. Elizabeth E. Barber (née James), who is a sister of said Charles A. James, deceased.
7. Lydia L. Hopkins (née James), who is a sister of said Charles A. James, deceased. And
8. Willard B. James, who is a brother of said Charles A. James, deceased;
II. That all the above-named nephews and "nieces, brothers and sisters of said Charles A. James, deceased, are and at all times mentioned in their petition herein were nonresidents, to wit, residing out of the state of California.
III. That on the twenty-first day of February, 1895, Andrew C.' Freeze, Esq., was, by the order of said Superior Court, duly entered and made, duly appointed the administrator of the Estate of said Charles A. James, deceased, and his powers as such administrator have never been revoked.
IV. That thereafter, to wit, on the twenty-first day of February, 1895, notice to creditors to present their claims against said estate were duly published.
*195 V. That thereafter, to wit, on the fourth day of March, 1896, said administrator presented his account of his administration to said court for allowance, and the same was duly allowed and settled on the twentieth day of March, 1896.
VI. That all the claims against said deceased presented to said administrator and all the taxes against said estate have been and were at the time of filing said applications for distribution herein paid and discharged, and said estate was then and is now ready for distribution.
VII. That the residue of said estate now remaining in the hands of said administrator is that certain real estate situate in said city and county, bounded and described as follows, to wit: Commencing at a point on the southeasterly line of Howard street, distant thereon 75 feet southwesterly from the southerly corner of 5th and Howard streets; thence southwesterly along the southeasterly line of Howard street 25 feet; thence at right angles southeasterly 80 feet; thence at right angles northeasterly 25 feet and parallel with Howard street, and thence at right angles northwesterly 80 feet to the point of commencement, together with the improvements, consisting of a three-story frame building and the appurtenances appraised at $15,000; also, personal property consisting of cash on hand about $31,000; and the following jewelry, to wit: One small gold ring; one large gold ring; one gold ring with five diamonds; one amethyst set consisting of brooch and earrings; one diamond stud; three yellow metal collar buttons; one gold watch No. 10095, J. W. Tucker, maker; one gold chain; one-pair of diamond earrings containing six stones each; one pair gold bracelets, containing nine diamonds each, and one gold cross containing sixteen diamonds.
The furniture has hitherto been sold by the administrator under the order of the court.
The wearing apparel of Chas. A. James, deceased, and of his deceased wife, Susan K. James, have not been accounted for by said administrator. The above residue of property is subject to expenses of administration and counsel fees for absent heirs, which have not been settled or allowed.
VIII. That Laura Milen James (so called) never was at any time the wife or widow of said Charles A. James, either by contract or otherwise.
*196 IX. That Theodore Hilen James (so called) is not the child of said Charles A. James, legitimate or illegitimate, or otherwise.
X. That said Charles A. James left him surviving neither issue, surviving wife, father nor mother.
• XI. That all of the property aforesaid was the separate property of said Charles A. James, deceased.
From the foregoing facts the court finds the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
That P. M. James, Chas. T. James, Nathan W. James, Francis T. Broughton, Lucy A. Nichols, William J. Clark, Lydia E. Hoxie, Geo. W. Clark, Hannah A. Wadsworth, Amy A. Beisch, William Henry Barber, Mattie E. James, Daniel M. J ames, Elizabeth E. Barber, Lydia L. Hopkins and Willard B. James, are the next of kin and heirs at law of said Charles A. James, deceased, and as such are entitled to inherit his estate—to the brothers and sisters in equal degree, and the nephews and nieces by right of representation.
Let a decree of distribution be entered accordingly.
The Principle Case Was Appealed to the supreme court and reversed on questions of evidence. No new trial of the case was had, however, and the judgment of the trial court stands as originally rendered. Hence it may well be doubted whether the action of the appellate tribunal materially affects the decision of the lower court as an authority.
COMMON-LAW MARRIAGES.
Marriage as a Civil Contract.—Marriage is a civil contract, depending for its validity upon the free consent of parties not laboring under any legal disability, and upon nothing else in the absence of positive statutory declarations to the contrary: Brisbin v., Huntington, 128 Iowa, 166, 103 N. W. 144; Floyd County v. Wolfe (Iowa), 117 N. W. 32; Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 61 Am. St. Rep. 419, 69 N. W. 31, 34 L. R. A. 384; Keen v. Keen, 184 Mo. 358, 83 S. W. 526; Voorhees v. Voorhees Exrs., 46 N. J. Eq. 411, 19 Am. St. Rep. 404, 19 Atl. 172; Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N. Y. 467, 95 Am. St. Rep. 609, 67 N. E. 63, 63 L. R. A. 92; Commonwealth v. Haylow, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 541. To quote from Cartwright v. McGown, 121 Ill. 388, 2 Am. St. Rep. 105, 12 N. E. 737: “A marriage is a civil contract, made in due form, by which a man and woman agree to take each other for husband and wife, during their joint lives, unless it is annulled by law, and to discharge toward each other the duties
Marriage as a Status.—But while the law defines marriage as a civil contract, and such indeed it is, it is something more than a mere contract, for it creates a status or relation as much as that of parent and child, which the parties of themselves cannot dissolve: Willits v. Willits, 76 Neb. 228, 107 N. W. 379, 5 L. R. A., N. S., 767; Hilton v. Roylanee, 25 Utah, 129, 95 Am. St. Rep. 821, 69 Pac. 660, 58 L. R. A. 723; Holmes v. Holmes, Fed. Cas. No. 6638, 1 Saw. 99. “Marriage is more than a mere civil contract for the establishment and maintenance by the parties to it of certain relations to each other. It involves, except in so far as it has been modified by statute, an intimate personal union of those participating in it of a character unknown to any other human relation, and it creates a civil status, the maintenance of which in its full integrity is vital to the moral welfare of society”: Taylor v. Taylor (Md.), 69 Atl. 632. Said the supreme court of Missouri: “Marriage is considered in law as a civil contract, to which the consent of the parties capable in law of contracting is essential. While it is here declared to be a civil contract, it is almost universally held to be something more than an ordinary contract. Marriage is a status, created by contract, and we formulate the definition of it as follows: Marriage is the civil status of one man and one woman, capable of contracting, united by contract and mutual consent for life, for the discharge, to each other and to the community, of the duties legally incumbent on those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex”: State v. Bittick, 103 Mo. 183, 23 Am. St. Rep. 869, 15 S. W. 325, 11 L. B. A. 587. “What persons establish by entering into matrimony is not a contractual relation, but a social status; and the only essential features of the transaction are that the participants are of legal capacity to assume that status, and freely consent to do so”: University of Michigan v. McGuckin, 64 Neb. 300, 89 N. W. 778, 57 L. B. A. 917.
Essentials of Common-law Marriage.—The mutual agreement to be husband and wife in praesenti by a man and woman capable of assuming that relation, especially if followed by matrimonial cohabitation, constitutes a common-law marriage, without any necessity for a solemnization or formal ceremony of any kind: Blanchard v. Lambert, 43 Iowa, 228, 22 Am. Rep. 245; Smith v. Fuller (Iowa), 108 N. W. 765; Laurence v. Laurence, 164 Ill. 367, 45 N. E. 1071; McKenna v. McKenna, 73 Ill. App. 64; Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 96 Ill. App. 52, 196 Ill. 432, 63 N. E. 1023; Porter v. United States (Ind. Ter.), 104 S. W. 855; State v. Walker, 36 Kan. 297, 59 Am. Rep. 556, 13 Pac. 279; Matney v. Linn, 59 Kan. 613, 54 Pac. 668; Williams v. Kilburn, 88 Mich. 279, 50 N. W. 293; State v. Worthingham, 23 Minn. 528; Dickerson v. Brown, 49 Miss. 357; Floyd v. Calvert, 53 Miss. 37; Dyer v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 391, 27 Am. Rep. 359; Eaton v. Eaton, 66 Neb. 676, 92 N. W. 995, 60 L. R. A. 605; Voorhees v. Voorhees'
Proof of Contract.—A marriage contract may, like other contracts, be proved by the signature of the parties or by witnesses who were present when it was made: In re Imboden’s Estate, 111 Mo. App. 220, 86 S. W. 263; Commonwealth v. Stump, 53 Pa. 132, 91 Am. Dec. 198. If such evidence is wanting, then marriage may be proved from cohabitation, reputation, conduct and other circumstances (Smith v. Fuller (Iowa), 108 N. W. 765; Pourier v. McKenzie, 147 Fed. 287), of which more will be said hereafter. While the evidence to establish a common-law marriage should be clear, consistent and convincing (In re Rossiquot’s Will, 112 N. Y. Supp. 353), still each fact and circumstance relied upon need not be so conclusively proved that no other reasonable conclusion from the evidence can be drawn; it is enough that all the facts and circumstances are fairly sufficient to justify a finding in favor of the marriage: Edelstein v. Brown (Tex. Civ. App.), 95 S. W. 1126.
Conflict of Laws.—The rule that a marriage, valid in the state or country where entered into, is valid in every other state or country, unless there prohibited by some positive rule of law or public policy (Succession of Gabisso, 119 La. 704, 121 Am. St. Rep. 529, 44 South. 438, 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1082; Commonwealth v. Graham, 157 Mass. 73, 34 Am. St. Rep. 255, 31 N. E. 706, 16 L. R. A. 578; Pennegar & Haney v. State, 87 Tenn. 244, 10 Am. St. Rep. 648; State v. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403, 60 Am. St. Rep. 936, 38 Atl. 81, 40 L. R. A. 428; Willey v. Willey, 22 Wash. 115, 79 Am. St. Rep. 923, 60 Pac. 145), applies to common-law marriages: Darling v. Dent. 82 Ark. 76, 100 S. W. 747; Smith v. Smith, 52 N. J. L. 207, 19 Atl. 255; Estate of McCausland, 213 Pa. 189, 110 Am. St. Rep. 540, 62 Atl. 780. Hence, a common-law marriage contracted in a state where such marriages are valid may be recognized in another state where such marriages cannot be entered into: Nelson v. Carlson (Wash.), 94 Pac. 477.
A marriage by contract in one state, followed by cohabitation in another state, was held valid in Gibson v. Gibson, 24 Neb. 294, 39 N. W. 450. And where the question as to the validity of a common-law marriage arose in Alabama after there had been cohabitation in Kentucky and in Ohio, the supreme court of Alabama said: “Although the. statutes of Kentucky declare every marriage void unless solemnized in the manner provided therein, and a common-law marriage cannot be contracted in that state, yet evidence was properly admitted to show that the cohabitation, which began and continued for ten years in Ohio, where the common law is presumed to prevail, and where a common-law marriage is valid, in' the absence o'f a
Effect of Common-law Marriage.—A common-law marriage confers upon the parties all the rights and subjects them to all the duties and obligations usually incident to the marriage relation when entered into in accordance with the written law: Steves v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), 107 S. W. 141; Davis v. Pryor, 112 Fed. 274, 50 C. C. A. 579. If the father and mother of a child, soon after its birth, agreed with each other in one state to become, and live together as, husband and wife until parted by death, thereafter continuing to live together as, and holding themselves out to the world to be, husband and wife, such contract of marriage legitimates their child, not only in that state, but also in another state where a common-law marriage is recognized as valid: McCausland's Estate, 213 Pa. 189, 110 Am. St. Rep. 540, 62 Atl. 780. And in case of the wrongful death of a man, his wife and children by a common-law marriage may recover damages therefor: Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Cody, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 520, 50 S. W. 135.
Necessity for Agreement.—It is essential to a common-law marriage that there shall be a mutual agreement between the parties to assume toward each other the relation of .husband and wife. Cohabitation without such an agreement does not constitute marriage: Compton v. Benham (Ind. App.), 85 N. E. 365; Commonwealth v. Stevens, 196 Mass. 280, 82 N. E. 33; and an agreement to live together is not marriage, if there is no agreement to live as husband and wife: Soper v. Halsey, 85 Hun, 464, 33 N. Y. Supp. 105.
Form of Agreement.—No particular words, however, are necessary to constitute a valid marriage by mutual agreement; if enough is said and done to evidence an intention by the parties to assume a marital relation, this is sufficient whatever may be the form of expression employed. But enough must be said and done to show such intention: Mickle v. State (Ala.), 21 South. 66; Heymann v. Heymann, 218 Ill. 636, 75 N. E. 1079; Bowman v. Bowman, 24 Ill. App. 165; Marks v. Marks, 108 Ill. App. 371; Clancy v. Clancy, 66 Mich. 202, 33 N. W. 889; State v. Hansbrough, 181 Mo. 348, 80 S.. W. 900; In re Hines’ Estate, 7 Pa. Dist. Ct. 89. The intention of the parties is to be gathered from the circumstances attending the contract, rather than from mutual reservations or secret intentions of either party: In re Imboden’s Estate, 111 Mo. App. 220, 86 S. W. 263. If there is an agreement, followed by cohabitation, a marriage
Implied Contracts.—While some doubt has been expressed on the question, still it would seem clear that to constitute a common-law marriage, an express agreement is not essential, but a contract to live together as husband and wife may be implied from the acts and conduct of the parties; and that a contract so implied has all the force and effect of a contract expressed in written or spoken words: Hilton v. Roylance, 25 Utah, 129, 95 Am. St. Rep. 821, 69 Pac. 660, 58 L. R. A. 723; Adger v. Ackerman, 115 Fed. 124, 52 C. C. A. 568. “If a marriage contract need not be evidenced by writing, and of course it need not be, we can conceive of no reason why it may not, like many other civil contracts, be evidenced by acts and conduct from which its making ore tenus may be presumed”: Renfrow v. Renfrow, 60 Kan. 277, 72 Am. St. Rep. 350, 56 Pac. 534. “We must start, therefore, in the examination of this case,” said the New York court, “with the fact that the living together of these two people, so far as they did live together, was not preceded by any ceremonial marriage, or by any express agreement that they should live together as man and wife. No ceremony is necessary to create the relation of man and wife in this state. The contract of marriage, so far as its inception goes, is regarded as is any other contract, and it may be begun by an agreement between the two interested parties that they assume toward each other the relation of husband and wife. That agreement, if it is not proven in express terms by competent evidence, may be established by the facts of cohabitation and reputation among their friends and neighbors, and of recognition of each other as holding that relation: Gall v. Gall, 114 N. Y. 109, 21 N. E. 106; Hynes v. McDermott, 10 Daly, 423, affirmed 91 N. Y. 451, 43 Am. Rep. 677. But these facts, of themselves, do not constitute a marriage. They are simply evidence from which, if sufficiently strong, the courts are at liberty to infer that the cohabitation was the result of a previous agreement to become man and wife, and from that fact to infer further that a marriage actually existed between the parties: Gall v. Gall, 114 N. Y. 109, 21 N. E. 106. It is quite true that it has been said that the presumption of marriage arising from cohabitation, apparently matrimonial, is one of the strongest known to the law. In many cases this is undoubtedly the fact. But this presumption is indulged in in the interest of decency and clean living, and because of the preference which the law has for orderly and decent conduct as against licentiousness. The inference is not made for the benefit of either party to the alleged contract”: In re Brush, 25 App. Div. 610, 49 N. Y. Supp. 803.
Agreement in Words of Present Tense.—There is no doubt, in the absence of a positive statutory declaration to the contrary, that where a man and woman agree in words of the present tense to take each other as husband and wife, and then in pursuance of the agree
Agreement to Marry in Future.—An agreement to marry in the future, followed by cohabitation, does not constitute marriage. In other words, a man and woman, engaged to be married in the future, who live together as husband and wife when they do not understand themselves to be such, and are looking forward to a marriage in the future, are not husband and wife in the eye of the law: Robertson v. State, 42 Ala. 509; Farley v. Farley, 94 Ala. 501, 33 Am. St. Rep. 141, 10 South. 646; Port v. Port, 70 Ill. 484; Hebblethwaite v. Hepworth, 98 Ill. 126; Stoltz v. Doering, 112 Ill. 234; Judson v. Judson, 147 Mich. 518, 111 N. W. 78; Sorensen v. Sorensen, 68 Neb. 483, 94 N. W. 540, 98 N. W. 837, 100 N. W. 930, 103 N. W. 455; Cheney v. Arnold, 15 N. Y. 345, 69 Am. Dec. 609, and note; Duncan v. Duncan, 10 Ohio St. 181; Estate of Grimm, 131 Pa. 199, 17 Am. St. Rep. 796, 18 Atl. 1061, 6 L. R. A. 717; Peck v. Peck, 12 R. I. 485, 34 Am. Rep. 702. Nevertheless, when cohabitation follows an agreement to marry in the future, it is presumed to be in fulfillment of such agreement and in consummation of actual marriage. A matrimonial union thus effected is a valid common-law marriage, and is denominated a marriage per verba futuro cum copula. But this rule that the copula or cohabitation is presumed to be in fulfillment of the previous promise to marry and hence to convert the executory agreement into an actual present marriage, is merely a rule of convenience, and may always be overthrown by evidence that the fact is otherwise: Cartwright v. McGown, 121 Ill. 388, 2 Am. St. Rep. 105, 12 N. E. 737; Hiler v. People, 156 Ill. 511, 47 Am. St. Rep. 221, 41 N. E. 181; Mc-Kenna v. McKenna, 180 Ill. 577, 54 N. E. 641; Marks v. Marks, 108 Ill. App. 371; Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 61 Am. St. Rep. 419, 69 N. W. 31, 34 L. R. A. 384; Topper v. Perry, 197 Mo. 531, 114 Am. St. Rep. 777, 95 S. W. 203. “To constitute a marriage legal at common law the contract and consent must be per verba de praesenti, or if made per verba de futuro cum copula, the copula is presumed to have been allowed on the faith of the marriage promise, and that so the parties, at the time of the copula, accepted of each other as man and wife. It is not sufficient to agree to present cohabitation and a future marriage when more convenient. Where parties have contracted a common-law marriage, without any solemnization or other formality apart from the agreement itself, it is not requisite that the agreement should be made before - witnesses. But such a marriage is to be distinguished from cases of seduction or sexual intercourse followed by a promise of marriage, and eases where
Said the supreme court of Nebraska in a recent decision: “In states where no marriage celebration is necessary, and when such contract, is followed by sexual intercourse between the parties, the law, so as not to presume fornication, presumes that parties who have promised to marry mean sexual intercourse following such promise to be the consummation of such agreement. But this presumption may be rebutted by any facts which show that the parties knew or intended their intercourse to be illicit, as where at the time they were looking forward to being married with a ceremony: Peck v. Peck, 12 R. I. 485, 34 Am. Rep. 702; Fryer v. Fryer, Rich. Eq. Cas. 85. In Stoltz v. Doering, 112 Ill. 234, it is said: ‘At common law the fact of sexual intercourse after an agreement to marry at a future day does not constitute marriage. The copula must have been in fulfillment of the agreement to marry. From these authorities it appears that the law, in the absence of evidence, raises the presumption that by the act of copula the parties then and there intended to consummate their existing agreement to marry—i. e., to. convert the future agreement into a present consummation. This is the whole doctrine of marriages de futuro cum copula. There is no difference in the basic principles of the marriage contract from any other. The minds of the parties must meet, and the agreement to marry must be made. The time when the marriage shall take place may be the present, or may be in the future. If in the future, there is not a present marriage, but an agreement to marry, and the mere act of copula does not change the agreement. The law presumes, in the absence of evidence, that the parties themselves changed the terms of the contract from the future to the then present. When, however, the evidence establishes, as in this case, that during the period of the sexual intercourse between the parties they had set the day in the future, and were making preparations for and intending to solemnize their marriage rites in accordance with the statute of this state, there is no ground for this presumption, and the law will not indulge it’ ”: Sorensen v. Sorensen, 68 Neb. 483, 94 N. W. 540, 98 N. W. 837, 100 N. W. 930, 103 N. W. 455.
Consent of Parties.—There can be no such thing as marriage without the consent of the parties. Contracts of marriage do not differ from other contracts in this respect; the first essential to their validity is the mutual assent of the parties: McKenna v. McKenna, 180 Ill. 577, 54 N. E. 641; Hooper v. McCaffery, 83 Ill. App. 341; Roszel v. Roszel, 73 Mich. 133, 16 Am. St. Rep. 569, 40 N. W. 858; University of Michigan v. McGuckin, 64 Neb. 300, 89 N. W. 778, 57 L. R. A. 917; Keyes v. Keyes, 22 N. H. 553; Hynes v. McDermott, 91 N. Y. 451, 43 Am. Rep. 677; Jaques v. Public Admr., 1 Bradf. Sur. 499; Town of Mountholly v. Town of Andover, 11 Vt. 226, 34 Am. Dec. 685. “It is well established in this state,” remarks the supreme court of Missouri, “that a marriage without observing the statutory regulations, if made
Necessity of Cohabitation.-—-The statement is sometimes met with that an assumption of the marriage status is essential to a common-law marriage; that an agreement presently to be husband and wife is not sufficient to constitute marriage until it is acted upon by the parties: McKenna v. McKenna, 180 Ill. 577, 54 N. E.641; Robinson v. Robinson, 188 Ill. 371, 58 N. E. 906; Lorimer v. Lorimer, 124 Mich. 631, 83 N. W. 609; Topper v. Perry, 197 Mo. 531, 114 Am. St. Rep. 777, 95 S. W. 203; Sorensen v. Sorensen, 68 Neb. 483, 94 N. W. 540, 98 N. W. 837, 100 N. W. 930, 103 N. W. 455. See, too, Hawkins v. Hawkins, 142 Ala. 571, 110 Am. St. Rep. 53, 38 South. 640. The statutes of California declare that “consent alone will not constitute marriage; it must be followed by a solemnization, or by a mutual assumption of marital rights, duties or obligations.” This assumption of the marital relation means cohabitation as husband and wife; mere copulation without such cohabitation is not enough: Sharon v. Sharon, 79 Cal. 633, 22 Pac. 26, 131; People v. Lehmann, 104 Cal. 631, 38 Pac. 422. Some of the decisions state that a present assumption of marital relations is necessary: McKenna v. McKenna, 180 Ill. 577, 54 N. E. 641; Topper v. Perry, 197 Mo. 531, 114 Am. St. Rep. 777, 95 S. W. 203. But in California, if any length of time thereafter they assume the rights and duties of the marital relation, both understanding thereby to consummate the marriage covenant, a lawful marriage will result under the statute: In re Ruffino’s Estate, 116 Cal. 304, 48 Pac. 127.
The true rule, however, is that a marriage is complete when the parties agree, in words of the present tense, to take each other as husband and wife. Cohabitation or .copulation following such agreement may be evidence of the existence of the agreement, but it adds nothing to the agreement and is not essential to the validity of the marriage: Dumaresly v. Fishly, 10 Ky. (3 A. K. Marsh.) 368; Jackson v. Winne, 7 Wend. 47, 22 Am. Dec. 563. Said the supreme court of Minnesota in the leading case of Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 61 Am. St. Rep. 419, 69 N. W. 31, 34 L. R. A. 384: “Upon this state of facts the contention of the appellants is, that there was no marriage, notwithstanding the execution by them of the written contract;
A mere agreement to be husband and wife, said the supreme court of Iowa, in Pegg v. Pegg (Iowa), 115 N. W. 1027, without a present intention to assume that relation, does not constitute marriage.
, Cohabitation Without Agreement.—While marriage may be consummated without cohabitation, there can be no marriage without an agreement between the parties to be husband and wife. Cohabitation, in the absence of such agreement, does not amount to marriage. Cohabitation is evidence of marriage, but it does not of itself constitute marriage: Hawkins v. Hawkins, 142 Ala. 571, 110 Am. St. Rep. 53, 38 South. 640; Kilburn v. Kilburn, 89 Cal. 46, 23 Am. St. Rep. 447, 26 Pac. 636; Compton v. Benham (Ind. App.), 85 N. E. 365; Randlett v. Rice, 141 Mass. 385, 6 N. E. 238; Noreross v. Noreross, 155 Mass. 425, 29 N. E. 506; Commonwealth v. Stevens, 196 Mass. 280, 82 N. E. 33; State v. Kennedy, 207 Mo. 528, 106 S. W. 57; Goldbeek v. Goldbeek, 18 N. J. Eq. 42; Voorhees v. Voorhees’ Exrs., 46 N. J. Eq. 411, 19 Am. St. Rep. 404, 19 Atl. 172; Dunbarton v. Franklin, 19 N. H. 257; Riddle v. Riddle, 26 Utah, 268, 72 Pac. 1081; Holmes v. Holmes, 1 Saw. 99, Fed. Cas. No. 6638.
Cohabitation not Matrimonial in Character.—Cohabitation which will sustain a common-law marriage must be matrimonial in its char
To quote from In re Wallace, 49 N. J. Eq. 530, 25 Atl. 260: “Where a man and woman constantly live together, ostensibly as man and wife, demeaning themselves toward each other as such, and are received into society and treated by their friends and relations as having and being entitled to that status, the law will, in favor of morality and decency, presume that they have been legally married. Such cohabitation and repute is said to be matrimonial,, in distinction from that occasional, hidden and limited cohabitation and repute which marks the meretricious relation. It is always a question whether the cohabitation proved is of the character which will raise a presumption and make prima facie proof of marriage. At best it can do no more, for the presumption may be rebutted."
Cohabitation Illicit in Its Inception.—A cohabitation between a man and woman, illicit in its inception, and so understood by them, is presumed to continue illicit until some proof is made of its change to a matrimonial cohabitation; therefore no presumption of marriage arises from it: Clark v. Cassidy, 64 Ga. 662; Marks v. Marks, 108 Ill. App. 371; Pike v. Pike, 112 Ill. App. 243; Cartwright v. McGown, 121 Ill. 388, 2 Am. St. Rep. 105, 12 N. E. 737; Cram v. Burnham, 5 Me. 213, 17 Am. Dec. 218; Cargile v. Wood, 63 Mo. 501; Clayton v. Wardell, 4 N. Y. 230; Harbeck v. Harbeck, 102 N. Y. 714, 7 N. E. 408; Ahlberg v. Ahlberg, 24 N. Y. Supp. 919; Bates v. Bates, 7 Misc. Rep. 547, 27 N. Y. Supp. 872; United States Trust Co. v. Maxwell, 26 Misc. Rep. 276, 57 N. Y. Supp. 53; Bell v. Clarke, 45 Misc. Rep. 272, 92 N. Y. Supp. 163; McBean v. McBean, 37 Or. 195, 61 Pac. 418; Appeal of Hunt, 86 Pa. 294; Appeal of Reading Fire etc. Ins. Co., 113 Pa. 204, 57 Am. Rep. 448, 6 Atl. 60; Henry v. Taylor, 16 S. D. 424, 93 N. W. 641; Cuneo v. De Cuneo, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 436, 59 S. W.
Of course the fact that a cohabitation is meretricious in its inception does not preclude the parties from subsequently entering into a valid marriage contract and effecting a lawful marriage union: Elzas v. Elzas, 171 Ill. 632, 49 N. E. 717; Foss v. Brown, 151 Mich. 119, 114 N. W. 873; Swartz v. State, 7 Ohio Dec. 43, 13 Ohio C. C. 62; Travers v. Reinhardt, 25 App. D. C. 567. That their relations were originally illicit is immaterial so long as their minds subsequently meet in the formation of an actual marriage contract: University of Mich. v. McGockin, 62 Neb. 489, 87 N. W. 180, 57 L. R. A. 917. In other words, the presumption that a cohabitation adulterous in its origin continues to be of that character may be rebutted and proved to have become matrimonial, and a lawful common-law marriage established; this fact, that the evil intent of the parties has changed and become matrimonial, may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence: Drawdy v. Hesters, 130 Ga. 161, 60 S. E. 451, 15 L. R. A., N. S., 190; Potter v. Clapp, 203 Ill. 592, 96 Am. St. Rep. 322, 68 N. E. 81; Hynes v. McDermott, 91 N. Y. 451, 43 Am. Rep. 677; Roberson v. McCauley, 61 S. C. 411, 39 S. E. 570; Edelstein v. Brown (Tex. Civ. App.), 95 S. W. 1126. And inasmuch as the law itself and all its presumptions deprecate illegal and favor lawful relations, slight circumstances may be sufficient to establish a change from an illicit to a legal relation; and no proof of its time or place is indispensable: Adger v. Ackerman, 115 Fed. 124, 52 C. C. A. 568. Evidence of marriage is strengthened, however, by the fact that previously the parties had no illicit relations: Heymann v. Heymann, 218 Ill. 636, 75 N. E. 1079.
Said the court in Badger v. Badger, 88 N. Y. 546, 42 Am. Rep. 263: “The rule that a connection, confessedly illicit in its origin, or shown to have been such, will be presumed to retain that character until some change is established, is both logical and just. The force and effect of such a fact is always very great, and we are not disposed in the least degree to weaken or disregard it: Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N. Y. 198, 10 Am. Rep. 460. Very often the changed character of the cohabitation is indicated by facts and circumstances which explain the cause and locate the period of the change, so that in spite of the illicit origin the subsequent intercourse is deemed matrimonial: Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52, 4 Am. Dec. 244; Rose v. Clark, 8 Paige, 574; Starr v. Peek, 1 Hill, 270; Jackson v. Claw, 18 Johns. 346. But a change may occur, and be satisfactorily established, although the precise time or occasion cannot be clearly ascertained. If the facts show that there was or must have been a change, that the illicit beginning has become transformed into a cohabitation matrimonial in its character, it is not imperative that we should be able to say precisely when or exactly why the change occurred: Caujolle v. Ferrie, 23 N. Y. 90. While we have no hesitation about the rule, and shall be prompt to apply it in a case which demands such appli
And in Darling v. Dent, 82 Ark. 76, 100 S. W. 747, it is said: “While it is true that, if it be shown that the relations between Darling and Mrs. Williams were illicit in the beginning, the burden is upon those asserting a valid marriage agreement to show that such an agreement was afterward entered into, still there is no presumption that the relationship continued to be illicit. It is a matter of proof, and not of presumption, whether the relationship continued to be illicit, or whether it was changed to a legal and moral status. Whatever presumptions are indulged are in favor of the legitimacy of such relationship.”
A somewhat stricter rule may be inferred from the following extract: “The general rule upon the question of proof of marriage by proof of cohabitation, conduct and declaration of the parties is stated by a learned judge as follows: The general and ordinary presumption of the law is in favor of innocence, in questions of marriage, and of legitimacy where children are concerned. Cohabitation is presumed to be lawful till the contrary appears. Where, however, the connection between the parties is shown to have had an illicit origin, and to be criminal in its nature, the law raises no presumption of marriage: 2 Kent, 87; Jackson v. Claw,. 18 Johns. 346; 2 Green-leaf on Evidence, sec. 464; Physick’s Estate, 2 Phila. 278. The presumption against marriage, where the connection between the parties is shown to have been illicit in origin, may, however, be overcome by proofs showing that the original connection has changed in its character, and a subsequent marriage may be established by circumstances, without actual proof of a marriage in fact. The eases cited by the learned counsel for the respondent in their brief in this case fully establish this point. The following eases also illustrate the same subject: Starr v. Peck, 1 Hill, 270; Clayton v. Wardell, 4 N. Y. 230; Caujolle v. Ferrie, 23 N. Y. 90; O’Gara v. Eisenlohr, 38 N. Y. 296; Foster v. Hawley, 8 Hun, 68. The rule laid down in the last case cited is stated as follows: A cohabitation illicit in its origin is presumed to be of that character, unless the contrary be proved, and cannot be transformed into matrimony by evidence which falls short of establishing the fact of an actual contract of marriage. Such contract may be proved by circumstances, but they must be such as to exclude the inference or presumption that the former relation continued, and satisfactorily prove that it had been changed into that of actual matrimony by mutual consent”: Williams v. Williams, 46 Wis. 464, 32 Am. Rep. 722, 1 H. W. 98.
Removal of Impediment to Marriage, Followed by Cohabitation.— Some authorities take the view that where a man and woman commence cohabitation when there is a known impediment to their legal marriage, such as the existence of a prior undissolved marriage of one of them, that their continued cohabitation after the removal of
Some authorities declare that where an attempted marriage is void by reason of the disability of one of the parties, a subsequent marriage will be presumed after the disability has been removed, where the matrimonial relationship is continued, and the parties hold themselves out, and are regarded and treated by their relatives and friends, as husband and wife: Blanchard v. Lambert, 43 Iowa, 228, 22 Am. Rep. 245; Barker v. Valentine, 125 Mich. 336, 84 Am. St. Rep. 578, 84 N. W. 297, 51 N. W. 787; Bechtel v. Barton, 147 Mich. 318, 110 N. W. 935.
There appears to be no doubt that if parties in good faith marry when in fact a legal impediment exists to their marriage, and they continue to cohabit as man and wife after the removal of the impediment to their lawful union, the law presumes a common-law marriage: Cartwright v. MeGown, 121 Ill. 388, 2 Am. St. Rep. 105, 12 N. E. 737; Land v. Land, 206 Ill. 288, 99 Am. St. Rep. 171, 68 N. E. 1109; Teter v. Teter, 88 Ind. 494; Busch v. Supreme Tent of Knights of Maccabees of the World, 81 Mo. App. 562; Bull v. Bull, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 364, 68 S. W. 727; United States v. Hays, 20 Fed. 710. The presumption arises immediately after the obstacle is removed: Adger v. Ackerman, 115 Fed. 124, 52 C. C. A. 568. And even though the removal is unknown, continued cohabitation thereafter evidences consent to live in wedlock: Eaton v. Eaton, 66 Neb. 676, 92 N. W. 995, 60 L. R. A. 605.
In other words, when a man and woman in good faith do what they can to render their union matrimonial, but the marriage is ineffectual because one of them is under a legal disability on account of a prior marriage supposed to be (but not) dissolved; and they live together as husband and wife after the disability is removed, supposing and intending themselves to be such, they are husband and wife from the date of the removal of the disability: Poole v. People, 24 Colo. 510, 65 Am. St. Rep. 245, 52 Pac. 1025; Manning v. Spurck, 199 Ill. 447,
If the woman is in good faith, while the man conceals an impediment to his marriage, then it would seem that a marriage will be presumed in her favor from cohabitation after the removal of the impediment: Robinson v. Ruprecht, 191 Ill. 424, 61 N. E. 631; Flanagan v. Flanagan, 122 Mich. 386, 81 N. W. 258; Barker v. Valentine, 125 Mich. 336, 84 Am. St. Rep. 578, 84 N. W. 297, 51 L. R. A. 787. “There is a well-defined distinction between illicit relations, forbidden because of an undisclosed disability on the part of one of the parties thereto, and such relations as are mutually meretricious, involving on the part of the woman knowledge that its character is not, and is not intended to be, matrimonial”: In re Schmidt, 42 Misc. Rep. 463, 87 N. Y. Supp. 428. “The rule ought to be that where one person is free to enter into the matrimonial relation and does so in good faith, but the other party is incapable of entering into such relation because of a former wife or husband living, or other impediment, when such impediment is removed, if the parties continue matrimonial cohabitation, continue to introduce and recognize each other as husband and wife, and are so recognized by their relatives, friends, and by society, it ought to be held that from such moment they are actually husband and wife, and that, under such circumstances, it is of no importance that a formal agreement to live together as husband and wife was not entered into, or that either did not know that the impediment to such an agreement had been removed, when, in fact, it had been so removed, and both parties were competent to enter into the matrimonial state”: In re Wells’ Estate, 108 N. Y. Supp. 164, 123 App. Div. 79.
Manifestly, an express agreement to marry, followed by cohabitation in pursuance thereof, does not constitute a common-law marriage so long as there exists a prior valid marriage between one of the parties and a third person: Blanks v. Southern Ry. Co., 82 Miss. 703, 35 South. 570.
Cohabitation not Exclusive in Its Character.—Cohabitation, in order to form the basis of marriage, must be exclusive in its character. It is one of .the essential obligations of a valid marriage contract that it binds the parties to keep themselves separate and apart from all others and cleave to each other during their joint lives. Where the evidence shows that a man cohabited with two women, the presumed innocence of either cohabitation must fall, for it is impossible for two marriages to exist together, and neither is by such evidence established: Klipfel v. Klipfel, 41 Colo. 40, 124 Am. St. Rep. 96, 92 Pac. 26; Riddle v. Riddle, 26 Utah, 268, 72 Pac. 1081.
Beputation of Marriage as Evidence.—Where a man and woman have held themselves out to the world as husband and wife, this is strong, persuasive evidence that they are married: Drawdy v. Hesters,
What Constitutes Beputation.—When a marriage contract is kept secret, this does not invalidate it; there may be an assumption of marital relations without their being made public. But secrecy in an alleged marriage is a circumstance to be considered in determining whether such a marriage in fact exists: Cargile v. Wood, 63 Mo. 501; Rose v. Clark, 8 Paige, 574; Commonwealth v. Stump, 53 Pa. 132, 91 Am. Dec. 198; Stans v. Baitey, 9 Wash. 115, 37 Pac. 316.
“In order to constitute evidence from which a marriage may be inferred, the origin of the cohabitation must have been consistent with a matrimonial intent, and the. cohabitation must have been of such a character, and the conduct of the parties such, as to lead to the belief in the community that a marriage existed, and thereby to create the reputation of a marriage”: Williams v. Herrick, 21 R. I. 401, 79 Am. St. Rep. 809, 43 Atl. 1036. “A marriage is a civil contract, and may be made per verba de praesenti—that is, by words in the present tense, without attending ceremonies, religious or civil. Such is the law of many states in the absence of statutory regulation. It is the doctrine of the common law. But, where no such ceremonies are required and no record is made to attest the marriage, some public recognition of it is necessary as evidence of its existence. The protection of the parties and their children and considerations of public policy require this public recognition; and it may be made in any way which can be seen and known by men, such as living together as man and wife, treating each other and speaking of each other in the presence of third parties as being in that relation, and declaring the relation in documents executed by them
But reputation to prove marriage must be general and uniform in the community where the parties live: it cannot be founded on divided or singular opinion: Powers v. Charbmury’s Exrs., 35 La. Ann. 630; Ashford v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 80 Mo. App. 638; In re Yardley’s Estate, 75 Pa. 207; Williams v. Herrick, 21 R. I. 401, 79 Am. St. Rep. 809, 43 Atl. 1036; Eldred v. Eldred, 97 Va. 606, 34 S. E. 477. To quote from the supreme court of Wyoming: “The general reputation in the community where the parties reside as to whether or not they are husband and wife is competent evidence as tending to prove marriage. It is in the nature of a verdict of the community upon their relations, arrived at from observing their conduct, their manner of life, their deportment toward each other and the community, and their declarations. It is the general impression or belief created in the minds of the people from these things which constitutes the general reputation, which may be shown in evidence as tending to raise the presumption of marriage or the contrary. To be of any value as evidence such reputation must be general and uniform”: Weidenhoft v. Primm (Wyo.), 94 Pac. 453, citing White v. White, 82 Cal. 427, 23 Pac. 276, 7 L. R. A. 799; Jackson v. Jackson, 82 Md. 17, 33 Atl. 317, 34 L. R. A. 773; Arnold v. Chesebrough, 46 Fed. 700.
“Reputation consists of the belief and speech of the people who have an opportunity to know the parties and have heard of and observed their manner of living”: Cargyle v. Wood, 63 Mo. 501. “By general reputation and repute is meant the understanding among the neighbors and acquaintances with whom the parties associate in their daily life, that they are living together as husband and wife and not in meretricious intercourse. In its application to the fact of marriage it is more than mere hearsay. It involves and is made up of social conduct and recognition, giving character to an admitted and unconcealed cohabitation”: Klipfel v. Klipfel, 41 Colo. 40, 124 Am. St. Rep. 96, 92 Pac. 26; Badger v. Badger, 88 N. Y. 546, 42 Am. Rep. 263.
Presumption from Cohabitation and Beputation.—Where a man and woman live together as husband and wife, and so acknowledge themselves to, and are so reputed among, relatives and acquaintances, these facts are sufficient prima facie to establish a marriage, although there is an entire failure of evidence of a formal ceremony. In other words, a presumption of marriage arises from cohabitation as husband and wife and reputation of marriage in the community: Bynon v. State, 117 Ala. 80, 67 Am. St. Rep. 163, 23 South. 640; Moore v. Heineke, 119 Ala. 627, 24 South. 374; Tarrt v. Negus, 127 Ala. 301, 28 South. 713; Klipfel v. Klipfel, 41 Colo. 40, 124 Am. St. Rep. 96, 92 Pac. 26; State v. Wilson, 5 Penne. (Del.) 77, 62 Atl. 227; Myatt v. Myatt, 44
Nevertheless cohabitation and reputation do not constitute marriage, but simply are evidence thereof. The presumption of marriage which arises from them, however strongly favored by the law, is rebuttable: Myatt v. Myatt, 44 Ill. 473; Marks v. Marks, 108 Ill. App. 371; Boone v. Purnell, 28 Md. 607, 92 Am. Dec. 713; Adair v. Mette) 156 Mo. 496, 57 S. W. 551; State v. St. John, 94 Mo. App. 158, 68 S. W. 374; Olsen v. Peterson, 33 Neb. 358, 50 N. W. 155; Peck v. Peck, 12 B. I. 485, 34 Am. Bep. 702; Allen v. Hall, 2 Nott. & McC. 114, 10 Am. Dec. 578; Eldred v. Eldred, 97 Va. 606, 34 S. E. 477.
Separation of Parties.—The presumption of marriage which arises from cohabitation and reputation is rebutted where the parties separate and one of them, while the other is known to be alive, marries or cohabits with a third person: Weatherford v. Weatherford, 20 Ala. 548, 56 Am. Dec. 206; Moore v. Heineke, 119 Ga. 627, 24 South. 374; In re Beverson’s Estate, 47 Cal. 621; In re Maher’s Estate, 183 Ill. 61, 56 N. E. 124; Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 144; Jones v. Jones, 48 Md. 391, 30 Am. Rep. 466. But where a common-law marriage is almost conclusively established by the evidence, the fact that subsequently both parties again marry without having obtained a divorce, the marriage of the woman being after the man had been absent and unheard of for over seven years, is not conclusive against the common-law marriage: Smith v. Fuller (Iowa;, 108 N. W. 765.
Subsequent Ceremonial Marriage.—A subsequent ceremonial marriage between the parties is not inconsistent with a prior common-law marriage between them, and does not necessarily overcome the presumption thereof from matrimonial cohabitation, repute, and the declarations and acts of the parties: Simmons v. Simmons (Tex. Civ. App.), 39 S. W. 639; Shank v. Wilson, 33 Wash. 612, 74 Pac. 812; Adger v. Ackerman, 115 Fed. 124, 52 C. C. A. 568. But the fact that a ceremonial marriage is performed, after many years of cohabitation, on the advice of a friend who deems it necessary, is evidence that a general and uniform reputation of marriage is lacking: Williams v. Herrick, 21 R. I. 401, 79 Am. St. Rep. 809, 43 Atl. 1036.
In some states, however, the statutes have expressly taken away the right to contract a common-law marriage, and have made a substantial compliance with the statutory formalities essential to a valid marriage : See the authorities cited in the second succeeding paragraph.
Jurisdictions Where Common-law Marriages Recognized.—The validity of common-law marriages has been recognized in the jurisdictions indicated by the following citations: Tarrt v. Negus, 127 Ala. 301, 28 South. 713; Darling v. Dent, 82 Ark. 76, 100 S. W. 747; Klipfel v. Klipfel, 41 Colo. 40, 124 Am. St. Rep. 96, 92 Pac. 26; Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173; Drawdy v. Hesters, .130 Ga. 161, 60 S. E. 451, 15 L. R. A., N. S., 193; Hiler v. People, 156 Ill. 511, 47 Am. St. Rep. 221, 41 N. E. 181; Franklin v. Lee, 30 Ind. App. 31, 62 N. E. 78; Davis v. Pryor, 3 Ind. Ter. 396, 58 S. W. 660; Porter v. United States (Ind. Ter.), 104 S. W. 105; Smith v. Fuller (Iowa), 108 N. W. 765; People v. Mendenhall, 119 Mich. 404, 75 Am. St. Rep. 408, 78 N. W. 325; Supreme Tent etc. v. McAllister, 132 Mich. 69,102 Am. St. Rep. 382, 92 N. W. 770; Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 61 Am. St. Rep. 419, 69 N. W. 31, 34 L. R. A. 384; Hargroves v. Thompson, 31 Miss. 211; Floyd v. Calvert, 53 Miss. 37; In re Imboden’s Estate, 128 Mo. App. 555, 107 S. W. 400; Eaton v. Eaton, 66 Neb. 676, 92 N. W. 995, 60 L. R. A. 605; State v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 62 Am. St. Rep. 800, 46 Pac. 802, 34 L. R. A. 784; Town of Londonderry v. Town of Chester, 2 N. H. 268, 9 Am. Dec. 61; Voorhees v. Voorhees’ Exrs., 46 N. J. Eq. 411, 19 Am. St. Rep. 404, 19 Atl. 172; Clark v. Clark, 52 N. J. Eq. 650, 30 Atl. 81; Mullaney v. Mullaney, 65 N. J. Eq; 384, 54 Atl. 1086; Atlantic City R. R. Co. v. Goodin, 62 N. J. L. 394, 72 Am. St. Rep. 652, 42 Atl. 333, 45 L. R. A. 671; Tummalty v. Tummalty, 3 Bradf. Sur. 369; Hicks v. Cochran, 4 Edw. Ch. 107; Geiger v. Ryan, 108 N. Y. Supp. 13, 123 App. Div. 722; In re Wells’ Estate,
Jurisdictions Where not Recognized.—The validity of common-law marriages has been denied in the jurisdictions indicated by the following citations: Norman v. Norman, 121 Cal. 620, 66 Am. St. Rep. 74, 54 Pac. 143, 42 L. R. A. 343; Estill v. Rogers, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 62; Robinson v. Redd’s Admr. (Ky.), 43 S. W. 435; Johnson’s Heirs v. Raphael, 117 La. 967, 42 South. 470; Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361; Noreross v. Noreross, 155 Mass. 425, 29 N. E. 506; Dunbarton v. Franklin, 19 N. H. 257; Holmes v. Holmes, 1 Saw. 99, Fed. Cas. No. 6638; Smith v. North Memphis Sav. Bank, 115 Tenn. 12, 89 S. W. 392; Offield v. Davis, 100 Va. 250, 40 S. E. 910; Morrill v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 Atl. 829, 33 L. R. A. 411; In re McLaughlin’s Estate, 4 Wash. 570, 30 Pac. 651, 16 L. R. A. 699; Nelson v. Carlson, 48 Wash. 651, 94 Pac. 477; Beverlin v. Beverlin, 29 W. Va. 732, 3 S. E. 36.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.